DÆDALUS

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Preface to the Issue "Tradition and Change"

THIS ISSUE of *Dædalus* follows the convention established in earlier summers—it treats a number of subjects which, although not always related, in every instance derive from present and projected activities of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The title for the issue, "Tradition and Change," was selected after the articles were submitted; while it only partially expresses the major intent of certain of the papers, its relevance to each of them recommended its use.

A few words may be in order about how these essays relate to publication programs of the Academy. Martin Meyerson's analysis of the effects on American higher education of the vastly increased size of student populations was originally prepared for the Houghton Mifflin Dædalus Library volume, *The Contemporary University: U.S.A.*, scheduled for publication later this summer. This volume, an expanded and revised version of the fall 1964 *Dædalus* issue on American universities, contains several new essays on the American student. It is hoped that they may serve as the basis for a later *Dædalus* issue which will deal with the subject comparatively, exploring the character of student populations in the United States and other countries, taking into account the social and political roles of the expanding university student class.

Mary Catherine Bateson's study of H. N. Bialik's poetry is intended to give notice of two *Dædalus* projects, one near completion, the other still in the planning stage. The Editors, aware that a large and important literature, written in other than the commonly used Western languages, is known only through the "accident" of good translation, decided that many purposes would be served by directing attention to these works. The fall 1966 issue of *Dædalus* will discuss novels in this category; a later issue, it is hoped, may treat the poetry of these less well-known languages.

For a number of years, the Editors of *Dædalus* have considered

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devoting an issue to the general theme of development and modernization. Initially, we thought of this principally as a volume which would dwell on foreign aid policy, with particular attention to what the United States was (or should be) doing. More recently, we have favored empirical studies of the modernization process. Samuel P. Huntington's article provides a model of the kind of study which ought to be undertaken for other societies as well. The theme of modernization is certain to figure prominently in the issue on Latin America which the Editors are currently planning.

In the last decade the American Academy has given considerable attention to the problems of population and food. In 1963, the Academy published a collection of essays on *Human Fertility and Population Problems;* and, in the summer of 1964, articles on the subject appeared in *Dædalus*. Plans for an issue entitled "The Revolution Against Want" have existed for some time, and Nevin Scrimshaw's article suggests how imperative it is that we treat the problem in a full issue of *Dædalus*. In recent months, conversations have started looking toward the publication of an issue whose simple and stark title at the moment is "Hunger."

The articles by John Dyckman, Paul Mus, Godfried van den Bergh, and Stanley Hoffmann are all related to the seminar on Conditions of World Order, described in the spring 1966 *Dædalus* issue. These articles, while complementing those published earlier, open the way for other issues now being considered. In the winter of 1961, *Dædalus* published an issue entitled "The Future Metropolis." John Dyckman's article indicates that it may be appropriate for us to return to that subject again in the next two or three years. Paul Mus, in writing on Buddhism, revives an interest in doing an issue on Ancient Civilizations; talks on that subject have proceeded, perhaps too slowly, over the last eighteen months. Finally, with the contributions of Messrs. van den Bergh and Hoffmann, we are reminded that many have urged, at one time or another, that *Dædalus* deal with the problem of Contemporary Nationalisms.

S.R.G.

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MARTIN MEYERSON

The Ethos of the American College Student: Beyond the Protests

THE STUDENT protests at the University of California at Berkeley starting in September 1964 attracted the scrutiny of the press, magazines, and television and their audiences as well as the academics and intellectuals of the country. The Berkeley events signified to many the end of the "silent generation," the years since World War II during which college and university students presumably viewed the American scene with little, if any, critical judgment. The students of that period were thought to be silent because of the timidity created in the time of the late Senator McCarthy or because of placid acceptance of college life as a set of rites preparatory to becoming junior organization men or suburban parents. Others attributed the silence of students to their coddled and passive existence in miniature collegiate welfare states under the umbrella of the larger welfare state.

The news media, particularly sensitive to student "insurrection" because of their extended coverage of the Berkeley experience, found examples, during the following months, of student unrest at Yale, Maryland, Ohio State, Colorado, Columbia, and elsewhere. In addition, there were the campus wrangles over United States policy in Viet-Nam. Many observers linked student protests to student participation in the civil rights movement, although they split on their appraisal of the linkage: some hailed the new student militant morality, implying a modern children's crusade was underway; others deplored the lack of respect for law and order, implying a dangerous political revolution was festering.

I doubt that we can appropriately label this decade's student as vocal, and last's as silent. Instead, I prefer to try to understand today's college student as a member of an egalitarian near-majority

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rather than of an élite minority. The major change in American higher education in the last half century is that college has shifted from being the prerogative of a few (only one in seven young people of college age went on to college as late as 1939) to being the life pattern of almost half of the young people and, in some urban areas, more than half.

With five and a half million students, a third of whom are women, American colleges and universities have a larger population than Denmark, Ireland, or any one of a majority of the independent nations in the United Nations. At such a scale, higher education increasingly contains the divergences and convergences of the larger American culture. With these vast numbers, paradoxically, even a small minority may be large. If 98 per cent of the students are "silent," and the other 2 per cent dissenting, the latter category would have over 100,000 students, a large figure for any kind of protest. (No single national group devoted to student protest is that large; for example, the Students for a Democratic Society claimed a national membership of over 3,000 in 1965.) However, even a relatively small number can, if concentrated at a few influential institutions, have a potent national impact.

The Berkeley protests started over political activity and speech, but then stimulated complaints about education. It is surprising to me that there is not more student debate about education; the strains within the present educational situation suggest many sources for student dissatisfaction. I do not endorse flamboyant acts like campus sit-ins any more than I endorse the Watts solution to racial tension. But I do welcome student concern about their education and hope for continued questioning and even some answers to problems of developing further the intellectual community, the preparation for work, and the other functions which the American campus serves.

In the shift of higher learning to a mass base of students, many strains are put on students since they are all expected to go to college if they are to share the rewards of the middle class. I shall comment on some specific complaints which students make about their life at colleges and universities. These complaints followed the free speech protests in Berkeley. They are not all new, but they have quickly become part of the current rhetoric of students seeking university reform in several parts of the country. The issue of free speech itself and the latitude for it at Berkeley have been widely discussed elsewhere, and my comments will largely be on other matters.

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Neither the issue nor the discussion has ended. The questions surrounding student speech and political activity must be examined in terms of the purposes of higher education for the American student, and the redefinitions of these purposes which are and should be taking place.

Education of the Majority

A century ago there were about 50,000 students enrolled for degrees in American institutions of higher education. The Morrill Act, supporting land-grant colleges, had been passed in 1862; the egalitarian principle of the frontier and its emphasis on advanced practical education as the opening to opportunity had begun to be felt. As the American dream was sketched in, the number of students enrolled for degrees rose five times to almost a quarter of a million by the turn of the century. By the end of World War I that figure had more than doubled; it doubled again by 1929 and more than doubled once more by the end of World War II and again since then.

Never in the history of the world have so many young people continued their education beyond the secondary school as in America today. Indeed, there are as many Negro students in colleges and universities in the United States as there are students in higher education in England. However, the very poor do not share America's college bounty any more than they partake of affluence in other areas.

America's colleges and universities are not limited to a social, an economic, or intellectual élite; they are educating nearly everyone. Soon most American families will have one or more members who have had some college or university education. Today, the supermarket manager finds a job more easily if he has had some college education; at an earlier time, even doctors and lawyers could be legitimized through apprenticeship. This transformation of the college man and woman from the rarity to the commonplace is having and will have extraordinary effects upon the society—its cultural character, its labor supply and use of resources, its living and recreational preferences, its political opinions, and its levels of aspirations.

College students attend about 2100 institutions, about a third of which are under the control of state or local government (about a dozen are controlled by the federal government) and which have

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two-thirds of the students. There are over 100 institutions attended primarily by Negroes. In 1963, there were 57 technological schools with 133,000 students, about as many collegiate schools of art, over 200 theological schools, and 79 other separately organized professional schools. There are also about 600 junior colleges, mostly publicly controlled. (In 1917–18 there were only 46 junior colleges with an enrollment of 4,500, of which 3,600 were in privately controlled schools.)

C. R. Pace of the University of California at Los Angeles estimates that about 5 per cent of students are in prestige liberal-arts colleges such as Swarthmore, Smith, and Reed, 10 per cent in other liberal-arts colleges, 5 per cent in Roman Catholic and other strongly denominational schools, 45 to 50 per cent in universities and state colleges, 20 per cent in junior colleges, and 10 to 15 per cent in other kinds of schools, such as technological institutes. There is no formal system of American higher education as there is no national system for our elementary- and secondary-school education. With such an apparently wide range of provisions, there should be something for everyone; each student should be able to find the educational environment most suitable for developing his capabilities.

To some extent, students do sort themselves according to their images of themselves and of the colleges to which they apply; to some extent, particularly at the prestigeful private schools, the institutions match student characteristics to institutional ones. But, to a large extent, selections are made by accidents of propinquity, pocketbook, and propaganda. Students rarely have clear notions about their alternatives.

One reason that students do not have a clear sense of alternatives is that our colleges and universities, although diverse, tend to round the edges of difference and become more like each other, as David Riesman has astutely pointed out. Student populations are becoming more heterogeneous, especially at campuses which are growing, and at the same time, when campuses are compared, the mix at each campus increasingly resembles that at many other campuses. There is a greater range of income and ethnic or religious background on many campuses than ever before. Also, there is a great range of student subcultures, as Burton Clark and Martin Trow point out. They distinguish among the collegiate students (who seek fun and games, are loyal to the symbols of the school but not its intellectual purposes), the academic (who seek traditional intellectual or scholastic goals at the school and revere the school for those

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qualities), the consumer-vocational (who seek a degree and thus a job opening through higher education), and the nonconformist (who seek a variety of ideas, stimulation, and creativity at school and who chafe at institutional authority). Members of each of these subcultures may be found on almost all campuses, although the combinations vary.

Distinctions between private and public institutions are being blurred. Public institutions charge high fees to out-of-state students to satisfy their locally oriented legislators and citizens, and then go out of their way to attract out-of-state students to satisfy their more cosmopolitan faculties. Private institutions may give such extensive scholarship aid that an able but poor student, particularly from a distant state, can better afford to attend an Ivy League school where his living expenses as well as tuition are underwritten than to attend a public university which is "free" but where he would have to pay various fees and living expenses. Private institutions get a great deal of their support from public money, mainly from the federal government, while many public institutions receive considerable sums from outside gifts or foundations.

Colleges and universities tend to stretch themselves out of their early character: the local campuses seek students and teachers from elsewhere in the nation and the world; Catholic schools hire more lay teachers; and all compete for distinguished professors and try to make the campus attractive to these stars. Like other American enterprises, many smaller schools are trying to grow larger. The smaller schools add graduate programs if they do not already have them, claiming that they must do so to hold their faculties. To maintain a graduate program, undergraduate programs often must be expanded so that graduate students can be supported through teaching undergraduates. To keep up with the academic Joneses, colleges and universities add more and more subdivisions to older fields and encourage greater and greater specialization. It is a rare college or university which, although it may disclaim vocationalism, does not provide vocational programs. A vocationally oriented institution may seek a patina of intellectualism in the arts; one that attracts serious lower-middle-class students may want to leaven the student body with frivolous members; an institution historically aloof from local affairs may try to be of community service. Even the most sober of colleges and universities try to suggest a collegiate image (generally compounded with other images, too) in which student life is portrayed as glamorous, relaxed, and frolicsome.

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Boards of trustees, administrators, and faculties at many institutions note and often emulate the developments at the pace-setting colleges and universities. Although there may be no formal system to American higher education, there is a tendency toward the mean and for extreme characteristics to atrophy, resulting in more institutional similarities. Nevertheless, a crude pattern of differentiation persists. For example, twelve universities, or about one-twentieth of the number granting at least one doctorate in the ten-year period of 1953–1963, awarded 40 per cent of the total earned doctorates. About half of the remaining universities with doctorate programs graduated an average of fewer than ten per year. The same twelve universities (half of them public, half private) which award the main share of doctorates receive more than a quarter of federal monies going to colleges and universities. Another 5 per cent—about one hundred schools—get almost all the rest of federal research monies.

Endowments are also distributed unevenly. In 1960, all institutions had an endowment fund of $1,645 per student, $517 per student in publicly controlled institutions and an average of only $3,145 in privately controlled ones. This average endowment for private schools would yield a return of about $150 per student per year, suggesting that it is only in a handful of private schools with huge endowments (and annual gifts, too) that students are heavily subsidized through private funds.

Four-fifths of the institutions of higher education have under 2,500 students. These schools have only a minority of students, however.

Thus, in the seeming diversity of America's colleges and universities, perhaps a tenth of them—some very large and some very small—dominate higher education quantitatively and qualitatively. A much smaller number set the main tone for the changes which take place.

The Strain of Being Part of Neither the Elect Nor the Electorate

The status which came from college attendance has been diluted. The college sudent is no longer one of the happy few—he is one of the frustrated many. As higher education has become more diffused in the population, it has become, paradoxically, both more and less important to the general public and to the specific people

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experiencing it. The disillusionment which comes from dilution is not the simple disaffection with the familiar. It is the more complex dissatisfaction which arises out of dependence upon a relationship with little or no control over that relationship. Today's student is neither one of the elect nor part of the electorate. He no longer automatically belongs to a high-status group by going to college; too many people are going to college. Today's student cannot afford not to go to college if he has middle-class career aspirations; college is as necessary to him as secondary schooling and has not much more standing than secondary schooling had a generation ago.

Today's student is not given the privileges attached to the elect, the small group anticipated as leaders, nor have new privileges befitting membership in an electorate evolved. Most colleges are as authoritarian as high schools, and the college student is far less able to influence his relationships with teachers and administrators than he is able to retort and otherwise respond to his parents. Once the youth has made a choice of an institution of higher learning and of a field within it, he has few meaningful educational choices left. Students are on the fringe of the adult world, but not in it. They are in limbo. Many are grateful for the deferral because they can test themselves in different ways and so find their identity. Others are resentful of the deferral; they sense more keenly than they did in high school that students do not have inalienable rights or, indeed, many rights at all.

There is little in the formal life of the institution that the student can control, question publicly, or about which he can seek redress. Whether the teacher shocks him, or ignores him, or bores him, or awakens him to new vistas, or patronizes him, or argues with him, or is friendly to him, the student is dependent on the teacher's mood and interest. He is also bound by the actions of the administrators. Much of the student's extracurricular life—for example, the conduct of student residences or student activities—is controlled by the institutional administration.

If many share the station of having been to college, then mere attendance becomes less significant than marginal distinctions in the college experience. Thus, parents, the general public, and students make distinctions between private institutions and public ones, between liberal arts and professional or vocational ones, between smaller and larger ones, between those with presumed high admission standards and unselective ones, and among those with a professed character—for example, between the church-dominated

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school and the metropolitan school, the "grind" college or the "surfer" college, the traditional or the experimental program. Students perceive a pecking order, although they may not know its subtleties. They send half of all applications to fewer than 10 per cent of the colleges and universities.

I assume that the marginal distinctions made both by the public and by entering college students are oversimplified, and that entering college students do not match themselves correctly to their oversimplified conceptions of college. The national average of those who enter college and fail to finish is estimated at 40 per cent. The college dropout is only partly a result of faulty selection and self-selection, but misperceptions of marginal characteristics do play their part.

If education is the door to job opportunities, it is hardly surprising that as higher education becomes more a majority than a minority phenomenon, it becomes more job-oriented. When a policeman is required to have at least two years' college education, as he is in some communities, all those who aspire to jobs at this level or beyond feel more than ever compelled to go on for higher education. Most undergraduate students are in education, engineering, business, and other job-oriented programs. Even where the student is following a liberal-arts program, his course choices are greatly influenced by the linkage between success in college grades and entrance into graduate school or the job market. The student is thus inclined to be purposeful, to do well in conventionally prescribed terms, and to avoid risks. When the sons of the rich dominated some of our colleges, they could afford to be academic dilettantes, to regard teachers as little better than hired hands, and to be intellectually playful, for they knew they would have no job problems after graduation. When "who one was" was the critical question for success, a Harvard or Oxford accent or a Göttingen dueling scar was the most important kind of "learning." If going to Yale would open access to the top of the social and economic ladder, a gentleman's "C" was in order. When intellectual knowledge was expected, it was of a precious nature—during two millennia, the officials of China were chosen on the basis of their knowledge of Confucian literature, just as the British civil servants were chosen on their knowledge of Homer. As Veblen liked to point out, no one could accuse such knowledge of having direct utility or of being widely held.

Today, if there is kudos for the accident of birth, it is more for

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talent in the genes than for the silver spoon. Also, even the rich tend to go on to graduate school and cannot afford a poor grade in a difficult subject or a record that gives the impression of academic flightiness. Thus, there is much more purposefulness than before in both the job-oriented undergraduate programs and the liberal-arts programs. The job focus in college, necessary as it may be, dims the light of intellectual pleasure which trial-and-error exploration can provide.

When colleges and universities were training an élite, it was easier in many ways for faculty and administrators to share their world with students. At Oxford and Cambridge, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, the rewards of teaching included the faculty's sense—even if not articulated—that their students were the sons of the famous or were themselves apt to be famous in the future. It is more attractive for teachers to spend time with the well-prepared and potentially powerful than with the mediocre student of humble origins. The professor's frequent preference is to devote intellectual and leisure energies to colleagues or in some cases to men of affairs; he can be motivated to attention toward his students by a sense of duty, but this sense functions best when duty is reinforced by pleasure. And the pleasure the teacher gets seems to increase with the social as well as the intellectual standing of his pupils.

Thus, it may be expected that, unless compensatory steps are taken, the increased democratization of the student body will elicit ideological enthusiasm from the faculty but not closer faculty-student ties.

The paradoxes, then, are many in the shift of higher education from a minority to a majority phenomenon. At the same time that college is more important to youth in the sense of being required as an opening to a career, it is less important in the sense that going to college by itself does not automatically convey high status. At the same time that knowledge about the world is vastly increasing, many students continue to view college as a purposeful path to a vocation rather than as an intellectually enrichening experience. At the same time that students need greater intellectual guidance, and perhaps moral guidance as well, from their teachers because the students are poorly prepared by previous family and school background, teachers are less attracted to spend time with the students beyond the classroom and the office hour. At the same time that there seemingly are many diverse kinds of institutions among which the applicant may choose the one that fits him best, he is

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constrained from a rich choice by individual circumstances (previous school record, cost, and imperfect knowledge of possible options) and by the tendency of colleges and universities to grow more like one another.

These paradoxes are strains superimposed upon the ordinary strains of being young, being away from home for perhaps the first prolonged time, and being from lower- or middle-class origins. (Upper-class youth often has faced some of the unsettling effects of being away from home earlier.) While the student is interacting with adults who are less accountable to him than his parents are, his parents, seeing the college experience as pivotal to later success or failure for their child, are often trying their hardest to influence his life.

The student may share the parents' view of the college as a ladder to social and economic success, but he also senses that the college years are his chance to be nonconformist. The student is peripheral to adult society, confused about sex and his identity, and also bewildered by the many course and activity and friendship offerings which are available. At a time when other students are jostling him in behavior, intellect, daring, and values, and are competing with him for prominence on campus and distinction in grades, some professors regard it as a duty to shock students into questioning their beliefs and prejudices. Even those who do not aim to reveal adult hypocrisies shake the students' accepted way of looking at the world. In all this turmoil, the student finds no unifying institutional symbolic rallying points, no clear adult models; and yet he is enjoined to have the best time of his life.

The student activism which erupted in 1964–65 at Berkeley and other schools must partially be attributed to the accumulation of student strains, particularly those of being part neither of the elect nor of the electorate, as well as to specific issues such as those of free speech. I do not wish to guess whether students will resort again to this kind of activism. I assume that only a small proportion of students on any campus are both seriously enough concerned about the conduct of educational practices, or the content of their courses, or the restrictions or requirements placed on student activities, and casual enough about their career lines to tussle with authority. But the fact remains that whether or not students actively protest the kinds of patterns they are supposed to fit into on a campus, many of them are dissatisfied with these patterns. And they often have reason to be.

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What then are the voiced dissatisfactions of students? Following the protests at Berkeley in 1964, some of the most articulate students focused on problems which merit fresh attention by educators, whether or not students persist in pressing for recognition of a student interest, rather than an institutional interest. The several problems which follow were prominent among student dissatisfactions at Berkeley; though not central to the main intellectual and political dissatisfactions of the students, they were closely linked with them.

In Loco Parentis

Undergraduates may jest about the college and university stance of *in loco parentis* as meaning "crazy like parents," but many of them are offended by what they see as a facade of domestic sentimentality hiding bureaucratic regulations. Residential quarters are called "houses," and some have "house mothers"; deans of men and women try to act like older brothers and sisters. But these devices do not alter the fact that administrative personnel enforce a great many rules and regulations in a manner families do not. As Edgar Friedenberg points out in *Coming of Age in America,* parents respond to children as persons, and institutions do not. Even though parents may believe their families are governed by rules, they are in fact governed by a process of mutual accommodation. Institutions can rarely respond sensitively to individual needs but can only apply general regulations as impartially as possible.

What many students quarrel with most are the rules that infringe, they think, upon their personal dignity. These may include rules relating to appearance; to personal behavior, including the use of liquor and drugs; to living arrangements and the access of persons of the opposite sex to them; to entertainment, including what society might consider obscene; and to political expression, including the right to listen to and advocate radical views. Certain students feel that regulations on these matters are used only to control them, and are never used for their protection; some restrictions they regard as petty and inconsequential, and therefore completely unnecessary; others they regard as infringements on their liberties, and therefore intolerable.

Some students are accustomed to much more freedom of action at home than they find at college. Others may wish to escape the supervision of the parental home. For them, the sleep-in school has

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a special magic. Then the student discovers that, if he lives in collegiate residence halls, the supervision he was trying to escape has followed him. Furthermore, the supervisors, using such titles as "student personnel officers," have national associations through which practices for student activities adopted at one school are quickly transmitted to others. David Boroff pointed out that at least in the 1920's at American colleges there was not such a professional fostering of the *in loco parentis* role. He said that the students' "infantilism wasn't sponsored by the administration, which these days lays down the ground rules and acts as umpire for the nursery games."

Not all students object to the restraints. Some students, particularly girls, may be grateful, for example, for parietal limits set by an outside authority on dormitory hours and visitors which relieve them from the burden of saying no. Many parents, of course, request institutional surveillance. They may demand that college regulate student life, especially for girls.

Colleges and universities would do well to offer a variety of choices to students. For minors, it might ask the parents to decide whether the school should play the *in loco parentis* role or not. Students over twenty-one might make the choice themselves. But if such a policy were followed, the institution would be well advised to caution parents that it cannot shield a young person from knowing that some students will flaunt prerogatives he does not enjoy. The university can assume responsibility for enforcing a curfew for those whose parents want them to be in their quarters at a certain time; it cannot guarantee that the other students will not carouse all night, setting a "bad example."

Living Arrangements

At Berkeley, less than 12 per cent of the seniors of either sex live in residence halls, although a majority of the freshmen live there. Of all students, graduates and undergraduates, under 15 per cent live in university residence halls (including International House) and about 15 per cent live in fraternities, sororities, approved and cooperative housing. Only 8 per cent live at home with parents (a decrease from almost 20 per cent ten years earlier) and 5 per cent live in university apartments for married students. The remaining 60 per cent live in private apartments and houses, or in rooming houses.

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Most students choose not to live in university-run facilities, and the university chooses not to supply housing for most students. The goal has been to house one-quarter of the single students.

The students complained that the university was interested in equalization and standardization of living quarters, and not in meeting their diverse needs. Residence halls, they said, are built primarily for ease of maintenance and administration. If they are designed at all for the student, they are designed for one kind of student—the collegiate student who likes to socialize, who does not want to be bothered about food even to the extent of choosing a restaurant to go to, who is willing to share a room, and who is not individualistic in study habits, creative abilities, or anything else. What they would like is differentiated housing, some very minimal, for those who just want shelter and want a "home" elsewhere in the university at the library, the coffee shop, the laboratory. Others want single rooms, where they can study quietly, and intellectual and cultural facilities such as a good library and a music room on the premises, and a chance to meet with faculty members. Others seek low-cost housing for married students, claiming that these are the students most at the mercy of a harsh private-housing market, and that the university has a duty to protect its most vulnerable members. Others want facilities in which they can express themselves, by such means as painting the walls or cooking.

The students had complaints about food, lack of a quiet setting for study, curfew regulations, and so on. Many were upset about the lack of flexibility on the part of a university which has 27,000 students but offers a standardized room, a standardized price, a standardized tie-in of room with food, a standardized set of ancillary lounges and facilities. A student who is ready to sacrifice other space in order to maximize private study space does not have the choice available to him; nor does he have other options except those incidental to the fact that some buildings are newer than others.

Administrators and some faculty point out that the housing accommodations were provided in the traditional manner under the strain of rapid growth, that students are not compelled to live in university-run facilities (and Berkeley has a great diversity of other close-by living arrangements), and that some students are being satisfactorily housed. However, both faculty and administrators are becoming more sensitive to the diverse housing requirements of students.

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Down with Administration

At Berkeley, one of the student dramatizations of complaints was the IBM card on which was printed, "Do not fold, spindle or mutilate," and which was worn as a badge. Students, resenting lines and forms, resenting impersonality and the frictions of a large student body, resenting rules and restrictions, resented the feeling that they were as manipulated and undistinguishable as an IBM card. Objecting to what they regarded as the machine character of universities, the students, like the Luddites in England in the early nineteenth century, wished to smash the machine. Their message, like the message of the Luddites, had an easy contagion. Also, as in the case of the Luddites, it readily resulted in countermeasures by the larger society which wished to protect its institutions.

Part of smashing the machine, to the students, meant casting out those in authority. (Another favorite badge was the button, "Abolish the Regents.") Anti-administration feeling by students is no doubt widespread at many universities and is not confined to those who vocally protest; this feeling is reinforced by faculty criticism which regards administration at best as a necessary evil, at worst as an unnecessary evil. Among epithets I have heard about academic administrators are that they are inept, inefficient paper-pushers or, in other words, weak and ineffectual; they are also accused of being autocratic, compromising hypocrites. For some, it may be the very nature of an administrator, acting as a distant but substitute parent, that has become unacceptable. To those who feel the generational conflict most ("you can't trust anyone over thirty") the words of Bob Dylan, the folk-singer, have become a theme: "Come mothers and fathers throughout the land, And don't criticize what you don't understand. Your old road is rapidly aging. Please get out of the new one if you can't lend a hand/for the times they are a-changing!"

The anti-administration bias was given intellectual muscle by what has come to be called the new student left. Maoism has some appeal—its spare and lean economic and political order attracts the daring (and a radical has to be daring, by definition) more than the soft, bourgeois, bureaucratic, old-style Russian communist. But it would be a mistake to see student protests as an instrument of Maoism or other Marxist doctrines, even though the leaders of such radical groups would like nothing better than to inflate their role. Much more important, I think, are the tactical approach and the

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ideological implications of the civil rights movement which probably has more in common with turn-of-the-century anarchism than with Marxist doctrine and organization.

Given the linked membership of the civil rights groups and the student protest groups at Berkeley (many of the student leaders had devoted themselves earlier to civil rights work in the South), it is not surprising that direct action was used as the means to get attention from other students, faculty, university administration, and the government of the state. The civil rights movement had had the problem of drawing attention to its principles and proposals, and it had learned that ideas are not so much kept from public expression as they are drowned by competing ideas in television programs, news stories, books, and magazines. Increasingly each claimant on the public ear seeks to amplify his message. The young people who lead the civil rights movement discovered that actions—particularly disobedient ones—are an excellent means to capture the interest of their elders, although not always a sympathetic interest.

The protesting students are more sophisticated in their condemnations than in their proposals. For example, some of them discount the notion that what is public is bureaucratic and what is private is enterprising (the prevalent anti-administration attitude in America); they perceive the pernicious effects of bureaucracy even in cultural activities and in activities such as the poverty program, which, to them, conceals its failings behind a cant of welfare slogans.

Devoid of a coherent interpretation of the world, protesting students at Berkeley often form a loose coalition on specific issues. They say they reject hierarchy within their own organization and they scorn the hierarchy of other organizations. They like to think that each member is totally committed to the cause. Inside some student groups the democratic ideal of the town meeting is revered, although the behavior is often autocratic. Students sometimes refer to the work of Mary Follett, the administration specialist of a generation ago, who was deeply attached to grass-roots participation in decisions. The students distrust those in power. They feel that those in power are corrupt, and they want to confront the policy-maker with their own force of dedication and militancy.

There is a tendency to overestimate the power of the administration, to see all issues in terms of polar viewpoints, and to regard any supporter of student protest who happens to side with the

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administration on a particular question as a "sell-out." Even faculty and administrators who happen to be less than satisfied with the cumbersomeness of university administration recognize, as the students do not, the efficiencies of a division of labor, the necessity of full-time devotion to specialized tasks, and other Max Weber-type characterizations of the effective bureaucratic organization. They are more eager to improve the workings and style of administration than to destroy it or give it a smaller, less powerful mandate.

Sandbox Government

Student government has never amounted to very much in most American colleges and universities. American higher education in the last century grew out of a graft of the Germanic autocratic scholarly tradition (in which little provision was made for the nonacademic life of students) and the English residential pattern (in which the rules of a comfortable monastery were approximated). Neither pattern was conducive to providing students with more than a feeble voice in the affairs of the university. Nevertheless, most American colleges and universities do have some kind of student government, and, where they do not, the student government may have been voted out of existence by the students, as has been happening at some Eastern private institutions.

But it is also a rare college or university where students do more than hold discussion forums and publish a student newspaper or magazine. They may seem to run economic enterprises such as book stores, but these, if they are large, are in the hands of a paid staff and are subject to intervention by the administration. By and large students have little involvement in student recruitment, curriculum, grading, policies for student-teacher relations including student evaluations of teachers, and campus rules and regulations. A few colleges with clearly defined aims of student participation—Antioch is a prime example—have students take part in almost all decisions.

At Berkeley the sophisticated students have regarded student government as playful pretense—their term is "sandbox government"—for they argue that even though the student government is nominally in charge of assets worth millions of dollars and its officers have the perquisites of junior executives, including

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private offices, university cars, and secretaries, student government is foreclosed from any actions in areas that matter. It can only rubberstamp administration wishes. Other students, particularly preprofessional ones, are not scornful; they simply are not interested in anything outside their own field. The academic students working for high grades begrudge time to student activities. At Berkeley and at many other large universities, it is a rare election in which more than one-quarter of the students vote. It is even tremendously difficult to find candidates to fill posts on time-consuming but interesting assignments such as the judicial committee or the newspaper, let alone to be poll-watchers.

Those who have been attracted to student government at Berkeley are mainly a small group of conventional students who are motivated by personal advancement and a small group of radical students who seek ideological advancement. The latter group is not necessarily devoid of overtones of personal advancement, but they do stand on a platform. Two major areas that this group at Berkeley wants removed from adminstrative control are the budget (for example, they wish to switch funds from support of the band to the student bookstore) and the right of a compulsory student government to take, and make known, stands on off-campus issues such as the war in Viet-Nam.

The most extreme proposal for self-government advocated by students at Berkeley was the establishment of the principle of *co-gobierno*. This principle was first exercised at the University of Cordoba in the Argentine, and literally means co-government, wherein students and faculties jointly run the university. The *co-gobierno* principle dominates Latin American universities where professors are generally part-time, the administration is weak, and students are almost the only full-time, strongly motivated group within the university. There was almost no faculty support at Berkeley for this approach to governing the campus except in the area of student conduct.

In the past, there was less friction over the role of student government. Those students who were attracted to the essentially innocent character of sandbox government voted and held office; those who found it inconsequential, ignored it. However, because of the open dissatisfaction of some students at Berkeley with the role of student government, even the more usual participant in the student government has been prodded to seek a new definition and meaning in student government. At other campuses, too,

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various student groups are asking for a greater voice in educational affairs. Though faculty and students may find common cause on other issues, they are likely to be divided on this one.

Attention from Teachers

In the wake of the Berkeley protest, horror stories were reported about education amid 27,000 fellow students. A senior student, for example, claimed he could not get into graduate school because he could not get letters of recommendation from professors. He had attended only large lecture classes and sections led by teaching assistants. No professor knew him well enough to write a letter of recommendation about him.

Some of the more articulate students complained about teaching-assistant education and pressed for small classes, with the Oxford-Cambridge tutorial system as a goal. They did so in ignorance of the fact that some Oxbridge students are weary of tutors who they claim invade the privacy of their lives under the guise of intellectual intimacy. Many Oxbridge students and teachers are dissatisfied with the educational impact of the tutorial also, wherein hard-pressed tutors are bored and exasperated with individual sessions, and wherein individual tutorials are giving way to group ones anyway.

There is no simple answer to class size. Some teachers are at their best when they are lecturing to a large audience. Other teachers do not lecture, they discourse, and need the intimate response of a small group of students. Some students respond best to the stimulus of the large class and the almost anonymous, delayed response in the written examination and paper; others are stimulated by the seminar discussion.

There is no simple answer, either, to the use and abuse of teaching assistants. The teaching assistant, closest in experience and age to the students, can be more responsive to their needs than the older professor; under ideal circumstances, the teaching assistant should himself be so recently exposed to the newest findings and undertakings in his field that he would reveal the drama of the frontiers of knowledge, rather than the dreary wastes of the backwaters. Many of the new discoveries and techniques are not in the older professor's storehouse of knowledge —they are being newly and rapidly created. The young, alert teaching assistant, under ideal circumstances, may be at least as well

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equipped to convey new ideas and information laterally as the established professor is able to do hierarchially.

In actual situations, teaching assistants are often given more responsibility than they are capable of handling—that is, they are regarded as inexpensive and lowly teachers but suitable enough to make up exams, grade them, direct student work on research papers, as well as to hold discussion meetings. Thus, they are overworked and undersupervised as well as underpaid; to top this, they are frequently inexperienced teachers, unmotivated to do better because they are pressed to follow their own studies.

The more I met with discontented students, the more I realized that they were not so much objecting to instruction by teaching assistants, or to the large size of classes. They were objecting to being neglected. This was true for graduates as well as undergraduates. Some felt that the teachers were devoting their main energies to research, to outside commitments, to committee work, to their families, rather than to the classroom. Others felt neglected intellectually out of class; they did not have an opportunity to discuss the new ideas that were troubling them (which might, incidentally, be old ideas to their professors). Others felt neglected socially—they felt that they never got to know their teachers as persons and were not known as persons to their teachers. Interestingly enough, many of these students object to intercollegiate athletics and yet they were seeking the kinds of ties coaches and athletes so often have with each other.

It became fashionable at Berkeley for students to blame teacher neglect on the pressure on faculty to publish. They urged that "good" teachers be given tenure despite lack of publications, forgetting that a teacher who did not contribute to the development of his field would often have little to say in five or ten years, let alone twenty. They also blurred the designation "good"; for example, students who get high grades frequently choose different "good" teachers than students who get low grades. And the students failed to recognize that the impact a teacher makes may not be directly related to how well and widely liked he may be. There have been great physics professors, for example, who have been ignored by all but a handful of students, but those few students went on to become the great physicists of the next generation.

Many of the proposals to get teachers closer to students on American campuses have a somewhat defensive tone, as though faculty had to be led to do their duty. We might as well recognize

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that faculty have many pulls away from their students, but that they also have many pulls toward them or they would not have become teachers. The problem is how to appeal to these latter kinds of pulls in strengthening faculty-student ties.

For example, professors often do not enjoy going to student living quarters for purely recreational purposes; they may feel ill-at-ease, just as a student feels ill-at-ease going to the office hour of a professor without a specific question. Combining social and intellectual activities can be very fruitful. For example, many professors and students enjoy work breaks at their offices, labs, or libraries. When lounges are set up at work places and refreshments are available, faculty and students talk with each other more casually, regularly, and naturally than they do at formal departmental teas when everyone is on his good behavior.

The daily informal teas at the University of Chicago social science lounge are an excellent model for the relaxed intermingling of faculty, students, and visitors. Faculty-student lounges are splendid supplements to the usual segregated student lounges in the student union or domitory, and the segregated faculty club. Of course, the work-place lounge serves to reinforce departmental ties rather than interdepartmental ones.

Another way to create faculty-student bonds is through experimental educational programs. When faculty members are enthusiastic about an educational experiment, their enthusiasm is contagious, and their students cannot help but share in the process as well as the product of the experiment. While I think that the Hawthorne approach (the Western Electric study which showed that production rose under difficult as well as pleasant experiences, proving that what was important was being part of an experimental group) can be abused, in most colleges and universities it suffers from underuse rather than overuse.

Student Grades and the Grading of Teachers

The students at Berkeley who complained the loudest about the indignities of students being graded were the strongest advocates of schemes in which teachers would be graded by students.

Students objected to such abuses of grading as the inequalities which spring from the different attitudes of various teachers toward grading (some easy, some hard; some with an absolute standard, others marking on a curve; some capricious, others too

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rigid). Students are irked by a system which equates an A in quantum physics with an A in a less complex subject. They resent knowing that at institutions with lower academic standards, students can get high grades with less effort than at an institution with more exalted academic standards. They point out that the students are not uniform, the courses are not uniform, the teachers are not uniform, and even the competitor schools and colleges are not uniform; thus, with all these unique elements of education, there cannot appropriately be a rigid, quantitative, standardized set of measures. The students did not draw the analogy of grades in the education system, as David Riesman had, to money in the marketplace, but they might have done so, for they felt that numerical weights were being placed on qualitative relationships, and often for capricious reasons, and that grades were the leveler, giving a false comparison between immeasurable experiences.

The students concerned believed that these abuses could be corrected only by abolishing grading. They claimed that marks discouraged intellectualism and encouraged grubby mediocrity, that students were coerced into learning what pleased their teachers and not what concerned and interested them. Some even asserted that the establishment funneled new members into the society through the grading system which measured how docilely students absorbed the values of the establishment. Moreover, some students claimed that the necessity of putting their attention to getting good grades was so distasteful that they lost all love of the subject. Here they paraphrased Einstein's autobiographical attitude:

> . . . one had to cram all this stuff into one's mind for the examinations, whether one liked it or not. This coercion had such a deterring effect that, after I had passed the final examination, I found the consideration of any scientific problems distasteful to me for an entire year. . . . It is in fact nothing short of a miracle that the modern methods of instruction have not yet entirely strangled the holy curiosity of inquiry; for this delicate little plant, aside from stimulation, stands mainly in need of freedom. . . .

Student complaints about grading are matched by those of the teachers. However, the faculty more often see grading as a necessary evil and see some compensatory advantages, which the students do not acknowledge. Professors say that students are highly competitive and despite their complaints wish to be gauged. Defenders of grades point out that no matter how they may vary from course to course or instructor to instructor they do

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have a logic. Moreover, grades and the examinations, laboratory work, and papers on which the grades are based are teaching instruments which help students organize material, grasp the central character of a course, and otherwise prod students to do what they might put off doing, even though their intentions are good. Grades serve as both a carrot and a stick in the educational process, and many professors feel both are necessary.

The student clamor for the grading of teachers is a bid for better teaching—the students feel that no one knows better than they who is a good teacher and who is not, and that nobody else much cares. They point to the failures of faculties to weed out poor teachers, to encourage good teaching, and even to check on teaching abilities. The students resent the fact that publication is the prime guide to hiring and retention practices.

The faculty's usual retort to this student complaint is that students are incapable of making competent judgments of teachers. They are deemed incapable because they are immature and laymen in contrast to the teacher's expertise. They are also deemed incapable because of their own highly involved relationship to teachers—students are biased in diverse ways, some wanting to be intellectually spoon-fed, some wanting to be entertained, some wanting political daring, some wanting an easy course. Teachers do not want to cater to student whims or pressures any more than they wish to cater to the whims or pressures of alumni or other groups who feel they have a claim to judge the content of courses or the quality of teaching.

Unfortunately, teachers, like many other professionals, have acquired a number of protective devices which shield them from direct evaluation of part of their professional performance. Judgment of publications and departmental, institutional, or community service is done by a faculty member's peers and by the academic hierarchy, but no one inspects classroom activities. This circumstance is exacerbated by the lack of clear definitions of the values and goals of higher education; without such clarity it is extremely difficult for anyone, including fellow members of the teaching guild, to fashion standards of judgment on teaching quality.

The Years Ahead

The issues churned in the wake of the protests at Berkeley are part of the rhetoric of university reform. Most of these issues

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were already part of the rhetoric of reform on various campuses around the country and were used afterwards at Berkeley to justify, and, even more, to supplement the free-speech protest. I have not focused on the protests themselves, and I shall not try to forecast whether or not there will be further dramatic confrontations of authority at Berkeley or at other universities or colleges. I do caution against any glib labeling of this generation of students as vocal, committed, moral, or rebellious. I agree with Professor Joseph Katz, who commented, after concluding a five-year study of students at the University of California and Stanford University, that "in spite of recent student activism, the primary need is still to wake up students, not to constrain them. They rank highest their own individual careers and future family life. Involvement in international, national or civic affairs and helping other people are ranked astonishingly low."

But the issues I have raised—and others as well—merit scrutiny and action by university faculties and administrators. The rights and responsibilities of students must be worked out afresh in light of the new mass base of students. Among the specific questions to be reviewed are the nature of due process in disciplinary action against students, what types of off-campus behavior might result in academic penalities, the kinds of contractual relations students have with an institution. There is a growing set of legal cases helping to define student rights on campus. Colleges and universities ought not, however, to wait for the courts. The great questions are not so much legal ones as intellectual and moral ones which students, faculty, and administrators should not evade.

There are many ways of coping with the particular issues raised in this paper. Not all student complaints are justified; even justified complaints cannot always be rectified. But the students ought to be essential and welcome partners of a joint endeavor and not a passive and silent part of an educational equation. In government, in industry, and in universities, we have an important tendency to believe that a change in policy requires an all-or-none approach rather than a trial or partial approach.

For example, on grading, students might be permitted to take a few courses outside their major field, without grades, as at Princeton, or new approaches to grading might be tried out with small groups of students. After some experience the new procedure should be kept, discarded, or extended. Why should the grading pattern not be evaluated, if only for the faculty's and adminis-

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tration's enlightenment? (When we made an audit of grades over several years at Berkeley, we were surprised to learn, for example, that one department gave 48 per cent "A's" to freshmen and sophomores while another gave only 8 per cent.)

I have suggested that student-faculty ties might be furthered through various means. Students and teachers could meet informally and as a casual extension of their shared intellectual life at workplace lounges rather than more awkwardly at an arranged tea or other social event. Also, faculty and students could jointly participate in new and relatively small educational ventures, each imbued with the enthusiasm of sharing fresh educational paths. But there are other ways, including tasks for the community, in which the idealism of both the young and the old may be joined to practical advantage.

Students cannot be regarded as identical and be fitted into identical living accommodations any more than they can be fitted into identical intellectual experiences. Different student subcultures have different values they wish to achieve in housing, and, as far as possible, the university ought to accommodate their desires. Some students may tolerate or even appreciate the traditional university role of *in loco parentis;* some parents may insist upon it. Other parents may not demand it, and some students may reject it. I think the time has come for some colleges and universities to relinquish much of their *in loco parentis* role.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of America is its open-endedness and its willingness to adapt to changing circumstances. We have done this in education, particularly in expanding educational opportunities to vast numbers, in a way not even hoped for in other countries in the world.

There is, however, a possibility that, as more and more people go on to education beyond high school, the offerings provided students will not reflect the different interests among them. We cater to majority tastes and choices in most fields, only reluctantly recognizing that minority tastes in films, in cars, in music, in food may represent very large groups. (An American minority may be larger than the population of France.) It is not surprising that we cater largely to majority tastes in higher education as well. Yet, if the number of students in higher education increases as rapidly as we expect, in about fifteen years the present number of students may be only half the total. With such vast numbers of college and university students, minority interests of student sub-

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cultures could fill many campuses. One of the prerequisites for high quality will be the provision of more educational diversity for these minority interests.

No doubt many colleges and universities will grow larger and many new institutions will be founded. As the number of college students rises, we must expect tremendous growth pains. We shall also have an extraordinary opportunity to conserve the most valuable aspects of present American education and to change, renew, and improve the rest.

As new schools are founded, we shall, if we exert our options, be able to develop them with new educational philosophies, or with known ones, newly clarified. We have shown relatively little innovation in recent years either in the ends or in the means of higher education. A few small liberal-arts colleges, such as St. John's or Antioch, continue to be our sports. New schools such as Hampshire College, which prefaced its founding by asserting that it was concerned primarily with new means rather than ends in education, may help revitalize the thinking about how new schools can create a special character.

I do not deplore the recasting which is taking place within each campus: the religious school which is growing more secular, the liberal-arts school which is adding graduate and professional programs, the technological institute which is setting up humanities and social science wings. However, there is a danger that the student will find a sameness about educational institutions, that they may become as bland and uninspired as turnpike restaurants, clean and wholesome though the food may be.

Instead, internal diversification, particularly at large institutions, can provide the student with clear sets of educational choices so that he multiplies rather than reduces his possibilities for self-realization. Not only could the student choose among institutions with different educational patterns and, for that matter, different mixes of student subcultures, but he could have the opportunity for important choices within the institution as well. Thus, at a large university such as Berkeley, an undergraduate should be able to choose, as I have urged, among a St. John's at Berkeley, an Antioch at Berkeley, and many other options.

I predict that many if not most of the new colleges and universities will be in or near big urban centers. The rural bias of American culture during the periods in which the early schools and later the land-grant institutions were founded is gone. America is now

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largely urban in population and focus, and it is the countryside that has become a nice place to visit but not to live in. Urban areas provide the art, the music, the theater, the cultural and recreational excitement which more and more Americans seek and which students and faculty wish to be near.

Urban areas are also the locus, the laboratory, for many of the problems people at universities want to study. I recall the facetious comment of a Yale president that Harvard is so outstanding because it is in a miserable metropolitan area and thus has more delinquency for its sociologists to study, more crime for its lawyers, more disease for its medical students.

If new institutions locate in urban areas, they will not be required to install a full set of residential, eating, and social facilities and services. These can be obtained, at least in part, from the existing provisions in cities and suburbs. I make this point less because of the financial savings that may be involved and more because I believe a larger proportion of students will not want colleges and universities to interfere with their personal lives. Residence halls will not atrophy. They will be attractive to some students, especially if the halls are subsidized. And some schools will probably make new attempts to integrate teaching facilities into residence arrangements. (Extensive programs of this kind are expensive, however. For example, Harvard's undergraduate houses probably have a current replacement value of $35,000 per student.) But if urban universities do not have to depend upon building residential quarters for all their students, then some students will be freed from the restrictions that go along with university-run quarters, and many urban students will be able to attend these schools who could not afford the expense of living away from home in supervised or unsupervised quarters.

If colleges and universities seek the cosmopolitan attributes of a metropolitan location, they will also contribute to the cosmopolitan character of the community in which they locate. The life of the city and of the university will be reciprocally enriched. Some tension between the community and the university is, of course, also inevitable, and this tension is not confined to ideas.

Most of all, as the college population grows, the schools get larger, and many of them, as I suggest, start in or near metropolitan areas, the problem will be to remember that faculty and administrators should be there more for the benefit of the students rather than the other way around. A new partnership hope-

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fully will emerge in which students and teachers will pursue broad intellectual questions as well as specialized academic and professional ones. This new kind of academic community can best be achieved in an atmosphere where diverse opportunities for students flourish. A new academic *ethos* of diversity and yet community will require far more spontaneity in organization than educational institutions commonly have exhibited.

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MARY CATHERINE BATESON

"A Riddle of Two Worlds"
An Interpretation of the Poetry of H. N. Bialik

FROM TIME to time a poet or writer may be credited with having "created" a language or a literary tradition, but in most cases this is a statement about the symbolic inventory of the culture rather than about the language as such. There seem to be writers who take up the materials of their language and culture and use them so that forever after they seem more deeply related to the lives of the people than they ever were before, although they were always used in the nursery, the field, the schoolroom, and the place of prayer. Haim Nahman Bialik, the greatest modern Hebrew poet, was one of a generation of intellectuals who prepared the way for a new use of Hebrew in all these places. Hebrew had to be freed from the suffocation associated with its traditional use in schoolroom and synagogue, and Bialik was able to do this by tracing through Hebrew the paths of the open fields of his childhood and the way back to his own nursery and the unresolved conflicts that lay there. He found a language wonderfully rich, which had been shaped by the Hebrew prophets and by the many poets who called themselves David or Solomon, using great names or going nameless, but had since long been impoverished by feeble indoor use. Bialik found the way to use a symbolism uniquely Judaic to express the nostalgia of every Jew for the days before he confronted his heritage and for some escape from it—the longing for some light and fresh air: "At my restoring the destroyed temple of the LORD—I will spread its canopies and cleave in it my window." To save his own soul he had to form a new understanding of his religion, his culture, and his art.

Bialik was born in 1873 in the village of Radi, Volhynia Province, in Southern Russia. When he was six, the family moved to

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Zhitomir, and a year later his father died, leaving his mother destitute. They went to live with his grandfather, a Talmudic scholar, and from his household Bialik entered the various stages of Jewish education, first the Heder and then the Yeshiva, where he stayed until his early twenties, so that his entire education consisted of the study of Jewish law and tradition. Later, he began to write both poetry and prose and worked with a group of young, nationalistic Jewish intellectuals who were publishing in the city of Odessa. After World War I, Bialik became increasingly involved in political activity and eventually went to Palestine. He gave up writing because he said he felt that the time had come for action and that poetry would be only a distraction. He may have resolved the problems from which his need for poetry had sprung or he may have been discouraged by the adoption in the Zionist settlements of the Sephardic pronunciation of Hebrew in place of the Ashkenazic (Eastern European) pronunciation on which he had based his meter. Bialik died in 1934.

A great portion of Bialik's writing is autobiographical. In attempting to present his poetry, with its many unfamiliar strands of imagery, I have taken his life as a loom, reweaving the diverse threads of his work within the frame of his life, treating his poetry as "case material"—as evidence of his psychological make-up—although an understanding of that make-up, in turn, may be valuable only as it leads to a new appreciation of his work. Bialik made a conscious effort to speak for the Jewish people as a "national" poet and the fact that he wrote in Hebrew tended to enhance the cultural content of his poetry. Hebrew was a second, a ritual language for him, so that the best worn phrases are not homely scraps of conversation but fragments of prayers; thus, Bialik's command of Hebrew does not reflect the everyday conversation of parents and siblings but the discussions of long-dead rabbis in the schools of Asia Minor. Bialik's symbols, too, are secondary: instead of verbalizing what he has seen and touched, he tends to use previously formulated symbols which draw their dynamic from the printed page and are then associated with the real world. In this way, continually conscious that he speaks as a Jew —or as The Jew—he is able to bridge the gap between two spheres of experience.

But Bialik could not be fully representative of Jewish culture. After all, only a few members of most cultures become poets, and that only by some inner distantiation.

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> In the midst of my childhood I was set apart
> And panted all my days for secret places and silence—
> From the body of the world to its light I yearned,
> Something I knew not clamored in me, like wine,
> And I sought out coverts. There I gazed silent
> As if peering out at the eye of the world . . .
>
> "Splendor"

If fantasy represents an area of refuge from the narrowing realities imposed by the society in which one lives, then the very manipulation of fantasy in the arts is in some sense an escape from cultural limitations and an appeal for validation to the most personal and, as it were, the precivilized elements of the psyche. Thus, though a poet must work with the tools and materials which his culture affords, he does so obliquely, aiming for a freedom not completely sanctioned by that culture. The paths of reference by which Bialik frees himself present a striking similarity to those which Sigmund Freud described in the precivilized elements of the psyche, and part of this similarity rests on the fact that Freud was himself a Jew, tracing his theories through the same mythology and the same history that Bialik inhabited. Poetry, then, was the only way Bialik could survive the culture to which he was so closely tied; but he escaped only in order to come back, reshaping his own understanding of Jewish traditions and eventually deeply influencing their interpretation by all Jews who adopted Hebrew as a spoken language.

Bialik's life may be seen as a complex variation of a familiar pattern. Born in a sunny village where his childhood was relatively free, he garnered a few years in paradise to carry with him through life, a remembered, day-to-day paradise which was merged not only with the lost paradise of his people but also with that of every child; for every child must lose the unlimited right to his mother's body and presence and learn that he will never possess her but must turn toward the competitive world of the father. In this way, the memory of a lost paradise is for Bialik truly "overdetermined" and he carries within himself a manifold nostalgia for previous happiness: the "milk and honey" of his mother's breasts, of the village of Radi, and of Eden and the Land of Israel. His father's death a year after the move from Radi to Zhitomir, instead of restoring paradise, plunged Bialik into complete dependence on the masculine world of his grandfather, where not even Bialik's mother had the right of intercession,

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for she was tolerated as a poor relative who had to be taken in. And then the boy was locked in the Hebrew school, where the hours of study were lengthened from year to year until his whole adolescence was worked out—to the extent that it was worked out—in the dark room of the Yeshiva at his grandfather's command.

This pattern corresponds to both the myth and the history of the Jewish people and to Freudian theory; it is present in a culturally very specific form in the individual lives of Eastern European Jews, where the image of the mother as warm and sheltering is very highly developed until suddenly the boys are shut up in a rigorous, academic discipline which, for the talented ones, continues into or through manhood. Not only is this study oppressive; it is also fiercely competitive, for it is the only area of distinction, the only area in which a Jew could hope to manipulate reality or even be a good Jew.

> In this house, between these walls,
> Not a day—but six years have passed on his soul;
> Here his childhood bore its first fruits, and his youth ripened,
> And here his eyes were quenched and his features paled.
> . . . . . .
> All day and half the night, he does not move from his place,
> There he eats his black crust in hunger—
> For who are you, adamant, who are you, flint,
> To a Hebrew boy occupied with the Torah?
>
> "The Constant Student"

Bialik built on his relation to the cultural prototype in his effort to tread a line between the two paths taken by his contemporaries. On the one hand, he would not join those Jews who repudiated their religion and most of the culture of the Diaspora and became violently nationalistic and aggressive, because he was aware that a Jew can justify the demand for special consideration for his people only by sharing with them a precious culture or a divine designation: when these are denied, the nationalists are involved in nothing but a banal contest for power.

> So say: Enough for me of satiating hate
> And shame and abasement in place of my love.
> Do I still not see the lifted hand of falsehood?
> Whom have I there? What have I there? I'll return to my rest.
> I'll not soil the true God's wonder in the dust,
> I will not sell my birthright for a mess of pottage,
> My voice won't mingle in the trumpet-blast of falsehood,
> Rather than a whelp among lions' whelps I will perish with sheep.

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I was not endowed with claws and fangs—
All my strength is God's, and God—life!
. . . . . .
I saw the lions' whelps with golden curls
Who fell as carrion on grazing ranges of deer.
All flesh is grass, its strength withers,
For the spirit of the LORD blows through it—and it is gone.

"On the Threshold of the House of Study"

Bialik could not accept the substitution of the extrinsic values of nationalism for the intrinsic values of Judaism, that is, the substitution of self-definition by aggressive confrontation with the outside world for the unique internal features of Jewish life. Yet, on the other hand, he felt that those Jews who adhered to the old orthodoxy and remained passive were on a path of rottenness and surrender which would lead to their destruction. This life is represented either by the Yeshiva or the image of the "wandering Jew:" "a staff and a pack and a whispered prayer."

It's not the staff I fear—not the pack that's terrible!
But more cruel than they, twice seven times more bitter,
Are life without hope and eyes without light;
Life without hope, life of rotten decay,
Sinking like lead, drowning in dark places;
The life of a hungry dog, confined by a chain—
Oh, you are cursed, you life without hope!

"Rejected Star"

Caught between these two alternatives, Bialik was in the desperate position of the rebel who can rise only in the name of the values he was born with, yet must repudiate the system in which those values survive. How can one rise in the name of the Jews when the Jews themselves live a life that one must disown and deny?

Bialik could resolve this basic ambiguity only by interpreting it in terms of the cleavage between the periods of his own life and their relation to the choices faced by his contemporaries. He had to divide his view of his culture, but, as he internalized its contradictions, he was left with a crippled structure which he struggled to support with all the passion he could muster. Because he had had so little emotional life outside the Yeshiva, all the energies of his adolescence were bound up in traditional learning, and the emotional poverty which would result from denying it completely was only too clear.

Shrine of the God of my youth—my old house of study—
Your rotted threshold once again confronts me,

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Once again I see your walls which are crumbled like smoke,
The muck of your floor, the murk of your ceiling.
Redoubled ruin you are ruined, without the comers in season;
The weeds have risen in your walks and your paths grassed over,
The spider's weaving shudders on your rafter,
Upon your breached roof sons of ravens cry out;
Stone by stone you are tumbled and battered to fragments,
Your pillars quake, all of you stands by miracles.

In dust of yours an Ark without a Torah writhes,
Green, wilted pages rot in a barrel,
And light rays, brooding in crevices, peer out,
And every corner mourns and every angle weeps.
. . . . . .
And again, my house of study, head bent like a pauper,
And desolate as you, on your threshold I stand.
Shall I weep for your destruction—do I weep at my destruction—
Or at both of them together shall I weep and mourn?
Hah! Your nest is emptied, your chicks have gone and fled,
They are vanished like a shade among the tall trees.
Many are smashed on the heads of boulders,
And many still stray in other fields.
Will they die the death of the straight? or find rest
In the life of scoundrels and forget you forever?

I have plucked no combs of honey on the paths of rebellion
Since the evil wind separated us;
Eternally lost from the LORD, all my world crumbled,
The waters rose to my soul—but she came not into them.

"On the Threshold of the House of Study"

Bialik's ambivalence toward his culture is expressed in the way in which he uses the division of God into two aspects which developed in relation to the needs and experiences of the Jews during various periods of their history. There is the mighty LORD of the Old Testament and the later Shkhinah. Against the one he rebels, while the other he conserves. The LORD is challenged (but not quite denied) and becomes the focus for the burgeoning rage which the extreme nationalists turned outward, giving the poet an expression of dynamism in a Judaic context. The Shkhinah, the immanent, merciful aspect of God, first becomes important in Jewish writing early in the Christian era, after the destruction of the Second Temple. The development of the concept, partly the result of Hellenistic influence, coincides with the period when the political situation prevented the Jews from asserting

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those elements in their culture which would reflect the attributes of the Almighty God, or, at any rate, prevented those Jews to whom the earlier idea of God was congenial from dominating the stage. In the Talmud, when God retires to a secret place to mourn the destruction of His Temple, it is as the Shkhinah that He weeps. When a man feels a sudden wave of pious joy, it is the wing of the Shkhinah which has touched him. The development of Chokhmah, "wisdom," (see especially *Proverbs* VIII) as a feminine principle in Biblical Judaism, which has been pointed out by Jung, was extended through the concept of the Shkhinah, which later absorbed many attributes both of Chokhmah and of the Rachel who weeps for the sufferings of her children. This feminine aspect of God seems to have no power of intercession with Her masculine aspect, and yet Her sympathetic weeping is a comfort and perhaps more, for the tears of the Shkhinah are precious things to be gathered up and saved. It is the Shkhinah Bialik wishes to save for his people and for himself—the Shkhinah who must be saved, for no action is anticipated from Her.

The wind has carried them all, the light swept them all away,
A new song has set the morning of their lives to singing,
And I, a tender fledgling, was forgotten
Beneath the Shkhinah's wing.

Alone, alone I remained, and the Shkhinah even She
Made Her broken right wing to tremble above my head.
My heart knew Her heart; fearfully She hovered over me,
Over Her son, over Her only one.

Already She is driven from all the crevices, only one
Secret place, small and desolate, remains to Her—
The House of study—and She cowers in the shadow,
And I am together with Her in sorrow.

And when my heart yearns toward the window, the light,
When the place is narrow to me, under Her wing—
Her head falls on my shoulder, and Her tear
Drops on the page of my Talmud.

Silent She wept above me and clung to me,
As though sheltering me with Her broken wing
"The wind has carried them all, they have all burst out,
And I must do without, all alone."

And like the coda of a very ancient dirge,
And like a prayer,—a petition and tremor in one,

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My ear heard that silent weeping of Hers
And that seething tear.

"Alone"

The Shkhinah is clearly identified with the poet's mother, and is the main focus of his nostalgia for the lost paradise. This identification is supported not only by the consistent reference to himself as a son in relation to the Shkhinah, but also in the interweaving of imagery in his religious and love poetry and all the poetry in which he refers to his mother. In one poem his mother faces the Sabbath with only enough money for either food or candles, and chooses to kindle the Sabbath light rather than feed her family. They stand around the empty table saying the blessing, and the mother is unable to control her weeping, and a tear falls and extinguishes one of the two candles:

The Sabbath stood shamed, her one eye blinded—
And the woman trembled:
"Would you scorn, God, the gift of a widow? Has your handmaid sinned?
Your Sabbath, how has she transgressed?
Why have you pierced her eye?
. . . . . .
Still no ear heard her on high, the Throne of Honor did not yet see
This fainting of a soul in her grief.
Then there fell from the cheek of the pious woman a single burning tear,
A fragment of a burning flame,
And fell, and dropped to double light, for there was kindled
The candle which had gone out.
My mother barely opened her blurred eyes when I saw
The light of the seven days shining there,
For the Shkhinah had kissed them—may the merit of this saint stand,
For us and for all Israel.

"My Mother, of Blessed Memory"

The Shkhinah was the aspect of God his mother turned to; because of her piety, the Shkhinah lived in her eyes. And the Shkhinah suffered as his mother suffered, for She too lived with sorrowing love and a feminine weakness and poverty in a world of masculine strength, taking Her only joy from Her son and so completely dependent upon his love of Her. Bialik had to remain oriented toward the Shkhinah or his mother would have been completely alone. He never tore himself away from this mutually protective relationship which was reflected in his later love affairs. One love he addresses:

Enter me under your wing,
And be to me a mother and a sister,

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And be your breast a shelter for my head,
The nest of my rejected prayers.

And in the hour of mercy, between the suns,
Bend down, and I will show you the secret of my bonds:
They say, there's youth in this world.
Where is my youth?

"Enter Me Under Your Wing"

Here we see the one Bialik, the one that delved into the Talmud to bring out beautiful legends of the Shkhinah and free them from their imprisonment between the dry legal discussions (the Talmud itself consists of two kinds of material, legend and anecdotal material written in the colloquial Aramaic, and legalities in purer Hebrew). Bialik was primarily responsible for making this aspect of Jewish tradition available to his contemporaries in a form they would use, greatly deepening their thinking. This is the Bialik who wrote poems of nature and childhood, recalling the lost paradise and comforting himself in the hard world with an image of his mother who had also been expelled (perhaps because she loved him too much, as he loved her?—at any rate, too purified now by tears to be considered in any other than a spiritual sense), an immanent feminine deity whose Temple had been destroyed and Her sons scattered, and could only protect them with a precious but broken right wing and a tear with something of flame in the midst of it, the consolation of poetry. In the Talmud the question is raised of whether a wise student who has grown senile and lost his learning shall still be honored, and the answer is that when Moses had broken the first tablets of the Law and new ones were given, the broken chips were put in the Ark along with the new. This is what Bialik clings to, the fragments of tablets; and the culture of an exiled and oppressed people permitted him to do so. But this was also the solution of hundreds of Eastern European Jews of Bialik's generation who divided their religion between an abstract fear of God and a love for the Shkhinah, and surrendered completely to the loss of paradise.

Surrender alone is not an appropriate movement for a poet; simple mourning and nostalgia do not make great poetry. There is another aspect of Bialik's childhood which is absent in the cultural prototype—for, after all, his father, the powerful figure who might be blamed for the loss of paradise, had died. Here a question arises

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which, again, is reminiscent of some of Freud's original findings. Bialik's father died when he was seven, and it may be that the child linked the memory of this drastic event with the death wishes which every boy is said to harbor against his father, not without deep guilt and ambivalent love. However, if he could believe he had "killed" his father, he had been left with another, sterner one, his grandfather, and beyond him an even sterner, an Almighty God, there both to punish him and to serve as a focus for a love with all the ambivalence involved in his love for his father. He had won a victory in a struggle for his mother which showed that such a struggle would remain hopeless and paradise could not be obtained in that way. For him, therefore, violence and aggression could not be tied to the success and acquisition to which Western thought has generally attached them. For Bialik, any chance of salvation, or rather relief, is relegated to the feminine principle, but masculine assertion still retains a certain brilliance, a Pyrrhic victory that did not involve an irremediable loss. Bialik has a memory that, somewhere in the far past, assertion was meaningful. This became closely tied up with the simplified form of Nietzschean thought that was adopted by many Jewish intellectuals and, as the ambiguity posed by his father's death prevented a complete surrender to orthodoxy and drove him into the intellectual arena of his period, he had to come to terms with it.

But here, too, the poet's idiosyncratic fate only gave special meaning to the theme of victory by unsuccessful violence, a continuing theme in Jewish thought. Violence on the part of man is consistently denied as a means to human success in the Old Testament, although it may be used in the fulfillment of some divine purpose, just as transgression and rebellion are. This is because violence is met by violence on the part of a God who always wins—although by this response He spares the rebel from the ultimate loss of a severed relationship. Rebellion is sanctified in primitive Judaism by the assurance that it will not succeed. This is the theme that Bialik plays on in "The Dead of the Desert." The corpses of the generation of Sinai, those who left Egypt and were denied entrance to the promised land, lie defeated and mighty in the desert.

Mighty ones have stuck to the ground, fallen asleep—and their weapons are on them.

. . . . . .

Their heads are sunk to the ground, heavy with the growth of hair,
And their curls grind and scrape together, like the manes of lions;

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Their faces are daring, are darkened, and their eyes tarnished as copper.
Their brows are hard and strong, set against heaven,
Their lashes—terrifying; and from their thicket horror lurks in ambush,
And their chests rise like quarried adamant.
. . . . . .
This is a camp of God, a primeval generation, a race mighty in daring, ancient of days.
Lo, brave in spirit and hard, as boulders in the desert, was this race:
They embittered the souls of their prophets and even enraged their God—
And He sealed them between the mountains, and sent eternal sleep upon them,
And commanded the desert over them, to guard them to the memory of all generations—
. . . . . .

And these, these are the fathers of the People of the Book! And once, in the eternity of the unmoving desert, the waste itself rebels and rises against the Creator in protest at its own desolation. And with it rise again the giant warriors of the desert, to protest once more against the God who has turned the face of His wrath against them. They shout:

"We are heroes!
The last generation of slavery, and first to redemption are we!
Our hand alone, our mighty hand
Has broken the weight of the yoke from the pride of our neck.
We lift our heads to heaven and it dwindles in our eyes—
And we longed for the desert, and said of the waste, 'Our mother!'
. . . . . .
Who is lord to us?!
Even now, when an avenging God has closed His desert upon us,
Barely does a song of insurrection and revolt sound among us—and we rise!"
. . . . . .
"Here we are, we have come up!
If God has taken away from us His hands,
And His Ark does not move from its place—
Then we rise without Him!"
. . . . . .
And the desert at that moment was . . .
Something bitter, a tyrant, very terrible.
. . . . . .
And the storm passed. And the desert silenced itself from its wrath and became pure.
And very bright and shining are the skies, and great is the stillness.

"The Dead of the Desert"

God has won, as always. But the corpses remain in the desert,

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staring up at their tyrant with terrible eyes, and woe befall any man of this weak generation who approaches their mighty secret or violates their armed camp. The fallen Maccabbees, the defeated Bar-Kochba, the David whose hands are too soiled to be allowed to build God's Temple—these are the heroes of the past, and He who decreed their defeat remained their God. There are many interpretations of the word Israel as it was applied to Jacob and the Jewish people, but Bialik may well have supported the interpretation that it means "one who struggles with God." This aspect of the religion of the Father God was almost dead in the Judaism in which Bialik grew up and for which he had to dig into the past; a metamorphosis of the same theme can be discerned in the victory which followed the death by violence of Jesus of Nazareth.

Given this memory of violence, it was necessary to confront the circumstances of a period when the Jews themselves were on the whole passive, while the gentiles were violent and unjustly successful. This produced a crisis, first because it removed the area of violence from that of justice, and second because the Jews were at any rate too weak to procure by violence either power or recompense. For Bialik it was the Kishineff Pogrom of Easter, 1903, which brought the matter to a head. Almost the whole Jewish population of the town was brutally murdered, probably with the encouragement of the Czarist government, and Bialik's lines from "In the City of Slaughter" were quoted all over Jewry; as a result, Kishineff brought on both his most personal crisis and his sudden emergence to fame: "For the Lord called forth the spring and the massacre as one. The sun shone, the acacia bloomed, and the slaughterer slaughtered." Bialik describes the town, the dried-out blood and brains on the sidewalks and walls, the shattered remains of day-to-day domestic life, all of them in every part of the town bearing witness to

What was done to the gored belly which they stuffed with feathers,
What was done with a pair of nostrils and nails, with skulls and hammers,
What was done to men slaughtered and hung from the beams,
And what was done to an infant found by his riddled mother's side,
As he slept with the nipple of her cold breast in his mouth;
What was done to the child ripped in pieces so his breath escaped with,
"mama!"—
And here are his eyes too, asking an account of me.
And more like this and like that the cobweb narrates to you,
Deeds boring the brain with that in them to kill
Your spirit and your soul with a total, eternal death—

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And you controlled yourself, and choked your roar in your throat,
And entombed it in the depths of your heart before its explosion,
And broke away and went out—and, lo, the earth after her own manner
And the sun like yesterday and the day before spills down its glory to the earth.

So you go down from there and come among dark cellars
Where they tainted the decent daughters of your kin, among the tools.
A woman—one woman—under seven, seven of the uncircumcized,
The daughter in the eyes of her mother, the mother to her daughter's eyes,
Before slaughter and during slaughter and after slaughter:
With your hand touch the soiled featherbed and the bloodied cushion,
The lair of wild swine and rutting of horses of men
With an axe dripping boiling blood in their hands.
See, then, see, in the dark of that same corner,
Under that matzoh-mortar, behind that very barrel,
Husbands lay, grooms, brothers, peering from the holes
At the writhing of holy bodies under the flesh of mules,
Smothered in their desecration, choking down blood from their own throats,
As, like a man portioning out tidbits, a loathsome gentile divided their flesh—
The men lay in their shame and saw—and did not move or stir,
And did not gouge out their eyes or go out of their minds—
And perhaps each even prayed by himself in his heart:
Lord of the world, work a miracle—may the evil not come on me.

The cowardice and degradation of the survivors are as terrible as the cruelty of the butchering gentiles. Bialik tells of a dozen men who crowded to hide in the bottom of a privy and suffocated themselves and then of how the survivors rushed to the synagogue to pray for forgiveness and to ask the law books whether their wives who had survived were permissible to them after being raped! In this poem, the Shkhinah is unable to weep; the poem is addressed to the poet himself (as if to Ezekiel, "Son of Man"), as he is led through the humiliations and horrors of the deserted town. He too is unable to weep or do more than list what he sees, until finally,

And now, what is there for you here, Son of Man? Rise and flee to the desert,
And carry with you there the cup of your despair,
And there you rip your soul in ten shreds,
And your heart you give as fodder for the impotent wrath,
And send your great tear down on the tops of hard boulders,
And send forth your bitter roar of fury—and let it be lost in the storm.

"In the City of Slaughter"

This is violence which cannot be met with violence, nor can it be

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met with poetry. Violence can only deal with itself and Bialik can only send it on its own evolution. Such are the alternatives within the circle of violence:

> If there is Justice—Let Him appear at once!
> For if after my destruction from under the sky
> Justice should appear—
>
> Let His chair be hurled down forever!
> The heavens will rot in the murk of ages,
> And you, presumptuous ones, go, in this violent wrath of yours,
> Go and be suckled on your blood.
>
> Cursed be the one who says: Revenge!
> Such a revenge, revenge for the blood of a small child,
> Satan has not yet created—
> Let the blood pierce to the depths!
> Let the blood pierce to the depths of darkness,
> And consume in darkness, and mine there
> All the rotten foundations of the earth.
>
> "On the Massacre"

Here is the end of violence. Neither the Shkhinah nor the Almighty, each expressing one set of divine attributes, offers an adequate solution to the conflict which Bialik faced. The extreme contrast between the different periods of Bialik's childhood had allowed him to experiment separately with "masculine" and "feminine" forms of expression in trying to find a personal solution to the historical and cultural conflict in which the Jews of his period found themselves. The fact that Bialik had entertained these two kinds of solution and had partaken of two trends in the development of Judaism which were not normally combined in a single individual had prevented him from settling for either one and resulted in his use of two almost completely separate poetic modes—songs of anger or heroism, and religious and lyric poetry. If the essential problem of life is the resolution of love and force or aggression (or, formulated on a different dimension, Eros and Thanatos), then Bialik has no more than separated them in the poems discussed so far and stands orphaned—and, finally, mute—in the center.

This conflict seems finally resolved in "The Pool," a long poem written three years after the Kishineff Pogrom; here Bialik deserts the mode of aggression and uses the imagery of nature and the gentle, nostalgic tone associated with the lost paradise, and yet

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asserts, in an interpenetration of feminine and masculine modes, an eternal source of strength.

I know a forest and in the forest
I know a single, humble pool:
In the depths of the glade, cut off from the world,
In the shadow of a high oak, blessed by light and taught by storm,
Alone she dreams for herself a dream of an inverted world
And spawns for herself in secret the fishes of her gold—
And none knows what is in her heart.

The pool is buried deep in the forest, while the tall trees above her gather the rays of sunlight in their own branches and compete in a world of strongly masculine symbols. And the pool

Suckles his roots in silence, and her waters are serene,
As though she rejoices, silent, in her part,
That she has merited to be a mirror to the mighty one of the forest.
And who knows, perhaps she dreams in secret
That not only his image with his suckling is in her—
But all of him is growing in the midst of her.

The young Bialik, still not deprived of paradise, approaches the pool by a

Path known only by the wolf and the hero of the hunt,

and sits on the bank meditating on a double world, on the existence of two suns, and waits for a revelation.

And while my ear is still tuned and hoping,
And in holy yearning my heart attends and pines and dies—
The echoed voice of a hidden God
Breaks suddenly through the silence:
"Where art thou?"

"Where art thou?"—the words of God who went seeking Adam in the garden when he had sinned and must be driven from paradise and plunged into a competitive world. So the next word is from the masculine trees; they stand amazed and ask, "What is he doing among us?" Now, for the first time, the trees notice the poet and he finds his place among these trees which are strong but are always nourished by paradise and are in paradise through their reflection in the pool. And then the image is reversed again as Bialik suddenly turns to define the language of poetry: this is the language in which the pool has posed to him her eternal riddle.

And hidden there in the shade, bright, calm and quiet,
Looking out for everything, and everything reflected in her, and altering with everything,

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It seemed to me as though she were the open eye
Of the prince of the forest, great with enigma
And wide in his musing boughs.

Bialik has accepted the reproach of God, and the accompanying demand that he relate himself to the masculine world. He has discovered that it is only the high tree which towers above the pool that can see its reflection in it. He has discovered that ultimately, living in the world, he can have access to his own creativity only if he can approach it by the path of the fearless hunter —by the conscious manipulation of the creatures of fantasy in relation to a real and hard world.

I have not taught my hand to strike with the fist;
. . . . . .
I was born to sing the song of the Lord in this world,
. . . . . .
So the words of our God are established forever
"On the Threshold of the House of Study"

In "The Pool," we see Bialik formulating a resolution to a conflict which is both individual and cultural. Because historical circumstances had cut the Jews off from any possibility of collective or individual assertion on their own terms vis-à-vis the gentile world in which they lived, they had reacted by shaping their personal and community behavior in terms of a feminine ideal and finding comfort in a feminine concept of God, the Shkhinah; they had learned to live in the sheltering world of memory and tradition. In the nineteenth century, however, a growing number of Jews sought masculine assertion in nationalism and repudiated this feminine passivity, at the same time rejecting all the nurturing elements of their culture. Bialik could accept neither alternative. On the one hand, he recognized that the nationalists rejected far too much that was precious in Jewish culture while their image of masculinity was, in fact, formed primarily on a gentile model. On the other hand, the events of Bialik's childhood fostered a particular attitude toward aggression, harking back to Old Testament Judaism, so that he could never be content with passivity. Any solution acceptable to Bialik would have to be much more complex than the divergent solutions of his contemporaries; his solution would have to be a synthesis of both.

It was in his poetry that Bialik tried to find this solution. In some ways, this made the task more difficult, for poetry itself is a maternal mode—a feminine form of creativity. It renounces the

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attempt to manipulate the external environment, shaping instead the forms and fancies of the mind. For a poet, then, a directly paternal mode is impossible, since it involves aggression which, if turned inward, becomes self-consuming. In his religious and lyric poetry, Bialik accepts the limitation of the maternal mode, and these poems are in harmony with the traditional culture.

At the same time, aggression remained attractive, and in the poems on the great pogroms we see the consequences. There is no real outlet for the poet's fury, and it must be internalized, so that he stands mute in the streets of Kishineff.

In "The Pool," finally, Bialik sees poetry itself as a way of relating to the world which need be neither masculine nor feminine. The pool is reflective and receives the strength of the trees around her. But at the same time the masculine trees are nourished by the pool, gaining the strength of their masculinity from her and becoming transfigured as they are reflected in her. Poetry becomes the source and the goal of strength and the only perfect offering, as the poet is able to offer back what he most desires by setting it in the context of the acknowledgment of power. Bialik thus takes the verbal and introspective richness of Judaism and transmutes the passivity which it had seemed to imply into a basis for a new and vigorous kind of national identity. When Bialik is able to imagine a relationship between love and power, he places God in a new position. In this poem God becomes the axis of the relationship between Bialik and his poetry, and religion becomes the end of that use of poetry which bravely takes the elusive and fragile and goes quietly and strongly with it in the world. Bialik once wrote of his soul as coming to one possible terminal after another, and yet failing to come to rest either in the delights of childhood or in the aridity of Talmudic study where, parched and straitened, his soul found expression in poetry and then escaped.

> To this day she flies and wanders in the world,
> Wanders at random, and finds no comfort;
> And on the holy nights at the beginnings of each month,
> At the prayers of the world for the dark side of the moon,
> She clings with her wing to the gate of love.
> Clinging, she knocks, and her weeping is in secret,
> And she prays for love.
>
> "If the Angel Should Ask"

Such an estrangement was the special burden of the poet with too vivid an insight into the extremes of constrasting potential in his

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culture. But the pool represents a refuge for such a divided soul and a lens through which those who followed Bialik, writing in modern Hebrew, could view their divided tradition. His contribution to the revival of Hebrew consists not so much in linguistic creation as in a reappraisal of the symbolic inventory of the culture, interpreting it in such a way that it is wide and deep enough to live in fully. For all who would be nourished by the Eastern European Jewish tradition without capitulating to it, Bialik has found in the pool that statement of the riddle in which two worlds are reconciled,

> . . . the open eye
> Of the prince of the forest, great with enigma,
> And wide in his musing boughs.

The Pool

I know a forest, and in the forest
I know a single, humble pool:
In the depths of the glade, cut off from the world,
In the shadow of a high oak, blessed by light and taught by storm,
Alone she dreams for herself a dream of an inverted world
And spawns for herself in secret the fishes of her gold—
And none knows what is in her heart.

At morning,
At sun's washing the tresses of the lord of the forest,
Spilling a sea of glory on his curls,
When he, the mighty, spread with precious gold all over,
At will, like Samson in Delilah's hands, stands snared,
From the midst of a light laugh and the light of a lover's face feeling his strength,
In a snare of gold of his own, receiving his bonds with affection,
And lifting his crown to his head, under heroisms of sun,
As though saying to her: flow over me or tangle or ensnare me,
Do with me whatever your heart desires—
The pool at that hour, if she is granted or not granted
A single ray of gold from above—
Swoons in the shadow of her shield of many branches,
Suckles his roots in silence, and her waters are serene,
As though she rejoices, silent, in her part,
That she has merited to be a mirror to the mighty one of the forest.
And who knows, perhaps she dreams in secret
That not only his image with his suckling is in her—
But all of him is growing in the midst of her.

And at moonlit night—
At the crouching of a weighty mystery on the glade,
When garnered light seeps softly through his boughs,

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Steals by and passes on his trunks,
Embroidering there in silver and in azure
Embroideries of his wonders—
And each grove hushed and hushed each tree!
Each shadows on himself with his top branches
And muses privately the musings of his heart.
Then the glade stands full of schemings, all of him loaded
With the secret of one mighty majesty, most precious and ancient,
As though there, in the deepest depths, in the vault of his power,
On a bed of gold, hidden from any being's eye, there sleeps
In very innocence, complete in splendor and eternal youth,
The daughter of a queen of ancient days who was bewitched,
While he, the glade, is charged to count her breaths
And keep a holy vigil on the secret of her chastity,
Until the king's son comes, her lover and redeemer, and redeems her—
The pool, at that hour, if she is granted or not granted
A muted ray of silver from above—
Is entered in the shadow of her shield of many branches
And is still with double stillness,
As though the grove's stillness and the beauty of his secret
Are doubled there in the mirror of her slumbering waters.
And who knows, perhaps she dreams in secret
That alas, in vain he wanders, the king's son loses his way
And hunts in distant forests and in wastes of sand and the sea's floors
The lost king's daughter—
While this hidden loveliness in her great splendor,
Why, is she not concealed here with her in her depths,
In the heart of the sleeping pool?

And on the day of storm,
On the crest of the forest already throngs of clouds are gathered,
With battle in their hearts,
Yet still they hold themselves, suppress their rage an instant,
And, in secret, thunder stirs their depths.
And cloud on cloud, as boding a nearby evil,
Send hints of lightening out in haste:
"Get set!"
Before the enemy is known
Or whence the enemy is come—
The forest all lowering stands ready
For any disaster in the world.
And suddenly—a spark! Fires flash! The forest pales,
The landscape flickers,
Crash! The thunder bursts, the forest stirs
And boils!
A thousand fold of bursting gusts
That see and are not seen
Descend with bestial shrieks upon its nobles—
At once they grasp them at their crests

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And shake them ragged, pound their heads,
And thunder after thunder!
And there came from the midst of the storm the voice of the forest's throng,
Resonant murmur and a heavy beat,
Like the roar of far breakers, weighted with water,
And it all says clamor, clamor, clamor . . .
At such an hour of tumult—the pool,
Hemmed with a wall of the knights of the glade,
Grows deeper still to hide in her depths her fish of gold,
And like a frightened child, hidden on a night of horror,
With fearful eyes, under his mother's wings,
His lashes flickering at each lightening bolt—
With such distorted features, with waters black and frowning,
She enters in the shadow of her shield of many branches
And all of her trembles, trembles . . .
And who knows,
Does she fear for the lordly-mantled forest,
For soaring tree tops sheared,
Or is she straitened for the beauty of her humble world,
Clear of dreams and pure of visions,
Which a wind suddenly passed and troubled,
And many visions of beauty, the nurslings of her heart,
The musings of day and musings of night,
In a moment of fury—shattered.

At dawn
The forest is still silent, there are still vexed and fearful
Shadows, remnants shrinking in its depths;
And yet warm milky vapors, creeping in the dust,
Begin already to perfume it. They lose their way,
Suspended shred by shred upon its highest boughs,
And small, sweet, tepid tongues of wind,
Like a baby's tongue that's soft on its mother's cheek,
Already had set out in darkness to appease the forest
For the frost of the night and its fury.

And they seek, so soft, light, comforting, between the leaves,
Wandering from thicket to thicket, from tree to its companion,
And lap the milk of whitish vapors,
Or fall on the edge of a nest and surreptitiously they stir there
The feather of a hatchling soft and sleeping—
And there on the heights of the forest there has stopped to rest
An entourage from on high—a plenitude of clouds.
Are they not clouds of honor, clouds of dawn—
With the visage of a troop of ancient chieftains, sages of the highest,
That carry secret scrolls, a monarch's anger, in their hands,
From another world to another world.
The forest stood there, stirred and hushed,

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Smothering, with trembling, with holding its breath,
Every nod, every flutter of awakening bird,
And all says trembling and awe . . .
At that hour, the slumbering pool,
Self-absorbed, carefree, warm, smooth,
In a light white sheet—the palest mist,
Sleeps the sleep of dawn.
And who knows if she dreams to herself
That yet in vain the honored ones of Heaven, the messengers of on high,
Extend their wanderings to seek another world
Beyond the sea and farthest margins of the sky—
That other world is so near, so near—
Behold, it's here below, here below,
In the heart of the humble pool.

And I, in the days of my youth, the delight of my days,
When first the Shkhinah's wing fluttered on me,
And my heart still knew longing, yearning, and silent wonder,
And to seek a shelter for its prayers,
I used to sally forth at the heat of a summer day
To the lovely kingdom of quiet,
To the depths of the forest.
And there, between great trees, which heard no echo of an ax,
On a path known only by the wolf and the hero of the hunt,
I let myself wander all alone whole hours,
Communing with God and my heart until I would come
Striding, and pass by mines of gold,
To the Holy of Holies of the forest—to the pupil of its eye.

Within the veil of leaves
There i. a small green island, cushioned with grass,
An island set apart, like some small world within itself,
Hidden among the lotuses, a tranquil Sanctuary
Of the ancients of the forest, broad of boughs and thickly crested;
Its ceiling—a small blue dome,
Fitted and set firmly on the trees.
Its floor—glass: a pool of pure water,
A silver mirror in a frame of moist grasses,
And in it, one more tiny world—a second world,
And in the center of that dome and in the center of that pool,
This facing that, two firm set topaz stones
Great shining topazes—
Two suns.

As I sit there on the pool's shore, gazing
At a riddle of two worlds, a world of twins,
Without knowing which of the two of them was first,
And bend my head beneath the blessing of the ancients of the grove,
Dappled with light and shade, and song and resin as one,

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Then I would feel a palpable still flow
Of fresh abundance to my soul,
And my heart, thirsting for a great and holy enigma,
Goes then and fills my blood with hope,
As though it asks still more, and waits
The revelation of the immanent Shkhinah or revelation of Elijah.
And while my ear is still tuned and hoping,
And in holy yearning my heart attends and pines and dies—
The echoed voice of a hidden God
Breaks suddenly through the silence:
"Where art thou?"
And the clearings of the forest filled with great wonder,
As great cypresses, vigorous burghers,
Look at me from a height of majesty, in silent amazement, as though saying,
"What is he doing among us?"

There is a silent language of the gods, a tongue of secrets.
It has no voice or echo—but a wealth of hues.
And it has charms and pictures of splendor and a host of forms.
In that tongue God reveals Himself to the chosen of His spirit,
And the Prince of the World muses in it His musings.
An artful creator molds in it the fancies of his heart
And finds a resolution to an unspoken dream.
For is it not the language of vision? Which shows itself
In a band of azure sky and its reaches,
In the purity of small silver clouds and the black of their billows,
In the tremor of gold wheat and the pride of a noble cedar,
In the flutter of the white wing of the dove
And the flap of an eagle's wings,
In the beauty of man's body and the brilliance of a glance,
In the rage of the sea, the mischief of waves and their laughter,
In the copious night and silence of falling stars,
In the noise of fires, the roar of a sea of flames
Of the sun's shinings and its settings—
In that language, the tongue of tongues, the pool also
Posed to me her eternal riddle.
And hidden there in the shade, bright, calm and quiet,
Looking out for everything, and everything reflected in her, and altering with everything,
It seemed to me as though she were the open eye
Of the prince of the forest, great with enigma
And wide in his musing boughs.

The poetry quoted here was translated by the writer from the Hebrew text of *All the Poems of H. N. Bialik* (Tel-Aviv, 1950) for this study; "Alone" and "The Pool" are the only poems quoted in their entirety. I should like to acknowledge the help of Rabbi Ben-Zion Gold, who was kind enough to go over them for me when a previous article, much of which has been incorporated into

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this one, was published in *Mosaic*, Vol. III, No. 2 (Spring 1962). In preparing these translations, I have tried to be as literal as possible, frequently retaining Hebrew gender and the extensive use of conjunctions. Wherever possible, I have tried to make my translations "read like poetry," and I find that this has resulted in a large number of approximately iambic lines; I have encouraged this trend but not made it a requirement.

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SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies

I. *Traditional Monarchies in Contemporary Politics*

THE WITHERING away of the European colonial empires has virtually eliminated what was widely believed to be a highly anachronistic type of political order. There still remain, however, much more antique and even more curious political systems in which legitimacy and power reside largely in the highly traditional institution of hereditary monarchy. Most of these monarchies exist today in countries which are beginning to undergo rapid social, economic, and cultural change. The purpose of this paper is to explore the problems which modernization poses for such traditional political systems. To what extent are kings simply the doomed relics of a fading historical era? Can monarchial systems cope with modernizing problems? To what extent are the political evolutions of such regimes likely to be in the direction of democracy, dictatorship, or revolution?

Contemporary monarchies can be divided into three categories. In the modern, *parliamentary monarchy*, the monarch reigns, but rule is carried on by a cabinet formed by political parties and responsible to a popularly elected parliament. The ultimate source of legitimacy lies in the people. The monarch is the chief of state, the symbol of national continuity, unity, and identity. His principal efficient power usually is the possibility of exercising some discretion in the selection of a prime minister if no single political leader or party commands a clear majority in parliament. The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Japan are the obvious examples in today's world.

In an *oligarchical monarchy*, the monarch reigns but does not rule; yet the monarchy remains the principal source of legitimacy in the system. Neither popular sovereignty nor party sovereignty is

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accepted in principle and neither is institutionalized in electoral procedures, parties, and parliaments. Effective power rests in the hands of an upper-class, bureaucratic-military oligarchy which rules in the name of the monarch. Thailand and Laos are oligarchical monarchies today; Japan was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In the *ruling monarchy*, the crown is the principal source of legitimacy, and the king rules as well as reigns. A ruling monarchy is not necessarily an absolute monarchy. The efficient powers of government may be shared with other institutions and groups, but in all cases the monarch also plays an active, efficient, political role in the governing process. Contemporary ruling monarchies range from those which closely approximate the absolute model (such as Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia), to those in which there are some institutional and constitutional restraints on the monarch (such as Iran and Afghanistan), to those in which there is active competition and collaboration between the monarch, on the one hand, and parliaments and political parties, on the other (Morocco, Greece). In today's world, oligarchical and ruling monarchies are, perforce, traditional institutions in modernizing countries.

In addition to their reliance on traditional sources of legitimacy and traditional institutions of political rule, ruling and oligarchical monarchies also share two other general characteristics. First, in comparison with other less developed countries, they tend to rank fairly low on most indices of social and economic development. In 1957, to be sure, in terms of per capita national income, both the richest country in the world (Kuwait, $2,900) and the poorest

TABLE 1. Types of Contemporary Monarchies

	Traditional		*Modern*
	Ruling	*Oligarchical*	*Parliamentary*
Principal function of monarch	Rule and reign	Reign	Reign
Principal source of legitimacy	Monarchy	Monarchy	People
Principal efficient authorities	Monarchy, bureaucracy, army, and perhaps parties	Army and bureaucracy	Cabinet, parties, and parliament
Scope of political participation	Narrow to medium	Narrow	Broad

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(Nepal, $45) were ruling monarchies. But the general pattern is quite different. Eight of fourteen traditional monarchies had per capita national incomes of $100 or less; four ranked between $100 and $200; only two had per capita incomes over $200. So also, in only two of the fourteen countries was more than half of the population literate, while in ten less than 20 per cent of the population was literate. In eleven of the fourteen less than a quarter of the people lived in cities over 20,000 population, and in eight countries less than 10 per cent of the population lived in cities of this size.[1]

While the traditional monarchies are typically at low levels of economic and social development, they also, typically, suffer somewhat less from problems of national identity and national integration than do most underdeveloped countries. Most ruling monarchies did not undergo colonial rule or had relatively indirect or brief experiences with it. They were usually located where the competing imperialisms of larger powers collided with each other and produced a stand-off which enabled the smaller, indigeneous monarchy to maintain its independence, however shakily. Thailand was between the English and the French, Nepal between China and India, Afghanistan and Iran between the English and the Russians, Ethiopia at the juncture of English, French, and Italian imperialisms. The colonial experiences of Libya and Morocco were, in some measure, limited by the competition between Great Britain and Italy, on the one hand, and France and Spain, on the other. Most of the other contemporary traditional monarchies are in the Arabian peninsula, in large parts of which neither Ottoman nor European rule was effectively exercised. In some instances, such as Ethiopia, Thailand, and Iran, claims can be made for the continuous existence of the monarchy through several centuries. While several traditional monarchies, such as Morocco and Ethiopia, have substantial ethnic minorities, even their problems of national integration seem relatively simple compared to those of most countries in Asia and Africa. One key problem for traditional monarchies, consequently, is how to preserve the headstart which independence and national institutions of authority have given them in the face of the need for rapid social and economic change and for broader political participation which challenges the capabilities of those institutions.

The traditional monarchies thus pose fascinating problems for the student of political development, and their fate is also of interest to policy-makers. In the first place, perhaps 15 of the world's 120 sovereign entities are ruling or oligarchical monarchies, and

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there are remnants of tribal monarchies in Uganda, Burundi, and perhaps elsewhere in Africa. No traditional monarchy is a major power, but Iran, Ethiopia, and Thailand have each more than 20 million people, and a total of about 150 million people throughout the world still live under this type of political system. Secondly, as a result of the historical conditions associated with their continued independence, many traditional monarchies occupy strategic geographical positions. At one time or another, Greece, Iran, Afghanistan, and Laos have all been the focus of Cold War struggles. Libya, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and Thailand are or have been sites of important American overseas bases. Thirdly, most of the traditional monarchies have sided with the West in the Cold War. The United States, consequently, has a significant interest in their future political development. The replacement of their existing political systems by revolution, chaos, instability, or radically nationalist regimes presumably would be less in the American national interest than the peaceful evolution of the existing political systems. Finally, while the traditional monarchies are, in general, no richer and no poorer in natural resources than other developing states, they do play a crucial role in the production of one of the essentials of a modern economy. Between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's oil comes from countries where the king rules as well as reigns.

II. *Power, Institutions, and Political Modernization*

To cope successfully with modernization, a political system must be able, first, to innovate policy, that is, promote social and economic reform by state action. Reform in this context usually means the changing of traditional values and behavior patterns, the expansion of communications and education, the broadening of loyalties from family, village, and tribe to nation, the secularization of public life, the rationalization of authority structures, the promotion of functionally specific organizations, the substitution of achievement criteria for ascriptive ones, and the furthering of a more equitable distribution of material and symbolic resources. A second requirement for a political system is the ability to assimilate successfully into the system the social forces which are produced by modernization and achieve a new social consciousness through modernization. In due course, these social groups demand participation in the political system, and the system either provides for their partici-

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pation in ways harmonious with the continued existence of the system, or it alienates them and produces overt or covert civil strife and secession. The response of the British political system to the rise of the working class converted Disraeli's two nations into one. The response of the Argentine political system to the same phenomenon converted the two nations into two enemies.

What political conditions, or, more specifically, what power conditions, are conducive to policy innovation in modernizing societies? In more complex systems, the evidence suggests that policy innovations are encouraged by a power distribution which is neither highly concentrated nor widely dispersed. In attempting to synthesize the literature on innovation in organizations, James Q. Wilson has concluded that the rate of proposing innovations is directly proportional to the diversity of an organization, while the rate of adopting innovations is inversely proportional to the diversity of the organization.[2] By organizational diversity he means the complexity of the organization's task structure and the complexity of its incentive system. In terms of large-scale political systems, "diversity" can be roughly equated with dispersion of power. So modified and extended, the Wilson proposition would then hold that a political system where power was dispersed would have many proposals and few adoptions and one where power was concentrated would have few proposals but many adoptions. Policy innovation in the United States and the Soviet Union may indeed approximate these models.[3] As Wilson points out, however, this double-barreled proposition in itself says nothing about what level of diversity or what distribution of power will produce the highest rate of innovation except to suggest that the rate will be lower at the extremes—that is, where power is totally concentrated or completely dispersed—than it will be in the middle of the continuum.

Starting from the Wilson theory, it may be possible to identify some qualifications which will enable us to relate the probability of innovation to the distribution of power. In the process of political modernization today the agenda of innovation is fairly well known. It is perhaps significant that power was more widely dispersed in those countries which were among the first to modernize—Great Britain, northwestern Europe, the United States—than it has been in those which did so later. The initial proposal of the various innovations which together constitute modernization could occur only in societies where many groups could take the initiative. Societies which modernize late do not need the same degree of diversity or

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dispersion to develop proposals for modernizing innovations. Indeed, the only minimum requirement is the exposure of at least some groups in the society to the earlier experience of the West. Thus, in the societies which modernize late the proposal of innovations (in the sense of their promotion within the society by some significant social group) requires less organizational diversity and dispersion of power than it did in those which modernized earlier.

The process of adoption rather than the process of proposal thus becomes the critical phase of innovation in societies which have modernized more recently. These societies, however, differ from the United States in the number and strength of the sources of opposition to reform. In the United States few traditional institutions and interests existed to block the path of social and economic modernization. Consequently, a modern society emerged, or was created, more or less spontaneously, without the government having to overthrow a traditional society. America was born modern as well as equal. In most of the more complex societies of Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and even parts of Africa, however, traditional social forces, interests, customs, and institutions are strongly entrenched. The change or destruction of these traditional forces requires the concentration of power in the agents of modernization. Modernization is associated with a marked redistribution of power within the political system: the break-down of local, religious, ethnic, and other power centers and the centralization of power in the national political institutions. Anthropological studies suggest that tribes and villages with more highly concentrated power structures innovate more easily and more rapidly than those with more dispersed power structures.[4] Policy innovation in a modernizing society thus varies more or less directly with the concentration of power in its political system.

The overthrow of entrenched traditional interests often requires the mobilization of new social forces into politics, and the second key capability required of a modernizing system is the capacity to assimilate into the system the social forces which result from modernization. In many instances there will be new social groupings, for example, entrepreneurs or urban workers, which did not exist in traditional society. At least equally important is the capacity of the system to incorporate traditional social groupings which acquire political consciousness during the process of modernization. Here it is necessary to expand the insight which Karl Marx had when he argued that the rise of industrial capitalism produced class

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consciousness in the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In fact, the process of modernization induces not just class consciousness but group consciousness of all kinds: village, tribe, clan, religion, caste. Modernization means that all groups, old as well as new, become increasingly aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups. This can be strikingly seen in many parts of Africa, where tribal consciousness was almost unknown in traditional rural life. B. O. N. Eluwa, an Ibo leader in Nigeria, has vividly described his experiences in the early 1950's, when he traveled through Iboland attempting to convince the Ibo villagers that they were Ibos. The villagers, he said, simply "couldn't even imagine all Ibos."[5] Eluwa and other Ibo leaders successfully created a sense of "Iboness." The development of group consciousness leads the groups to make claims on the political system and to demand participation in the political system. The test of a system is, in some measure, its capacity to respond to these demands. Successful assimilation depends upon both the receptivity of the system and the adaptability of the entering group, that is, the willingness of the group to relinquish some of its values and claims in order to gain admittance to the system. Generally these two qualities are directly related: group adaptability is enhanced by system receptivity. Systems also tend to be more receptive to new social groups which did not previously exist in the society than they are to old social groups which were previously excluded from the system but which develop new political consciousness. Consequently, the assimilation of industrial entrepreneurs and industrial workers poses fewer problems to a modernizing society than does the assimilation of peasants.

The expansion of participation in the political system means, in effect, the expansion of the power of the political system. Modernization thus involves, as Frederick W. Frey has argued, changes both in the distribution of power within a political system and in the amount of power in the system.[6] Political systems, it must be recognized, may differ in both dimensions. Power, as Talcott Parsons has observed,

> has to be divided or allocated but it also has to be produced and it has collective as well as distributive functions. It is the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general "public" commitment has been made or may be made. It is mobilization, above all, of the action of persons and groups, which is *binding* on them by virtue of their position in the society.[7]

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More generally, the amount of power in a society depends upon the number and intensity of the influence relationships within the society, that is, relationships in which action by one person or group produces changes in the behavior of another person or group. Modern political systems differ from traditional ones in the amount of power in the system, not in its distribution. In both traditional and modern political systems, power may be concentrated or dispersed. In the modern system, however, more of the society will be involved in more power relationships than is true in a traditional system.

TABLE 2. Political Systems and Power Configurations

Distribution of Power	*Amount of Power*	
	Small	*Large*
Concentrated	Bureaucratic empire; absolute monarchy	Totalitarian dictatorship
Dispersed	Feudalism; "pyramidal structures"	Constitutional democracy

Political systems thus differ according to the amount and the distribution of power in the system. More significantly, in terms of policy innovation and group assimilation, political systems can be distinguished in terms of their capacity to concentrate power and their capacity to expand power. These two capacities do not necessarily conflict: amount and distribution represent two theoretically distinct dimensions. Nonetheless, they may well be connected. The expansion of wealth in a society is related to the allocation of wealth in the society. Poor countries typically have extremes of luxury and poverty. In the early stages of economic growth there is evidence that wealth becomes even more concentrated. In later phases, however, economic expansion makes possible a broader sharing of material benefits. The wealthiest countries generally have the most equitable distribution of wealth. The relation between the concentration and expansion of power may be somewhat similar in the process of political modernization.[8] In an early stage, modernization requires policy innovations and hence the concentration of power. The gap between the powerful and the weak becomes greater. At the same time, the social and economic change produced by modernization leads new groups to demand entry into the political system and requires the expansion of the system. In a third phase, much later, the expansion of the system may make possible a new dispersion of power within the system. Depending upon

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one's perspective, one can thus define political modernization as either the concentration of power, the expansion of power, or the dispersion of power; and, peculiarly enough, political scientists have indeed defined political modernization in each of these ways. At one point or another in a country's history, each does constitute "modernization." In the earlier phases of modernization which characterize most of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the principal requirements are for the concentration of power and for its expansion. A crucial factor influencing the subsequent course of modernization may be the extent to which the concentration or the expansion of power has priority at the earlier stages of political change.

The capability of a system to concentrate and/or expand power will be directly affected by the nature of its political institutions. The great utility, and the great appeal, of the single-party system in modernizing countries is that it is an institution which, in large measure, promotes both concentration (and hence innovation) and expansion (and hence group assimilation). In various ways the established one-party systems in Mexico and Tunisia, North Korea and North Viet-Nam have all demonstrated both these capacities. Similar capabilities are also likely to exist in dominant-party systems, where there is a single major party and a multiplicity of smaller, more parochial, ethnic and ideological parties. In countries with this type of system, such as India and Israel, the minor parties play a significant role as bellwethers or warning devices, the rise and fall in their votes indicating to the dominant party the directions in which it must move to maintain its position either by assimilating new groups or by innovating policies. Ideological dogma and electoral pressure combine to induce the dominant party to maintain its innovative and assimilative capacities.

More competitive, two-party or multi-party systems may have considerable capacity for expansion and the assimilation of groups but less capability for the concentration of power and the promotion of reform. Political competition in a two-party system, for instance, may serve to mobilize new groups into politics and in this sense may expand the power of the system; but, at the same time, this mobilization also tends to divide power and to fracture the existing consensus on modernization. The typical manifestation of this is the "traditionalizing election," such as took place in Ceylon in 1956, in Burma in 1960, and, in some respects, in Turkey in 1950. In these elections, the opposition party won a dramatic and unex-

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pected victory by mobilizing previously apathetic peasants through appeals to ethnic, religious, and traditional values. All three elections witnessed the participation of new groups in politics. In all three countries, however, the previously existing political consensus was broken, antagonisms were intensified, and in due course military coups were attempted, successfully in Turkey and Burma, unsuccessfully in Ceylon. In slightly different fashion, other competitive democracies, such as the Philippines, have demonstrated considerable effectiveness in assimilating social forces into the political system (with the notable exception of the Central Luzon peasants immediately after World War II), but have also shown little capacity to date for the concentration of power necessary to push through extensive social and economic reforms.

The mere existence of political competition is not necessarily a guarantee of expansibility. For fifty years Colombia was held up as a model two-party democracy in Latin America. It was, however, a democracy which lacked the capacity either to reform its policies or to assimilate new groups. In the late 1940's the system broke down with the spread of decentralized violence and the emergence of a military dictator. That dictator, Rojas Pinilla, vigorously tried to do what the democratic system had been unable to do: to promote social reform and to identify new groups with the political system. Rojas, one observer has written, "turned the clock forward on social achievement for the masses. He gave them status and a sense of their importance, if only because his government has emphasized their welfare. . . . In this sense, paradoxically, the military dictator is making a substantial contribution toward democracy. . . ."[9] In 1958, Rojas was thrown out, and the system reverted to its usual pattern. In the words of another expert, using the same figure of speech, "The party leaders [in 1958] seemed, in many respects . . . to be turning the political clock back to 1930, to an Athenian type of democracy, to conditions prevailing before the left wing of the liberal party attempted to win support from groups outside the elite."[10]

The question to be faced now is: What are the capacities of the traditional monarchy for the concentration and expansion of power?

III. *Policy Innovation: Reform vs. Liberty*

Traditional monarchies are, in today's world, rarely, if ever, traditionalizing monarchies. The monarchial oligarchies are (like

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the Meiji samurai, the Young Turks, or the Thai Promoters of 1932) modernizing oligarchies, and the ruling monarchs are modernizing monarchs. The impetus of these élites toward reform and change may well be far greater than that of the less traditional, nationalist leaders who have come to power following the retreat of Western imperialism. The latter can claim modern legitimacy, and hence can afford to devote more attention to the spoils of power. The traditional legitimacy of the former, in contrast, is more open to question. They must prove themselves by good works. Thus, they become the protagonists of the royal revolution from above. In so doing, they fall, of course, into a familiar mold, populated by the centralizing and nation-building monarchs of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe and by such diverse nineteenth-century types as Mahmud II, Alexander II, Chulalongkorn, and the Taewongun. Undoubtedly the most dramatic and perhaps the most relevant of the older modernizing rulers for today's breed was the Revolutionary Emperor, Joseph II, who between 1780 and 1790 tried out on the Hapsburg domains almost every reform which the French Revolution was later to introduce into France. He attacked and subordinated the church, ordering the abolition of the contemplative religious orders and the confiscation of their property; he advocated the shift in responsibility for the poor from church to state, the toleration of Protestants, the supremacy of civil courts in marriage, and the incorporation of the clergy into the state bureaucracy. He established equal penalties for nobles and commoners convicted of crimes. He opened the civil service to the bourgeoisie and the Army to the Jews. He attacked serfdom, declaring that every peasant should be a citizen, an entrepreneur, a taxpayer, and a potential soldier. Peasants were to have secure tenure of their land with freedom to sell and to mortgage it. He wanted a uniform tax on land, "with no difference between the possessions of men, to whatever estate or order they might belong. . . ." Five months before the fall of the Bastille, he issued a dramatic decree providing that peasants should own their own land, keeping 70 per cent of their income for themselves, and paying 18 per cent to their former landlords and 12 per cent to the state.[11] In effect, a revolution from above had been tried and had failed in the Austro-Hungarian empire before the revolution from below started in France.

The priority which modernizing monarchs accord to particular reforms varies from one country to another. No monarch starts out

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with an entirely traditional society, and most countries which modernize in this manner require a succession of modernizing monarchs. Since the prerequisite of reform is the consolidation of power, first attention is given to the creation of an efficient, loyal, rationalized, and centralized army: military power must be unified. For Mahmud II, the prerequisite to all his other reforms was the suppression of the Janissaries. So, too, Manelik in Ethiopia and Reza Shah in Iran gave first attention to the creation of a centralized military force. Modernizing monarchs also typically push secularization, greater equality and uniformity in society, financial reform, rationalization of the bureaucracy, legal reform, and industrial development.

The modernizing monarch's policy innovations inevitably provoke sharp opposition among traditional groups in the society, particularly local and ethnic leaders, the aristocracy, and religious leaders. The crucial struggle, of course, is between the monarch and his bureaucratic servants, on the one hand, and these autonomous centers of traditional power, on the other. Effective opposition to the monarch varies inversely with the extent to which the society is bureaucratized. To implement his modernizing reforms, the monarch has to pursue centralization with unflagging zest. Mahmud II has been appropriately termed the Peter the Great of the Ottoman Empire. According to one expert, "The first essential task, as Mahmud saw it, was the centralization of all power in his own hands, and the elimination of all intermediate authorities, both in the capital and in the provinces. All power deriving from inheritance, from tradition, from usage, or from popular or local assent was to be suppressed, and the sovereign power alone was to remain the sole source of authority in the Empire."[12] These words could equally well describe Joseph II in the eighteenth century or Haile Selassie today. Each waged an unrelenting struggle against local privilege, corporate autonomy, feudal power. Needless to say, the traditional authorities fight back vigorously in the effort to maintain their power. And, in the process, they inevitably invoke the values of liberty and of pluralism against the monarch's goals of reform and centralization. This poses the classic dilemma of the first phase of political modernization: traditional pluralism confronts modernizing despotism; liberty is pitted against equality. R. R. Palmer aptly summed up this dilemma in his description of the Belgian revolt of 1787 against the modernizing reforms of Joseph II:

The issue was clear. It was between social change and constitutional

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liberty. Reform could come at the cost of arbitrary government overriding the articulate will and historic institutions of the country. Or liberty would be preserved at the cost of perpetuating archaic systems of privilege, property, special rights, class structure, and ecclesiastical participation in the state. It was a revolution against the innovations of a modernizing government—in a sense, a revolution *against* the Enlightenment. It was not in this respect untypical of the time.[13]

What was true of the Hapsburg domains in the eighteenth century was repeated in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Mahmud II was followed in 1839 by Sultan Abdulmecid who inaugurated in the so-called Tanzimat a new period of reform. These reforms eventually gave rise to a constitutionalist opposition, the Young Ottomans, generated, like most oppositions, in Paris. Its leader, Namik Kemal, had been inspired by Montesquieu and wanted to replace Ottoman absolutism with a constitutional system. All of this sounds very liberal and very modern, but, in actual fact, Namik Kemal had to appeal to traditionalism to find restraints which could be applied to an Ottoman sultan. In effect, he became a defender of Islamic traditions against the Tanzimat reforms. He argued that the reforms had abolished old rights and privileges without creating new ones; that the Sultan should be subordinate to Islamic law; that at one time the Ottoman Empire had possessed representative bodies which should be re-established; and that, indeed, the Janissaries, the bulwark of the old order, which Mahmud II had displaced in 1826, were in reality the "armed consultative assembly of the nation."[14] What a peculiar and fascinating combination of modern liberalism and traditional pluralism! The Young Ottomans successfully overthrew the Sultan in 1876 and forced his successor to adopt a constitution modeled on the Belgian Constitution of 1831. The Constitution, however, functioned only a year or so. The new sultan, Abdulhammid, dissolved parliament in 1878 and re-established the partnership of despotism and reform.

The Constitutionalist movement in Iran, at the turn of the century, was a similar combination of traditionalism and liberty. In 1896 a new monarch, who lacked the prestige of his predecessor, ascended the Iranian throne. Many Persians had been traveling abroad and had absorbed ideas of limited government. In 1906 the country suddenly erupted into revolt, and the Shah was forced to grant a constitution—one which, incidentally, was also modeled on the Belgian Constitution of 1831. Again the combination of forces which produced this step toward constitutionalism was a motley

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crew, including on its liberal side, students, merchants, intellectuals, and in its traditionalist wing, tribal groups, religious leaders, and the civic guilds. The Iranian Constitution was more successful than the Ottoman Constitution; indeed, it is still in effect today. But its authority has varied inversely with the speed of modernization and reform. During the 1920's and 1930's Reza Shah quietly forgot about the constitution while he modernized his country. So also, the most significant reform which the current Shah has undertaken, the land reform of 1961-62, was accomplished only when he evaded the constitution and got rid of parliament.

Against the liberal-conservative opposition, where does the modernizing monarch secure support for his reforms? His problem is a ticklish one. The policies of the monarchy are reformist, while the institution of monarchy is highly traditional. Just as his opponents combine traditional pluralists and modern constitutionalists, so must the modernizing monarch build a coalition to support himself from both modernizing and traditional sources. In practice, modernizing monarchs may receive support from four sources, three within their society and one outside it.

The first and most crucial source of support is the state bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is the natural enemy of the aristocracy, and through his control of the bureaucracy the monarch can bring individuals from non-aristocratic social groups into positions of power. Normally, however, he cannot do this on a wholesale basis without weakening the authority of the bureaucracy and possibly provoking more stubborn and overt aristocratic resistance. He can promote individuals but not social groups. He must, instead, attempt to blend new men and old in his bureaucracy so that it retains the prestige of the latter while serving the ends of the former. The most important element in the bureaucracy is, of course, the military officer corps. In many cases, such as the Ottoman Empire, the military officers may share the goals of the monarch. In other instances, such as Iran and Ethiopia, the dominant elements in the officer corps may have essentially traditional values but for that very reason remain loyal to the monarch because he is the traditional source of authority. In any event, the power of the monarch in large part depends on his army and the recognition of an identity of interest between the army and the crown.

A determined monarch and an efficient bureaucracy can have considerable impact on a traditional society. Rarely, however, will their power be sufficient to put through significant reforms. They

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need the support of other groups. In Western Europe, the classic source of such support was the middle class: the new financial, commercial, and eventually industrial bourgeoisie. In many societies, however, the middle class is not strong enough to be helpful. The great problem with the Revolutionary Emperor, as R. R. Palmer points out, was that Joseph's position "expressed no general or public demand, no groups of interested parties with formulated ideas and habits of working together. There was no one to whom he could appeal. His important followers were his own bureaucrats and officials."[15] In the Hapsburg realms, there simply were not sufficient middle-class elements to give the monarch effective support. In many modernizing monarchies the tradition of *étatism*, of officialdom being the preferred career for the indigenous élite groups, prevents the emergence of an autonomous middle class. Commercial and financial functions are performed by ethnic minorities—Greeks and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and in Ethiopia, Chinese in Thailand—who consequently cannot be a major source of political support. In addition, even if there is an indigenous middle class, it may well be a source of opposition to the monarch. In the eighteenth century Voltaire and the new middle class could be enthusiastic about benevolent despotism. This was before the era of popular sovereignty and political parties. The ideology and outlook of twentieth-century intellectuals and middle-class groups, however, tend to describe even the most benevolent despotism as a feudal anachronism. Monarchy is simply out of style in middle-class circles. However much they may support the social and economic policies of the modernizing monarch, they oppose the monarchy as an institution and they oppose the restrictions which a modernizing monarchy imposes on freedom of communication, elections, and parliaments. Hence in a country like Iran the educated middle class, far from being a source of support for the modernizing monarchy, ranks with the traditional clergy as its most deadly enemy.

A third potential source of support consists of the masses of the population. Kings are usually popular, or at least more popular than local aristocrats and feudal landowners. Many of the reforms proposed by the monarchs benefit the large masses of the common people, in the countryside and in the cities. There are, however, many problems involved in the seeking of such broader support. The appeal to the masses, much more than to the bourgeoisie, is liable to provoke even more extreme opposition on the part of the

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traditional élite, this in accord with the general proposition that in-groups are more likely to take in new groups than old out-groups. Second, the fears of the aristocrats may well be justified, the appeal to the masses may go too far, and the peasants may take things into their own hands. Joseph II had this problem when the peasants reacted to his sweeping agrarian reform by neglecting to work, refusing to pay taxes or rent to anyone, and physically attacking their former landlords and plundering their houses and estates. Third, while the masses may well be capable of spontaneous and erratic violence, they are not likely to be capable of sustained, organized, intelligent political support, and a monarch is ill-equipped to organize broad-based popular groups. A final difficulty is that the masses frequently do not share the goals of the monarch. On fairly specific bread-and-butter economic issues, such as agrarian reforms, calculated to benefit the peasants at the expense of the landed aristocracy, there will be a coincidence of interest. On issues of legal reform, secularization, changes in customs, and education, the masses, particularly the peasant masses, may be very traditional and may well line up behind other traditional élites, such as the clergy or the local landlords, to oppose the modernizing policies of the monarch.

A fourth potential source of support is a foreign government or some other body outside the political system. For a modernizing monarch who is a stranger in his own country this may well be a highly undesirable but necessary source of backing. Certainly the support of the United States was an indispensable element in the coalition which kept the Shah of Iran in power during the 1950's. Here, indeed, is an example where the roles and the interplay of all the various social forces can be seen quite clearly. The opposition to the Shah came from the nationalist middle class and from the traditional clergy. The principal sources of support for the Shah were the army, the bureaucracy, and the United States. Originally the landed aristocracy was also identified with the monarchy. As a result of the crisis of 1961, however, the government came to view the current opposition of the landlords as less of a risk than the future opposition of the peasantry. In effect, the government tried to reconstitute its coalition, to bring into politics new social forces, consisting of small landlords and peasantry, which would furnish it with a popular base and reduce its dependence on the security forces and the United States. Iran is thus one example of how support by a foreign power may fill a temporary need until the mod-

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ernizing monarch can develop broader sources of support from among his own people.

IV. *Group Assimilation: Success vs. Survival*

The difficulties of mobilizing support from the masses highlight the basic problem of the reforming monarch: how to expand as well as how to concentrate power. Modernization creates new social groups and new social and political consciousness in old groups. How can these be assimilated into a system whose dynamics require the centralization of power in the narrow traditional institution of a ruling monarchy? Power which is sufficiently concentrated to promote reform may be too concentrated to assimilate the social forces released by reform. A bureaucratic monarchy is quite capable of assimilating individuals; more than any other traditional political system it provides avenues of social mobility for the intelligent and the artful. In the past three years, contemporary monarchs, like Faisal and Zahir, have indeed asserted their power against oligarchic traditionalists by appointing cabinets dominated by commoners. (Afghanistan may well be the only country in history in which at one time Ph.D.'s made up half the cabinet.) Individual mobility, however, clashes directly with group participation. Policy innovation requires the monarch to destroy other traditional institutions which might contribute to the expansion of the power of the polity, and the nature of the monarchy as an institution makes it difficult or impossible to create other institutions to meet this need.

The problem is at root one of legitimacy. The legitimacy of reforms depends on the authority of the monarch. But the legitimacy of the political system in the long run depends upon the participation within it of a broader range of social groups. Elections, parliaments, and political parties are the methods of organizing that participation in modern societies. Yet the modernizing reforms of the traditional monarch require the absence of elections, parliaments, and political parties. The success of the reforms, on the other hand, means the end of the monarchy. This is a problem which is of some concern to a monarch: How does he escape being a victim of his own achievements? More importantly, from a somewhat broader viewpoint, are there any means which may exist for a less rather than a more disruptive transition from the centralizing authority needed for policy innovation to the expansible power needed for group assimilation?

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Four possible lines of development should be mentioned. One is simply to continue with the centralization of power and the concurrent modernization of society, even though the probable result of this course is the violent overthrow of the monarchy. The very concentration of power which creates the capacity for reform also creates the vulnerability to revolution. Societies with concentrated power are much more susceptible to violent overthrow than those characterized by pluralism and decentralization. As the physiocrat Letronne said in the eighteenth century: "The present situation in France is vastly superior to that of England, for here reforms changing the whole social structure can be put through in the twinkling of an eye, whereas in England such reforms can always be blocked by the system of party government."[16] But the same conditions which made reform easy in France also made revolution possible, and the "system of party government" which obstructed reform in England also protected it against revolution. So also, in 1861, Alexander II successfully decreed the abolition of serfdom in Russia; the simultaneous accomplishment of a comparable reform in the United States required four years of bloody conflict. Yet the same centralized power which made possible the reforms of the 1860's also made possible the Revolutions of 1917. Monarchs who pursue centralization unremittingly become increasingly dependent upon sheer coercion to maintain themselves in power. It is ironic but logical that, along with everything else he did, the Revolutionary Emperor, Joseph II, also created the first modern secret-police system in Europe.

A second possible alternative is for the modernizing monarch to stop modernizing. The dilemma stems from his efforts to combine traditional authority and modern reform. He could escape from the dilemma by giving up the idea of reform, by becoming, in effect, an un-modernizing monarch or a traditionalizing monarch. This may not be so unrealistic as it sounds. Presumably every society arrives at its own fusion of traditional and modern elements. Party competition in democratic modernizing countries gives renewed strength to traditionalizing movements. Maybe the problem of the modernizing monarch can be solved by slowing down the processes of modernization and reform, coming to an accommodation with the traditional elements in society, and enlisting their support in the maintenance of a partially modern but not modernizing system. Certainly monarchs can shape the pace and direction of changes in the different sectors of society in ways which will be least destabilizing

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for their regime. Like the Ethiopian government, they may, for instance, reduce the number of students studying abroad and place obstacles to the development of closely-knit student bodies in the colleges in their own country. The problems in the application of this tactic are, first, that once the process of modernization starts, that is, once a core of modern-oriented intellectuals appears on the scene, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to stop or reverse the process. If the intellectuals are not brought into the bureaucracy to push the reforms of the modernizing monarch, they will certainly go underground to overthrow him. Second, traditionalization presupposes isolation from the world community; traditionalizing policies are usually associated with more parochial and less cosmopolitan leaders. A traditionalizing monarchy, moreover, requires greater isolation from the world culture than any other type of political system including totalitarian ones. Yet the traditional character of its political institutions means it will be less effective than a totalitarian system in isolating itself. In addition, for many other reasons, such as foreign policy considerations, isolation may be undesirable. The success of the Ethiopian government in securing the location of the OAU and the ECA in Addis Ababa enhances Ethiopia's international prestige at the same time that it undermines Ethiopia's political stability.

If modernization is unavoidable, what can be done about expanding the power of the political system to make it bearable? Is there any reason that it should be impossible to combine monarchical rule and party government, to institutionalize competitive coexistence in the polity of two conflicting principles of legitimacy and two independent sources of power? Such a compromise may last for a substantial length of time—as it did, indeed, in Imperial Germany for almost half a century—but the relationship will always be an uneasy one. The pressures in such a system are either for the monarch to become only a symbol or for him to attempt to limit the expansion of the political system, thus precipitating a constitutional crisis such as occurred in Greece in 1965. Alternatively, the monarch can try to organize his own political party and attempt to institutionalize popular support for his continuing active rule. The successful adoption of this strategy probably requires the monarch to abandon his formal claims to monarchical legitimacy. In 1955, for instance, Sihanouk abdicated as king of Cambodia, turned the throne over to his father, organized a political party, won the parliamentary elections, and returned to the government as Premier.

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When his father died in 1960 the constitutional monarchy was formally continued and the queen ascended the throne; but the constitution was amended to provide also for a chief of state selected by Parliament, and Sihanouk was elected to that position. Thus, in a manner somewhat similar to that of the English aristocracy, Sihanouk has maintained the substance of traditional élite rule by accommodating it to the forms of modern popular legitimacy.

Most monarchs, however, are loath to pursue Sihanouk's radical course and instead attempt to mix traditional and popular sources of authority. The elections of 1963 in both Iran and Morocco illustrate some of the difficulties of this course of action. Because of its colonial experience, Morocco has had stronger political parties than the monarchies which did not suffer the benefits of colonial rule. The dominant party at the time of independence was the Istiqlal. After the return of the king, the Istiqlal split in 1958, and authority and power gravitated more and more into the hands of the monarch. After the death of Mohammad V, the new King, Hassan II, in an effort to move the regime in a more constitutional direction, promulgated a constitution in 1962. The principal participants in the elections which took place in May 1963 under this constitution were the Istiqlal, which by now was a conservative party, the National Union of Popular Forces, a leftist socialist party, and a party of what were essentially the King's friends, called the Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions. The King had hoped that the Front would gain a working majority. It did not. In fact, it got 69 seats out of 144. In the United States a broad consensus makes it possible for a President to work with a Congress dominated not only by men of the opposite party but by men of opposing policy viewpoints. In a modernizing country, the issues are deeper, passions more intense, and, in a case like this, opposing principles of legitimacy are at stake. Government became stalemated, and in June 1965 Hassan dissolved Parliament and decided to rule by himself. Parliament, he said at the time, was "paralysed by futile debate," parliamentary government would accelerate the degradation of the system, and "resolute action" was necessary. "The country cries out for a strong stable government." This effort to combine monarchical rule and parliamentary government ended in failure. Recent events suggest that Hassan may be becoming more and more dependent on and perhaps the prisoner of the bureaucracy and the security forces.

Political parties in Iran historically have been much weaker

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than they are in Morocco. In the late 1940's and in the 1950's, however, the Tudeh Party and the National Front did develop sufficient strength and appeal to block the Shah in the Majlis or Parliament; in 1954 they challenged the very existence of the monarchy. After recovering a surer seat on his throne, the Shah discouraged the development of political parties which might become autonomous foci of power. In 1960 and 1961, two parliamentary elections were held, the results of which were voided because of corruption and the dominance of the electoral process by reactionary elements. Finally in September 1963, the Shah, by the fairly direct method of virtually designating the candidates, got a Parliament which would support him. Questioned about this apparent deviation from the usual democratic procedure, he is reported to have said: "So what. Was it not better that this [i.e., his] organization do it than that it be done by politicians for their own purposes? For the first time we have a Majlis and a Senate truly representing the people—not the landlords." Thus, in Iran, the monarch subordinated the parliament and the parties while in Morocco he suspended and displaced them. In neither country has it been possible to combine an active ruling monarch and active autonomous political parties. The effort at sharing may also affect the speed of reform, and it may be significant that the kings of Morocco, who have generally been willing to live with political parties, have accomplished less in the way of reform than the Shah of Iran, who has done his best to suppress them.

If compromise is impossible, is there any reason that a traditional ruling monarchy cannot, if the monarch so wills, be peacefully transformed into a modern constitutional monarchy? In theory, this should be possible, but I can think of no case where a direct shift was peacefully made from absolute monarchy to an electoral regime, with a government responsible to parliament, and a king who reigned but did not rule. Such a change would involve a basic shift in legitimacy from the sovereignty of the monarch to the sovereignty of the people, and such changes generally require either time or revolution. The usual shift is not from ruling monarchy to parliamentary democracy but from ruling monarchy to oligarchic monarchy. This was, in effect, what happened with the Young Turk revolt of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire, and for the next decade a military junta exercised effective power in the name of the sultan. So also the revolution of 1932 transformed Thailand from absolute monarchy to limited monarchy. Since then a military-

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dominated oligarchy has ruled the country in the name of the monarch, with cliques within the oligarchy replacing each other regularly by means of fairly limited and usually bloodless coups. This oligarchical regime, like that of the Young Turks, represents some broadening of participation over what existed previously. It does not, however, involve the creation of any institutionalized capacity to absorb additional social groups. Thailand still does not have an expansible political system, and the 1932 pattern of events which overthrew the absolute monarchy seems likely to have its parallel in the future with the revolutionary overthrow of the military oligarchy.

A more successful transition, but a more dubious case for our purposes, is furnished by Japan. There also a traditional system was replaced by a modernizing, predominantly military, oligarchy working through an emperor who was absolute in theory but not in practice. The Meiji oligarchs, the Young Turks of 1908, and the Thai Promoters of 1932 all had much in common. Yet the former were in a stronger position because the principal locus of power had been in the Shogun rather than in the emperor, and hence they were able to describe their transformation of the political system as a restoration rather than a revolution. In addition, the decentralization which had been maintained down through the Tokugawa period furnished the social basis for the expansion of political participation and the integration of both the traditional clans and the newer commercial groups into the political system. The gap between the symbolic end of feudalism (1868) and the organization of the first modern political party (1881) was sufficiently brief so that the latter could be built upon the wreckage of the former. In Japan, therefore, modernizing policy innovations went on simultaneously with the broadening and institutionalizing of political participation.

The successful transition from ruling to constitutional monarchy depends in part on accidents of birth, health, and death. It is, one may assume, virtually impossible for a modernizing monarch who has struggled to centralize power and to force through reforms against strong traditionalist opposition to release his grasp and voluntarily assume a dignified rather than an efficient role. It is quite natural for him to feel that he is indispensable to the order, unity, and progress of his country, that his subjects would indeed be lost without him. When asked why he did not become a constitutional monarch, the Shah of Iran is reported to have replied that

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"When the Iranians learn to behave like Swedes, I will behave like the King of Sweden." Any similar monarchial modernizer is likely to have equally strong paternalistic sentiments. The survival of a monarchy, consequently, may be greatly facilitated by the timely appearance of a mad monarch, a child king, or a playboy prince. George III's insanity (if it was that) was a boon to constitutional evolution in Great Britain. The modernization of Japan was eased by the fact that the Emperor Meiji was fifteen when he was "restored" to power. So also, the shift from absolute to limited monarchy in Thailand was aided by the fact that King Prajadhipok was a rather passive, weak, ineffectual fellow, who gladly acquiesced in the Revolution of 1932 and then abdicated three years later, turning the throne over to a sixteen-year-old schoolboy in Switzerland. The transition from ruling monarchs to reigning monarchs in Iran and Morocco would be facilitated if Mohammad Shah and Hassan II should abdicate or die before their children reach maturity. There are perhaps some grounds for optimism in Ethiopia where the Crown Prince, rather weak and easy-going, is purportedly sympathetic to assuming a limited, constitutional rule when he succeeds to the throne. There are also, however, reports that he is anxious to pursue the conflicting objective of reinvigorating the process of reform which has slowed down in recent years. When he does come to the throne, he will thus have to choose between the potential political virtues of passivity and the immediate social need for activism.

V. *Conclusion*

The future of the existing traditional monarchies is bleak. In the past, the general rule has been: the more pluralistic in structure (and hence dispersed in power) a traditional political system, the less violent the process of political modernization and the more democratic the resulting modern political system. The centralized bureaucratic empires, Russian, Chinese, and Ottoman, have generally collapsed into violent revolution. In Europe, countries like France and Prussia, which took the lead in centralization in the seventeenth century, found it difficult to broaden participation and create stable democratic structures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[17] Countries in which the seventeenth-century tendencies toward absolute rule were either defeated (England), stalemated (Sweden), or absent (America) developed more peacefully and

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later tended to have more democratic institutions. The continued vitality of medieval estates and pluralistic assemblies is associated with subsequent democratic tendencies. "It is no accident, surely," F. L. Carsten observes, "that the liberal movement of the nineteenth century was strongest in those areas of Germany where the Estates survived the period of absolute government."[18] Similarly, in seventeenth-century Spain, Catalonia was the principal locus of feudal opposition to the centralizing efforts of Olivares, but in the twentieth century it has been the principal locus of Spanish liberalism and constitutionalism. In eighteenth-century Europe, too, the conservative and even reactionary efforts of the "constituted bodies" to maintain and to restore their privileges laid the basis for later, more popular, resistance against despotism.[19]

The leaders of the traditional monarchies of today have little choice but to attempt to promote social and economic reform, and to achieve this they must centralize power. This process of centralization under traditional auspices has reached the point where the peaceful adaptation of any of them, with the possible exceptions of Afghanistan and Morocco, to broader political participation seems most unlikely. The key questions concern simply the scope of the violence of their demise and who perpetrates the violence. Three possibilities exist. In the most limited form of change, the ruling monarchies develop along the Thai model into oligarchical monarchies. This involves a limited broadening of participation in the system without creating an institutional capacity for any subsequent broadening of participation, and it may mean some limitation of the capacity for policy innovation. It does, however, preserve the monarchy as a symbol of unity and legitimacy. In a country like Ethiopia such a course is probably the best that can be hoped for. A more drastic and perhaps more likely form of change in most ruling monarchies would be a Kassim-like coup which disposes of both monarch and monarchy, but which fails to produce any new principles or institutions of legitimacy. In this case, the political system degenerates into a formless, praetorian condition. The most violent solution would be a full-scale revolution in which several discontented groups join together for the demolition of the traditional political and social order, and out of which eventually emerges a modern party dictatorship. Some existing societies with traditional monarchies, however, may be too backward even for revolution. No matter what course they take, it seems certain that the existing monarchies will lose some or all of whatever capability they have

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developed for policy innovation under traditional auspices before they gain any substantial new capability to cope with the problems of political participation produced by their own reforms.

This article is based on one of the Stimson Lectures delivered by Professor Huntington at Yale University in January 1966. These will appear in book form early in 1967.

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NEVIN S. SCRIMSHAW

The Urgency of World Food Problems

DRAMATIC DIFFERENCES in health and nutrition dangerously divide the developed and technically underdeveloped countries of the world. In the developed countries, food is abundant, nutritional deficiency diseases have been virtually abolished, most children develop to their full genetic potential, and resistance to infectious disease is high. The amount of land used for agricultural purposes and the proportion of the population engaged in farming have decreased steadily, yet per capita food production continues to rise so rapidly that surpluses are helping to stave off mass starvation in a number of less fortunate nations.

By contrast, in the less developed countries malnutrition stunts the growth and development of most of the children, and infection and malnutrition interact to give mortality rates for youngsters which are ten to thirty times higher than those in the United States and Western Europe. In the rural and urban slums of the less developed areas, from one third to one half of the children born alive die before they are five years old. Infections are more frequent because of poor environmental sanitation; they often precipitate fatal nutritional diseases in already inadequately nourished children and are themselves more severe and often a cause of death because resistance is lowered by chronic malnutrition. Not only is the physical growth and development of many children in these nations impaired, but, also, according to a growing body of evidence, their mental age and learning ability may be permanently lowered.

Widespread blindness is being caused by vitamin A deficiency-induced keratomalacia, and individuals with avitaminosis A frequently die of superimposed infection. Anemias due to blood loss from hookworm disease or to dietary deficiencies of iron or B-

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complex vitamins weaken both children and adults. Endemic goiter causes needless disfigurement and sometimes results in mentally defective and physically dwarfed cretins. Ariboflavinosis subtly impairs health and decreases resistance; pellagra is still found in some corn-eating populations; and infantile beriberi has increased in recent years in Southeast Asia as machine milling displaces the hand pounding of corn.

Even though up to 80 per cent of their populations are engaged in agriculture, the less developed countries are losing the capacity to feed themselves. Before World War II, these regions were *exporting* 11 million tons of grain per year to the developed countries. During the early postwar years, 1948-1952, this flow reversed, as an average of 4 million tons of grain per year moved from the developed to the less developed world. As population growth rates accelerated in the 1950's, the flow increased, averaging 13 million tons annually in the years 1957-1959, and approximately 25 million in 1964.

Projections suggest that, at the end of this decade, the per capita supply of grains, legumes, roots, and tubers will be 210 kilograms in the developing countries, 470 in the Communist countries, and at least 670 in the technically developed countries of the West. Per capita food output in Asia, excluding Communist China, has dropped 4 per cent since the postwar high in 1961, and has fallen even more in mainland China. The output in Latin America has declined each year since 1958, dropping 5 per cent in five years. Reports show that per capita food production was lower in 1964 than in the preceding two years in ten of twenty Latin American countries, ten of sixteen countries in the Far East, and all four of the countries of South Asia—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Afghanistan. In forty-three of sixty-three countries for which data are available, per capita production of rice, wheat, and corn is currently decreasing.*

Some positive results are being achieved through the vigorous and costly efforts of many of the less developed countries to increase their food production with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (F.A.O.), the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), the

* The data on agricultural production come primarily from publications of the Economic Research Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, especially the publications "Man, Land, and Food" and "Increasing World Food Output" by Lester R. Brown.

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Rockefeller Foundation, and other agencies. There has been a rise in total food production in nearly all of the developing nations except those torn by civil strife, war, or attempts to collectivize agriculture. But they are not able to keep pace with the needs of the world's growing populations.

The death rates in the less developed nations, although still shockingly high when compared with the rates in industrialized countries of the West, have been falling steadily since the 1930's as a result of public health measures, modern medicine, and the control of mass diseases. There has been no corresponding decrease in fertility, and high rates of population growth are inevitable until efforts to lower the birth rates are effective.

The consequences of a continuing decrease in per capita food production in the developing countries cannot—for political, economic, and agricultural reasons—be avoided indefinitely by ever-increasing food shipments, largely from the United States. Yet, these must be continued at present since the only immediate alternative is further political unrest, administrative chaos, and in some cases mass starvation. It is evident that the rapidly deteriorating world food situation can be permanently improved only if there is a more rapid increase in food production in these regions and a less rapid increase in population.

We cannot, of course, countenance demographic control by a return to higher death rates. Nor should we blame successful public health programs and preventive medicine for the dilemma or lessen our efforts to improve health and reduce mortality in the developing countries. On the contrary, only a well nourished and healthy population can learn readily and achieve high productivity. Unless parents can be assured of living offspring, they cannot be expected to practice family planning. Fertility control is more readily accepted where medical services are effective, and health programs are needed to help disseminate the means of such control. It should be remembered also that we live in a shrinking world and that the return of many of the diseases which once kept death rates high would be a threat to the developed countries as well.

We should not delude ourselves that food shortages will provide a natural check on the increase in the world populations. If we ever allow this to happen, we will destroy virtually all hope of ever narrowing the dangerous gap between the developed and underdeveloped nations before we are engulfed in a world catastrophe. Morally we cannot permit a return to high mortality rates, and

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politically it would be suicidal. There is no rational or acceptable alternative to a reduction in the present high birth rates of developing countries. Fortunately, there are many indications that progress is at last being made in the development and application of effective and acceptable means of limiting family size. It should be a matter of grave concern to all of us that there has not been corresponding progress in increasing agricultural yields.

In the developed countries, yields have more than doubled in the last twenty-five years, while they have increased only about 8 per cent in the technically underdeveloped areas. Most of the growth in food production of the latter regions has resulted from an increase in the land area being cultivated, and not from the introduction of more efficient farming methods. Many countries are now running out of good agricultural land without showing any sign of the yield take-off achieved several generations ago by the present industrialized countries and more recently by Japan.

The factors limiting food production in the developing countries are primarily social and economic rather than physical. These include the illiteracy and inadequate education of the rural populations, long-standing customs, limited agricultural training, inadequate storage and distribution facilities, lack of fertilizer, pesticides, and mechanized equipment, poor seeds and animal breeds, and lack of money or credit.

The effort required to improve the knowledge and productivity of rural workers and to make available the material requisites of modern agriculture far exceeds the present international, bilateral, foundation, industrial, and private aid being offered to the less developed nations. Technical assistance has been too spotty and too limited. Although we may sometimes speak with pride of a single fertilizer factory, milk or fish-flour plant, or set of silos constructed in some country a decade or more ago, we should not lose sight of the fact that hundreds of such projects must be carried out every year for years to make significant inroads into the problem. Obviously, the nature and scale of past efforts both within the developing countries themselves and from outside sources have been inadequate to cope with the situation. This is indicated by the fact that the food gap is still increasing alarmingly, demographic projections are staggering, poverty and social unrest are the rule, and low-income countries are becoming trapped by growing dependence on external sources of food and money.

During the past year historic progress was made by A.I.D. and

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Food for Peace programs in formulating sound statements of the problem and new policies for dealing with it. Their implementation must not be allowed to falter. They can buy the world valuable time, as can the programs of the U.N. specialized agencies, F.A.O., W.H.O., and UNICEF. There is no doubt that present efforts are insufficient in themselves to reverse the current unfavorable per capita food trends.

The industrialized countries as a group must soon come to recognize that the application of scientific and technical knowledge in the developing nations requires a concerted and sustained effort equal to that being made to conquer space or a substantial portion of that devoted to armaments. If a revolutionary breakthrough is not achieved in the application of knowledge in these regions, the time will not be far off when we must all face the consequences of widespread starvation in many of them.

It is clear that the present—*and* future—populations of most of the developing countries could be fed by their own agricultural production of conventional crops if only there were time for crop yields to catch up with their needs and the economic situation improved sufficiently for the people to be able to purchase food. Since neither of these conditions can be met today, we must look to less conventional means to solve part of the food problem.

The major limiting factor in the food supplies of developing countries is the inadequate supply of protein of good quality, although in most cases more calories are needed also. Fortunately, there is no fixed nutritional requirement for the relatively costly sources of protein—milk, meat, and eggs. Legumes and oilseed meals are acceptable alternatives, as is fish protein concentrate. One third of a properly processed oilseed meal combined with two thirds of a cereal grain gives a mixture whose quality and concentration of protein is adequate for all human needs, even those of the infant and young child.

A low-cost, protein-rich vegetable mixture, Incaparina, was developed on this principle by the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP). Over three million pounds of Incaparina were sold in Colombia and Guatemala last year to make a drink with the protein value of milk at one fifth the cost; it is now being test-marketed in Venezuela, Brazil, and the rest of Central America. Similar mixtures are available in India, South Africa, and Hong Kong and can be developed to suit the local agricultural resources and food habits of any developing country.

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Eighty-three million metric tons of oilseeds were produced in the world in 1964, of which only a small fraction was used directly for human consumption. Extraction of the oil leaves a cake containing 50 per cent protein which costs only three to five cents per pound. Thus oilseed meals offer by far the largest and cheapest new source of good quality protein for human consumption, and they must be used for this purpose in the future to a much greater extent than at present.

A recent research breakthrough at Purdue University, the discovery of a gene in corn which can be introduced into any variety and which nearly doubles the quality of the protein, should also be mentioned. Corn contains about 9 per cent protein, but in ordinary varieties less than half of this can be used either by nonruminant farm animals or by man to meet protein needs. There is every reason to believe that similar genes will be found which can improve the protein value of wheat, rice, and other cereal staples such as millet and sorghum.

Last year the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries perfected a process for manufacturing fish protein concentrate from whole lean fish. The resulting powder has a neutral taste and odor and contains 80 per cent protein of high quality. The cost of this concentrate, when it is produced in quantity, should be similar to that of dried skim milk. The process should be of great help in providing protein to countries with good fisheries potentials.

Oilseed meals and fish protein concentrate have been developed to the point where they can now be used on a wider scale to satisfy world protein needs; in a few years, this will also be true of cereal grains having higher nutritive value. Unfortunately, the excellent, newly available synthetic foods made from textured soy protein isolate and the revolutionary freeze-dried foods which are light to transport, keep well, and are highly palatable are far too costly at present to help solve the problems discussed. Ionizing radiation, however, seems likely to make a contribution to the conservation of food even in the developing countries.

Other innovations lie ahead which eventually may relieve some of the pressure for agricultural land. Intensive industrial research into microbial protein grown on petroleum and other substrates is being undertaken both in this country and in France. Photosynthesis can be applied to algae more efficiently than to higher forms of plant life. An increasing number of nutrients are becoming available at low cost in synthetic form. Palatable, wholly synthetic foods,

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although not now economically feasible, are well within the reach of modern technology.

There is a real danger, however, that we will count on these new developments to solve the basic problem of world food supplies rather than concentrate sufficiently on the indispensable task of raising the yields of conventional crops. We need have no concern about the potential ability of agriculture, aided by science and technology, to feed the future world population if only the rate of increase becomes a reasonable one. But, anyone who expects that the important new agricultural and food developments mentioned above assure easy solutions to world food problems is unjustifiably optimistic. Experience to date demonstrates the vast difference between the availability of scientific and technical solutions and their effective application. I can see no substitute for massive assistance which will enable the developing countries to improve their own yields of cereals, legumes, oilseeds, poultry, meat, and eggs and to utilize oilseed meals, better cereals, fish protein concentrate, and other new developments.

This assistance must be unprecedented both in its magnitude and in its emphasis on providing health, motivation, and training for the individuals actually involved in food production, processing, and conservation. It must be flexible enough to adapt to varying social, biological, and physical environments, to give responsibility to the local people, and to make readily available to them the tools, improved seeds, chemicals, and other material requirements of modern high-yield agriculture. The basic productive work must be done by the citizens themselves and not by teams of experts assisted by national counterparts who serve merely as translators, handymen, or companions. The experts must know how to do the technical job, but their role should be largely educational and social. Such assistance can succeed only if the local population is properly fed and protected from disease. It will be difficult unless illiteracy is also overcome.

The principle which should be emphasized is that development depends on the efforts of people and is exemplified by people—and not by material things per se. The finest roads, dams, power plants, school buildings, and hospitals will all be to no avail unless the technical knowledge, motivation, and working capacity of the individuals in a population are improved.

There is, of course, no simple formula that will guarantee success —many different approaches will be required simultaneously, and

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these will vary greatly from country to country. Furthermore, governments, specialized agencies of the United Nations, private foundations, and private groups all must participate. Essential and too often neglected is the crucial role of private industry both in supplying the seeds, chemicals, and machinery which modern farming requires and in producing and marketing the new low-cost, protein-rich foods which the developing countries need.

Even if the industrialized countries are willing to give of both their material and human resources for this purpose on a scale hitherto unimagined, the task will not be easy and will take many years. We still need to learn *how* to share with the less developed nations the benefits of modern agriculture, medicine, education, and industrial technology. The widening food gap attests to the fact that our present efforts are failing to do this.

For our own future and that of the entire world we must soon begin to succeed, or it will be too late. We have a little more time, but not much more. I believe that governmental and private agencies in the United States are now on the verge of leading the world in an effort which can ultimately eliminate the differences in food, health, and opportunity which now so dangerously divide the privileged and underprivileged nations. The goals have been set, but the deeds must still follow.

This article is based on an address by Professor Scrimshaw to the Annual Meeting of the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation on October 18, 1965, in Washington, D. C.

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JOHN W. DYCKMAN

Some Conditions of Civic Order in an Urbanized World

MODERN CITIES and the notion of a social order based on freedom grew up together. Towns developed into cities with the rise of bourgeois institutions—standardized weights and measures, uniform codes of law, and freedom from governmental restrictions. In the new society of North America, men entered the cities free of the feudal restrictions of medieval times. Self-interest was the cement of this union. The Enlightenment, in its optimism, was confident that even the constituent atoms of chemical compounds could be held together by mutual affinity. With the French Revolution, the modern urban order was founded; and the way was cleared for commercial and industrial growth in cities.

By the nineteenth century, with the maturation of what Geddes and Mumford have called the paleotechnic age, the optimism of the eighteenth century yielded to doubt, both about the city and about the stable social order based on self-interest. Now, half-way through the twentieth century, it is apparent that the transition from village to town to city has become a runaway movement in which urbanization, a powerful organizing system which merges small cities with large ones, threatens to destroy the distinctions between small and large places within metropolitan areas.

Imperfect order is a necessary companion of rapid growth. Disequilibrium is the father of change. As a group of French scholars observed recently,[1] men have paid for the advantages of larger cities with a certain number of inconveniences, which, at each succeeding level of growth, have been staunchly protested by adherents of traditional civilization. In this paper, I shall examine several characteristic forms of contemporary urban growth which are capable of upsetting the established social and political order and are likely to impede orderly transition from existing institutions to new ones.

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Runaway Urbanization

The first threat is that of scale. The modern city came to maturity in the late nineteenth century, when the population of Europe increased from 180 to 450 millions, and that of America grew from 5 to 76 millions. This was a century in which mass politics was born, major military confrontations emerged, and the super-cities of our era began to take form. Yet none of the cities we have known has prepared us for the scale of the urban complexes which we shall soon experience. It is likely that during the next three generations the cities will have to accommodate populations at least ten times larger than those currently living in urban areas. If present agglomerative tendencies continue, they will lead to integrated metropolitan areas several times larger than contemporary New York. Harvey Wheeler expresses a common fear of this development with the observation that, "soon each of the country's ten metropolitan areas may have from 30 to 50 million people compacted into them. Traditional interventionist devices simply cannot cope with demographic dis-equilibrium on such a scale."[2]

This dis-equilibrium could take several forms. First, by overspilling old community, state, and national boundaries, metropolitan growth could require political re-ordering, threaten existing social arrangements, and upset the psychological stability of city dwellers. The elaborate technical arrangements necessary to maintain communications and the movement of persons and goods in these large service areas could become exceedingly vulnerable to sabotage or to unforeseen accidents and breakdowns. In addition, such urban growth may lead to population densities which could in time impair biological functioning.

Second, the juxtaposition of high urbanization rates and low per-capita economic growth threatens to plunge certain developing nations into financial chaos or to retard their planned national development. In the Chilean economy, for example, costs directly attributable to urbanization claim half the investment funds of the nation. In countries closer to subsistence, the drain may be felt even more keenly.

Third, urban culture, by feeding the revolutionary growth of expectations, is capable of stoking fires of rebellion and unrest. According to those who hold this view, the dense city is a source of mass discontent which may explode against almost any incidental target. In addition, mass urbanization increases the possibility of

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sudden floods of disquieting communication, including all kinds of inciteful rumors. Where the populations of these urban centers are compartmentalized, the danger of epidemic outbreaks, including those of social pathology, is likely to be increased.

Scale and Density

According to Wheeler, the population of the future city of 30 million might be "compacted" into dense masses. If humans living in the cities interacted like gas molecules in a closed container, or like rats in cages, increased densities could conceivably lead to overheating, or to a volume of contact which would overload the individual's capacity for response, and result in behavior breakdown. Studies on lower animals, such as rats, suggest that this outcome is a serious possibility.[3] However, there are a number of reasons for believing that this outcome cannot be extended to humans by simple analogy.

In the first place, the metropolitan area is not strictly "closed." Though sizable regions of agricultural and village occupancy are "emptying out," and the populations are pouring into cities, the density of inhabitants in urban areas is not increasing markedly. Density is a function of the technology of transportation and of spatial organization as well as the number of persons per acre. No large residential sector of any city in the United States has population densities equal to those of the lower east side of Manhattan at the turn of the century.

Second, and even more important, humans have a capacity for creating internal order behind the protective wall of privacy. Some of the highest densities in our present urban scene are accompanied by a high degree of privacy, particularly in the areas of luxury living. It must be recognized, however, that the personal defenses which secure this internal order may at times become pathological and lead to social disorder. Privacy may be secured by de-personalization, or by withdrawing entirely into oneself. While the anomie observed by nineteenth-century sociologists is one pathological form, a kind of involuntary privacy, the self-concern of bystanders who watch murder and mayhem in a subway without intervening, is another form. A degree of insulation from social concerns may be a price which must be paid for this defense in conditions of extreme overcrowding. Thus, high densities without good transport and communication, without amenities and a means of

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self-protection, are capable of producing dangerous frictions. Where there are means to overcome these, high densities appear quite tolerable. Modern techniques of transportation and communication have made possible cities in the style of Los Angeles. (The Los Angeles trouble-spot of Watts, contrary to the impression created by the mass media, is not a high-density area by conventional urban standards.)

The American urban pattern, in which cities merge in great metropolitan belts, developed as a consequence of the efforts of economically free agents to maximize profits and amenities. In North America, therefore, the city is especially an economic entity. The American city is free, in an economic if not a political sense, to push its boundaries outward. It can preserve a kind of density balance in which individuals' preferences for space are accommodated and technology is used both to concentrate a high intensity of activities and to disperse places of residence. Given the extraordinary heterogeneity of the American population, it is possible that the sprawling development of American cities has actually relieved tension and reduced intergroup conflict by substituting a stratified spatial order for a genuine social accommodation. (The dangers which result from an overly rigid territorial stratification are discussed below.)

In world terms, the new metropolitan growth, with its increasing organization of economic and political life, may be temporarily disequilibrating in a number of ways. First, for poor countries or those in early stages of economic development, the rapid transfer of energies from country to city may appear to be "over-urbanization." Second, the shift from rural to urban values and styles of life may, in the absence of appropriate urban opportunities, appear as "premature" cultural transformation, or result in an over-communication of expectations. Third, the specialization of place, occupation, and roles required by urban society may lead to wasteful and dysfunctional competition. Fourth, but not least important, the communications technology of urban agglomerations in the poorer countries may not match the demands placed upon it. An organizing vacuum may be created when upward and downward communications are blocked—particularly when traditional communications channels are eliminated.

Urban Costs and Economic Development

The first friction, that of over-urbanization, is found in countries

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where rapid population growth outstrips economic development in the pre-take-off period. Over-urbanization is a threat to social order because (1) the demand for the minimum urban capital necessary to accommodate the population at tolerable health and efficiency levels cannot be met by scarce national resources, (2) the growth in economic and political expectations of the new urbanites rises more rapidly than their contribution to economic or political life, and (3) concentration in urban centers gives revolutionary *cadres* a position strategically closer to the management of the society and the conduct of its political life. A principal symptom of over-urbanization is the growth of squatter communities on the fringes of the established cities, sometimes accommodating as large a total population as the old cities. In the underdeveloped countries with high rural birth rates, modest growth in productivity, and a low rate of accumulation of capital, population has been moving to the city at rates comparable to those of the industrial revolution. This has happened without a corresponding growth in economic development, and in a period of improved public hygiene and higher urban birth rates. In areas having high population growth, such as Latin America and the Middle East, the swelling city populations are inadequately housed. In the words of Kingsley Davis:

> By whatever name they are called, the squatters are to be found in all the major cities in the poorer countries. . . . They tend to occupy with implacable determination parks, school grounds and vacant lots . . . these areas account for about 45% of the housing in the entire city [in greater Baghdad] and are devoid of amenities, including even latrines.[4]

Though employment in cities lags behind the growth of the urban labor force, it is in the cities that the new opportunities are to be found. Success in the city is communicated to the rural areas and towns, and an over-response results. Because the rural population is increasing much more rapidly than are the corresponding employment opportunities in the villages and the country, squatters occupy land to which they have dubious legal claim, often with the tacit consent of state and municipal authorities. These squatter communities often lack even the most rudimentary water-supply and sewage systems, though the public health menace is sometimes no worse than in the corresponding slums of the established cities.

Urban Institutions under Pressure

The real difficulties are institutional and political: the squatter

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settlements are private governments which have set up their own administrative enclaves within the governmental process but without benefit of the usual legitimation. They are frequently anti-government (at least as far as the formal constituted government is concerned) and become centers of resistance, occasionally of rebellion. Governmental communication with the squatters is difficult; they may be outside the machinery of mobilization which can help to match people with opportunities.

Urbanization reduces the traditional violence of "feuds" but increases the chance of epidemic violence. The increasing probability of epidemic violence is not an aspect of mass urban society as such, but is a function of the character of communication in a mass society. In the past, when communication was less reliable and available channels were fewer, outbreaks of disorder were by no means uncommon. The Renaissance cities of Northern Italy were, on many counts, riotous and disorderly beyond the tolerable limits of contemporary urban life. Today we have come to depend on reliable communication, such as air-raid warnings, weather reports, and notices of school closings, for the regulation of daily city life. The possibility of manufacturing disorder through unreliable communication has increased with this new dependence. The battle for the radio station is a key feature of any contemporary *coup d'état* from Iraq to Cuba, for the radio is cheap and ubiquitous, and does not depend on literacy for its effectiveness.

Expectations of the New Urbanites

A second effect is observable where urbanization raises expectations more rapidly than it improves the means of achieving them. This is a common obstacle to developing countries striving to conserve capital for development schemes. The city is a powerful educative force in the matter of tastes because of its concentrated buying power, the diversity of consumer goods, and the highly cultivated and conspicuous forms of consumption which are evident. Migrants to the city from rural areas swiftly acquire a taste for urban consumer goods. In some countries, as the Yugoslav experience has shown, the demands of the new urbanites place heavy pressure on the supply of scarce credit. In other countries, pressure is placed on the balance of payments by the high propensity to import foreign consumer goods. The more the values of a country are organized around consumption and its growth, the more dangerous these pressures may be.

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The Watts uprising in Los Angeles in the summer of 1965 may be viewed, at least partially, in this light. Pent-up resentment against deprivation of the right to participate in the urban consumption orgy exploded into attacks on stores, particularly those which practiced the lure of consumer credit and then repossessed the treasured symbols of urban dignity. In part, the residents of Watts were protesting against their inability to participate in the consumer society; in part, too, they were protesting against the terms on which participation was offered.

The social standards of urban life set these expectations. These standards are not the same in all places—for example, the acceptable or expected behavior in Berkeley, California, and Birmingham, Alabama, would be dramatically different. But in almost every case, differences between urban and rural standards within regions of the same country are greater than the differences between those regions. Until these differences are accommodated, the movement of rural people to the cities will create tension.

Segregation and Conflict

In almost every part of the world where rural-urban migration is large, behavioral and social value differentials are accommodated by detaining the migrants in segregated sectors of the city. In the poorer countries, these enclaves are virtually villages within the city boundaries.[5] In the United States, for example, racial segregation emerged as a permanent feature of urban life only after 1900, when Negroes came to the cities in large numbers.[6]

The historic occupational stratification of cities was once economically functional. The medieval city found it advantageous, even necessary, to cluster guilds in recognizable quarters, and to keep villages intact. In contemporary cities, the spatial stratification is frequently less functional. It serves the purposes of social distinction better than it does the efficient use of land, though the latter may be an element in the segregation of industrial and other nonresidential uses.

Segregation is a form of order—a spatial ordering of social relations in the city. The highly developed ancient cities of the Indus Valley assigned residential quarters by occupation, an early expression of the caste system. The medieval city, of which New York is an atavistic reminder, segregated economic activities of the respective guilds. The economic and social order secured by the

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segregation of social groups by residence has become a source of new forms of disorder.

Rigid territorial allocations lead to fixed boundaries which are difficult to maintain. The boundaries, moreover, become the scenes at which sharply differentiated groups meet, and conflict arises. In this sense, neighborhood borders serve to promote conflict in much the way that badly defined but closed boundaries are the cause of disputes between national states. The gangs of city neighborhoods fight fiercely to protect the home "turf." The ghettos which hold populations in become barriers to movement within the city.

Segregation also leaves an area vulnerable to epidemic invasion, whether of physical or social pathology. The flow of information is accelerated by the narrowness of the channel, the homogeneity of the medium, and the absence of conflicting messages. A rumor can sweep Harlem or Watts in a fraction of the time required for it to circulate through mid-town Manhattan. It is significant that segregation has become the symbol of political and social inequality, the mark of a subject population within the larger political community. Racial segregation has bred separatist movements and has fostered the rise of conflicting nationalisms, of which the Black Muslims are a conspicuous example.

Finally, the segregation of the poor and the withdrawal of the rich to small, semi-private political enclaves have prevented the formation of integral political units at the metropolitan level. During periods of rapid urban growth, a major source of in-migration to cities is the rural poor. Thus, at a time when cities are growing large, usually by suburban accretion, they are marked by political fragmentation which combines the existing inequality in income and private consumption with a corresponding inequality in public goods provided by the respective local governments. This process hinders the acculturation and development of the in-migrants.

The Integrative City

The city is an integrating organization form. The politics, economics, religion, and the instruments of social organization and control of a society can be based on the ecology of the city, since communications are conveniently centered there. One would expect, therefore, that the city would mirror the social and political institutions of the society in which it is situated. But the process of urbanization

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is so widespread, and the world's economy so increasingly integrated, that cities in many parts of the world reflect this international organizational growth in their structure and ecological adjustments more than they do the national traits of the society of which they are a part. India, for example, is beginning to show the suburbanization of industry characteristic of the United States and of industrially developed societies.[7] At the jet ports of the world, an international, cosmopolitan society can meet and carry on business without regard for historic differences. This is not to say that the physical or social problems of Calcutta are the same as those of New York. The former are infinitely more severe because the level of wealth, income, and technology is so much lower in India than in the United States. What can be concluded, however, is that the city intensifies the contradictions and conflicts which have been developing within the national society. Cairo is a city of villages in which the inhabitants often have lower literacy than would be found in corresponding villages of the countryside precisely because Egypt has not developed the level of economic activity required by the degree of urbanization which events have thrust upon it.

The growth of this interdependent system, in which cities are increasingly integrated into continental and world systems, responds to, and places new demands upon, technological skill. If, as Seymour Mandelbaum has maintained, a ward and precinct organization was a necessary communication channel to link the business decision-makers with the immigrant workers in Boss Tweed's New York,[8] television, extended by satellite relay, and jet planes with termini connected by expressways are technical devices for coping with the contemporary world metropolitan system. With growth in scale there is an increase in interdependence, and interdependence in turn requires an increase in discipline. In the mature metropolitan centers, this discipline has come to be ingrained and virtually taken for granted; the behavior of New Yorkers during the power blackout and transit strike showed this conclusively.

The Casualties of Efficiency

The discipline of the city dweller, moreover, is accompanied by a real loss of individual power. The forces that affect the metropolitan resident are largely beyond his control. He is a prisoner

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of the location of freeway interchanges, the scheduling (or abandonment) of public transportation, and the accident of hundreds of historical, social, and political boundaries. In its struggle to attain a certain measure of efficiency, metropolitan organization throws off more and more individual casualties. Remedial public policy, in turn, tends to add new casualties, as is the case of urban renewal. The old and the unskilled, and particularly the Negro, are hard-hit by the selective, exacting requirements of a highly competitive efficiency system, moderated as it is by social status barriers. Even compulsory military service has had its greatest impact on the urban Negro—in this case, the young men who have minimal literacy and are most likely to be unemployed or underemployed because of the efficiency tests of metropolitan society.

The exclusion of the Negroes, the unskilled, the old, and the ideologically anachronistic small business types (who provide the recruits of the right wing) from full participation in the post-industrial metropolitan society is matched by the growing distance between the advanced industrial nations and the aspiring nations of Asia and Africa in terms of power, wealth, and influence. Not only is the gap between rich and poor nations widening, but the latter have, in the last five years, suffered some slippage in annual rates of economic growth, portending an increasing disparity between rich and poor. Indeed, the more effectively the economy is organized and rationalized, the more disadvantaged are the weaker competitors, whether they are firms, regions of a federal system, or nations in a world economy. Pockets of lagging growth find it almost impossible to catch up so long as an explicit equalization mechanism, based on other than efficiency, is not introduced. The programs of Appalachia and Mezzogiorno, not to mention the persistent problems of the southwestern and northern areas in Britain, are evidence of the difficulty encountered by disadvantaged elements of a large, thriving nation integrated into a competitive international economy. Without an industrial complex of a critical scale, investment programs poured into underdeveloped regions may suffer very heavy "leakages." The multiplier on federal investments in Alaska, for example, may be less than one. The interest payment for debt service on foreign aid returns almost half the aid of the United States. In addition to the superior returns to industrial and financial complexes, the very organization of the market for contemporary industry requires a scale of demand well beyond that provided by the poorer countries.

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Anti-Urbanism on the Power Fringes

The planning and rationalization of the world and national economies on efficiency (and often profit) lines have deepened social and political divisions. The Afro-Asian bloc, and particularly China, wishes to lead an ideological foray against the increasing rationalization of the world economy by the industrial powers. In Asia, the friction between the insurgent villages of the countryside and the internationally-oriented capital cities is expressed in open conflict. Rural guerrillas are besieging the urban power centers.

In the industrially advanced countries, such as the United States, a strong "anti-organization," "anti-establishment" sentiment is to be found in almost all the dissident groups from the non-ideological left to the ideological right. The student movement, with its protests against machine education and IBM-controlled progress, but also the civil rights movement and an appreciable proportion of the so-called activist youth are seeking some way of uniting private and public issues. They feel strongly that the urban industrial scientific planning activities of the "power structure" are separating public canons of conduct from those of morality, at the expense of both. In particular, they rebel against the one-way character of communications and civic control. The message of televised political speeches is rejected in favor of the atavistic public forum of the mass meeting, the debate, and the bull session. With C. Wright Mills, whom they admire, they are seeking for "media of genuine communication . . . with the aid of which they can translate the private troubles of individuals into public issues, and public issues and events into their meanings for the private life."[9]

Control by Communication

The failure of our urban industrial society to communicate effectively with certain groups whose contribution to the control of the society and the management of its technical system is minimal leads to various types of "crises." Effective communication is essential to crisis management. Misinformation, for example, spread rapidly by rumor and other informal channels has long been recognized as an immediate occasion of many forms of civil disorder. In the long range, the most effective form of social control is control by "communication of influential messages." From one standpoint, much of the jockeying for position in foreign policy and other forms

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of power politics proceeds in this manner. Mobilization, displays of force, exchange of messages, and a variety of other actions can be taken as efforts to communicate strength and intentions to a rival, and to influence his behavior. As David Schwartz has observed, the "strength, range, clarity and credibility of messages"[10] are decisive aspects of communication.

The argument has been made that the management of many crises and potential revolts of the working-class population in New York City at the turn of the century was achieved by the effectiveness of the communication of the ward machine organized on Tammany lines.[11] According to this view, political organization maintained effective social control at the local level through its elaborate personal communication system. On certain issues, that control appears to be less effective in the Negro ghettos of American cities today. The most frustrating aspect of Watts from the standpoint of city officials was their inability to find local leadership through whom they could communicate with the masses of the people. One should scarcely expect to find such control in a situation in which the potential local leaders had long been excluded from the inner councils of political leadership in the city (Los Angeles) and in which the rebellious citizens had little or no confidence in or communication with their nominal leaders.

Considerable attention has been given to the failure of communications media to keep pace with the great demands placed upon them in our urban industrial society. When it is simply a matter of a lag in recording stock-market changes or communicating with motorists in traffic jams, the cost of the loss of control has been tolerable. In the case of social discontent, it is much more serious. The citizens of Watts challenged the major American principle of the sanctity of private property and the civil order built upon it. When the disturbances arose, there was little time for making decisions. The main decision-makers had, moreover, failed to anticipate the situation. In the resulting crisis, they displayed a fatal inability to communicate with the aggrieved citizens. By contrast, it was possible for order to be maintained during the power blackout in New York City even with the breakdown of much of the formal communication machinery (only transistor radios were working).

These cases suggest, at least superficially, that processes of social control and social influence depend on the subjective state of those who receive information, as well as on many other factors, includ-

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ing trust. But they may also suggest that there is considerable risk in excluding a major segment of the population from participation in the social and political communication processes in a society which depends so heavily on predictable individual responses in order to preserve the smooth workings of its technology. In a very real sense, our urban centers are becoming more vulnerable to civil disobedience. People can be excluded from the technical decisions, but their ability to sabotage the workings of the system suggests that communication with these citizens is lost at great peril.

The Urban Outsiders

If the city is a powerful integrating device for a society undergoing rapid social and economic change, and if the characteristic modern urban culture is rationalized, pluralistic, and dependent on highly developed communications media, those who are not "integrated" into the urban system will be more completely alienated from participating in the society than were marginal groups in pre-metropolitan areas. The degree of this alienation and its consequences for social order are functions of the rate and amount of change, the pre-urban cohesiveness of the societal values, the homogeneity of the population, and the wealth of the society. In rich societies, the "unintegrated" can be bribed not to upset the smooth functioning of the urban machinery, and their dysfunctional behavior can be made the basis of folk art, as is the case with Negro-based popular music in the United States and the expressive "mod" fashions of Britain.

Nevertheless, explosive residues of discontent are found everywhere in the world urban order. In the poor countries, it is the students, whose training has outrun the growth of opportunity in the society and whose break with the folk culture has freed them for protest actions, who form the core of the marginal society and shoulder the burden of social upheaval. The unskilled workers transported to the urban setting are, in the absence of ethnic or tribal animosities, less likely participants in these outbursts. In the rich countries, social protest explodes into mass disorder only where the marginal groups have been completely excluded from participation and communication as well as from sharing in the material benefits of their society. Yet there is evidence that a more subtle and pervasive discontent with the rationalized economic and social

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organization of the metropolis has penetrated many ranks of life in the most advanced industrial nations.

Traditionally, the pull of the city for small-town and village dwellers lay in social freedom, cultural variety, and economic opportunity. These pulls exist today, but appear to be diminishing in force—being replaced in part by the drive to be in the *main stream,* rather than in an exotic culture. The city is so successfully integrative that it is drying up the regional sources of cultural difference. The outsiders are fighting a rear-guard action against the very success of the city in the post-industrial Western world; they distrust the goals of the processes of integration which it represents. Their "new humanism," which is touched with Renaissance romance, insists upon an assertion of the ends of mankind, upon a release from indirect relations, from organizational discipline, and from the requirements of instrumental efficiency. Unlike their youthful counterparts in the developing countries, the Western outsiders distrust efficiency in the service of material progress.

Material progress, based on mastering the techniques of an industrial civilization, is the professed goal of almost every society in the world. Where ultimate ends diverge, material progress is accepted as a necessary means.[12] The United States has not only succeeded in achieving extraordinary material progress and storing great quantities of goods, but it has also successfully vulgarized the idea of progress. Presumably, this notion of ever-spiraling progress in material well-being should carry with it the optimism of the Enlightenment which spawned it. A sizable segment of the American community, including a preponderance of Negro members, has been imperfectly infected with that optimism. For Negroes, the promise appears hollow; for certain segments of the Right, the instrumental costs in terms of other goals have been too high; for a portion of the youth, exclusion from the decision-making processes, bureaucratic control, and de-politicalized decisions by the disciplined industrial command have bred a new kind of distrust.

The city as an artifact of our cultural development may be criticized on aesthetic grounds, may be damned for its unexpected frictions and unwelcome costs, and may be deplored for its heedlessness; but, as an instrument for the accommodation of more and more of the world's population in a single economic efficiency system, it has been effective. Dissatisfaction with urban life in the richer countries of the world stems from the fact that urban trappings are symbolic of ideals which are chimerical to the excluded

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minorities, and with which others have become disenchanted. To the rebels of the poorer nations, the progressive organization of the world in an urban system for economic efficiency is a symbol of the dominance of the capital-rich nations, with their monopoly of modern arms. For both groups, the technological adaptation of metropolitan life is the heraldry of triumphant, and sometimes inhuman, materialism.

The very technological dependence of the city makes it vulnerable to the resistance of dissidents within it, as events in Saigon have demonstrated. The city, moreover, is the historic incubator of ideas—the richness of its communications milieu produces change. If the city proves to be a force for the disorganization of our present world industrial order we may expect that the forces will emanate from the ideological unrest of the unassimilated groups within the city, and not from the technical breakdown of the urban apparatus as a result of increased scale, runaway growth, or indigestible communications demands. The city is a threat to our economic-technological order mainly because the inhabitants of the metropolis resist the functional demands and the personal costs of its drive for efficiency.

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PAUL MUS

Buddhism and World Order

At the Conference on Conditions of World Order,* held in Bellagio, Italy, Raymond Aron enumerated several possible meanings of the term "world order." He suggested that the seminar concern itself with one of them, half descriptive and half normative—"order as the minimum condition for coexistence"—rather than with the purely normative one—"order as the conditions for the good life." The latter would too easily have been interpreted to mean "the good life as the condition for world order," which would have resulted in each participant supporting his own conception of that life. This, according to Professor Aron, could lead "only to platitudes or to acrimonious reproduction of the conflicts of values that exist in the world."

Under that cautious guidance, we avoided such dangers and reached substantial agreement "on the importance of the nuclear stalemate and on the continuing dynamics of development as the bases of world order." In contrast with this basic agreement, the seminar "reflected quite well the present state of affairs" in that it flatly disagreed "on the extent to which the new forms of interdependence would create not only the 'minimum conditions of coexistence,' but also a genuine community of values and of power" as a prerequisite to the endorsement of these conditions.

The quotation from an ancient Chinese author, Mo-ti, selected by Professor F. S. C. Northrop as an epigraph for his book, *The Meeting of East and West* (1946), still retains its relevance: "Where standards differ, there will be opposition. But how can the standards in the world be unified?"

What can a philologist hope to contribute to the kinds of issues

* Stanley Hoffmann's resumé of the conference appeared in the Spring 1966 issue of *Dædalus*.

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raised at our Bellagio meeting? A letter from the Editor of *Dædalus* specified the initial intention. He wrote:

> In a world in which we increasingly think of people only in economic terms . . . we ought to realize that there are other criteria for categorizing them also. Not the least of these criteria is the one provided by religion. . . . The existence of certain religions in the East is as important a factor in determining the attitude of these people as any other single factor. We in the West tend to ignore such factors and to think that what really separates one society from another is simply the level of economic development. It is well to be reminded that such categories as *developed* and *underdeveloped* are not the only important ones.

The obvious advantage of convening a seminar on "The Conditions of World Order" essentially among political scientists and economists, some of the latter "in charge of economic planning in their respective countries," East as well as West, was that the procedure, directed by a thinker and debater of Raymond Aron's class, simply could not have gone astray. It was a professional matter for that group of participants. The fact that eminent natural scientists were also invited to the conference to advise or arbitrate from the point of view of the latest scientific methods did not raise any problems and helped us to make our way toward the solution of a few.

With all the diffidence that befits a layman confronted with such technicalities, I must confess that to my mind the term "world order" seems to imply, besides planning, a broader inquiry which considers the appeal of such planning to the interested parties, that is, to the vast intercontinental areas markedly differentiated—as Mr. Graubard rightly observed—not only by their economic development, but also by deeply diverging trends in their conception of the world as a whole. In its widest implication, I would take the term not in any abstract sense but in a definite sense, what linguists call a *pregnant* sense, connoting, in the present case, some model of an order and also ways of implementing it.

I am thus at one with Stanley Hoffmann when he admits that our seminar reflected serious misgivings in this matter. Wherever planners do not secure or are denied solid ground on which to pursue the application of their propositions, planning reminds us of Aristophanes' satire of the great Socrates. In the light of what was to follow, one may think that the author of *The Clouds* unintentionally passed judgment not so much on the Sage of Sages as on those, including himself, who did not recognize him as such: History took charge of carrying out the sentence. The lesson is thus that a *plan*

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for world order, no matter how well-devised and realistic, may not even constitute a step toward world order if it provokes a sufficient amount of opposition—even unfounded opposition.

Religions, especially in Asia, represent, even today, more than "folkloristic residues," as they were tellingly described in one of our sessions. Moreover, no great Asian religion, whether Hinduism, Buddhism, or the popular Chinese mixture of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddism, may be categorized among "single factors." For these traditions, world order is not, as it is for us, a matter to which they may sometimes turn their attention. It is not, according to Professor Northrop's penetrating analysis, a *postulation*, a prospective and provisional scheme which we formulate, check against experience, and more or less successfully try to improve upon. It asserts itself as an autonomous, continual, and all-embracing process in which we find and may more effectively insert ourselves. The total, not the individual, comes first—a mode of thinking coinciding with Durkheim's much discussed but fundamentally sound description of society as an organic whole rather than as a mechanical addition of parts and circumstances.

Many centuries before the Stoics elaborated the idea of world order along lines still largely accepted by the Western world—though in a quite different spirit because of the penetration of Christian values—world order was generally conceived, throughout a wide cultural area extending from Egypt to China, not as a more or less direct religious preoccupation. On the contrary, it was religion itself, in its highest and impersonal expression, reflected on earth and personalized in a Pharaoh, a King of Kings, a Son of Heaven, or a King of the Wheel.

This can be seen, for instance, in Joseph Needham's suggestive *aperçu* of the Chinese version of the Pattern of Patterns:

> The highest spiritual being known and worshipped was never a Creator in the sense of the Hebrews and the Greeks. . . . The Chinese world-view depended upon a totally different line of thought. The harmonious cooperation of all beings arose not from the orders of a superior authority external to themselves, but from the fact that they were all parts in a hierarchy of wholes forming a cosmic pattern and what they obeyed were the internal dictates of their own nature.

Under various formulations, this high level of temporal and religious organization seems to retain, though with obvious differences, something of a previous, more primitive period, when divine powers may have been less directly conceived as personal figures.

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The outcome is often called Asian pantheism—a term which should be accepted only with the reservation that, as in the previous stage, the site was more divine than the genius, often theriomorphic and especially ophidian, that haunted it. In the same spirit, now, the total image of the world and of world order remains more divine than the pantheism it accommodates.

Such considerations will not be easy to reconcile with the notion so deeply embedded in our religious traditions that God has meant our surroundings to be, in the last resort, a Valley of Sorrow through which we gain a new life in the hereafter, once this world of ours comes to its end and final judgment is pronounced on us according to whether we have or have not succeeded in redeeming ourselves from its iniquities. Such a world is much more closely connected with the notion of an ordeal than of an order. However, many Westerners would not endorse such ideas today. Among those who would endorse them, many would not be fanatical about them, as was true in previous times. This is why Raymond Aron thought it possible to ask us to forget our personal and often irreconcilable conceptions of "the good life."

But, from another point of view, would it not be possible for our modern world, insofar as it is not totally satisfied with Newton's understanding of the laws of nature as given by a personal God and Creator, to find inspiration in the descriptive, naturalistic, and rational principles underlying China's classical philosophy? It is well known that such was the feeling of certain of our eighteenth-century thinkers, even though the interval was one of at least two thousand years, and of a society half a planet away. Joseph Needham's illuminating study, *Human Laws and Laws of Nature in China and the West,* Professor F. S. C. Northrop's *The Meeting of East and West,* and the collective volume published under his general editorship, *Ideological Differences and World Order,* give a sufficient idea of how large the gap remains.

The comparative approach may occasionally lead to suggestive conclusions, even though our current documentation on ancient and medieval Asian institutions derives mainly from religious or purely literary sources. Professor Needham's analysis of the Chinese cosmic pattern could, for example, help us to discern on our own side some very special stresses and trends during the Nazi venture—that most devastating attempt of ours at an authoritarian ordering of the world. Although lip service was paid to a God of its own, the Nazi machinery did not work fundamentally through divine com-

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mand or through rational principles, but through the fanatical application of a pattern—the Pattern of Patterns, that of the "tall, blond, dolichocephalic Aryan race"—established, much more emotively than in the Chinese system, as the supreme reference. This earth had already been given a foretaste of its reign during an Aryan semi-mythical Golden Age. It was to be reestablished, and this time for thousands of years. The prophecy was somewhat curiously echoed each morning, though in quite different cultural surroundings and with different racial connotations, in the greetings of the Japanese to their emperor and the dynasty: *Banzai,* "Ten thousand years!" East and West thus demonstrated their ability, if not to meet, at least to build between themselves the two extremities of an axle uniting either the most or the least commendable elements in both—a factor to be kept in mind when planning for world order.

Asian Order and the Westerners' Inroads

China, as early at least as Ch'in Shih Haun-ti, had built herself more than just theoretically into a self-contained and self-assertive world. Is it not symptomatic of that "Middle Kingdom" that the Dutch Sinologist De Groot should have summed up his elaborate interpretation of the popular Chinese syncretism of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism in the specific term *Universism*? In a less centralized but equally effective way, India, culturally, reached a similar position. In the eyes not only of her own "teeming millions" but also of her Southeast cultural dependencies, India became not just a large part of the world but the central expression of a world order. As already indicated by the famous message of Prince Shōtoku to the Sui Emperor, Yang-ti: "The Emperor of the Rising Sun to the Emperor of the Setting Sun . . ." (607 A.D.), the Japanese line long followed the same direction, although it was somewhat distorted, for a while, by its connection—without adequate ethical compensation—with modern Western power concepts.

How, then, can we expect such cosmic, self-vindicating systems, still powerful at the popular level, to put aside their traditional assertions about themselves in order to adopt our own set of values? This would be a self-denial unlikely to appeal to them since it would mean their joining us, under our leadership, in our desperate endeavors to establish some minimum of world order in the teeth of an impending destruction. The Afro-Asian nations see the present situation as proof that our system leads to destruction far more

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directly than to order. Are we, in the West, sufficiently aware that if the Russo-Japanese War offered evidence to Asians that they might emulate the West, the First World War (not to mention the Second) came as a warning that they ought not to do so? Something else had to be found: a Western-sponsored United Nations Organization may not be in a position to overcome this handicap; it will look dangerously like a stopgap.

We have not fully realized the implications of the fact that the major Asian civilizations view world history as essentially cyclical. In contrast with our own Western conception of an open, indefinite progression, they recognize progress and regress—that is, an alternation, at the cosmic level, of general improvement and deterioration of world order, bringing us periodically back where we began, thus to start all over again.

As a result, each of these different traditions considers that the Golden Age existed when their own patterns of thought and collective as well as private behavior were naturally followed all over the world. The notion that things could have been otherwise does not even arise. Degenerescence—whatever be its final reason—began when an increasing number of people went astray. This is a view which Westerners often do not understand, but which it is essential for us to know. How can the Asian civilizations fail to hold us and our activities responsible for the ever deeper obscurity of this Iron Age, where the leading powers in the world appear to have lost their bearings so that we not only openly expect—and dread—Armageddon, but prepare for it with all our might?

The first Asian impulse, a distinctly conservative one, would be to go back to its own traditions. This mood derives its strength partly from the preceding considerations, partly from the belief in transmigration—always so difficult for us to grasp—according to which Westerners and all that they represent and bring with them, *problems* rather than *solutions*, do not belong in the East at all. If they did, they would have been reborn there as natives.

This does not mean that belief in *karma* and transmigration discourages travel and communications—quite the contrary. In the usual, flexible, and highly pragmatic application of the doctrine, the contacts between the local people and visitors, sailors, traders, temporary guests, or even colonizers show that there must be enough in common in their respective retributions for these people to meet in the East. However, in contrast with the case of the natives destined by their merits and demerits to be born there and

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nowhere else, the force that brings alien elements to their countries operates peripherally; they will *come* but they do not *belong* there.

In good doctrine, to hear of Burma, or Cambodia, or Viet-Nam, then go there, and finally be born there, but as an alien, constitutes a regular progression. As these are Buddhist countries where one may get acquainted with the Master's teaching and his church, this progression allows the classification of the corresponding "destinies" as an escalation of rewards. But, as a Vietnamese friend told me once very seriously, to be entitled to a share in the administration and, consequently, in the revenue of the country, a person must wait until karmic retribution has moved one step further, making him a Burmese, Cambodian, or Vietnamese, as the case may be, by right of birth. Otherwise, there will be a perversion of the world order and commensurate punishment. "Why are you in a hurry?" asked my friend. "You are already so close to us, you and some of your compatriots. It *must* come!"

I confess that such speculations are a far cry from our quiet and productive Bellagio meeting; but perhaps this is one reason that a brief mention of them should find a place here. The road to international peace will *also* have to pass by Mandalay and Bangkok, by Phnom Penh and Saigon.

The age of Western colonial domination has come to an end. Since my early years in Viet-Nam and for nearly half a century, the Vietnamese never ceased to expect the final French withdrawal and to speculate on the time it would take. They considered it a natural and inescapable issue. They had reason to know: With the Chinese, occupation went on, once, for eleven centuries, time enough to build up two or three local Joans of Arc. This is not a country where the spirit of resistance wears off easily.

All this suggests that we should pay attention to the steady propaganda that feeds the newly liberated nations with the fear that colonization is not over, that a less overt but no less efficient form of neo-colonialism has taken its place. The criterion of transmigration, so remote from our usual way of thinking, is destined to play a not inconsiderable role in the opinions that the Southeast Asian masses form of the situation at home and abroad. Twenty years after the event, I see little to change in the conclusion of a report sent to General de Gaulle after a clandestine contact, in his name, with the Indochinese "underground" under the Japanese occupation: "nothing will grow any more in Viet-Nam except on the deepest local roots."

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This is certainly not to say that Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos, or their sister-nations of the culturally "Anglicized" half of Indochina will fall back on their old customs and superstitions, as may happen at first in some backward areas. The world is moving; they know it, and do not want to lag behind. They will need to be equal participants this time in the common venture. Token industrialization, screening their role as essentially purveyors of raw materials, will never do. To go to Tokyo and visit exhibitions displaying German, French, English, and American counterfeits or allegedly "inferior" copies of Japanese cameras, recorders, binoculars, and the like is to see what Asian industrialism can be. I would not say that such a goal is near for the Southeast Asian nations; nor do they believe it. But whoever does not understand that industrialism is at least one of their goals, and why it is, will find them difficult to handle. It is natural that they are sensitive about the management of their internal affairs. They will go abroad and learn, but the time of the foreign adviser is over.

To say this, of course, is to enter on highly controversial ground, and the objections can easily be anticipated. First, a question: "Does it apply to Northern Viet-Nam too, with its Russian and Chinese advisers and technicians?" Yes, given time, for we have to take into account that circumstances and perhaps a better understanding of the local psychological conditions have allowed the "obtrusion" to be lighter and less self-assertive there. But the more forcible exception will be that, in view of all that is at stake in Viet-Nam, with the prospect of an escalation of American expeditionary forces from two hundred to four or even six hundred thousand men in the near future, and the issuance of official statements suggesting that "We are reaching the stage when we shall not lose any more"—the whole picture of Vietnamese sensitivity to karmic interference of Westerners and their expectations may sound obsolete and somewhat childish.

One ought not, however, to regard as negligible the liminal and often subliminal approach of the Asian masses to this kind of situation. If they are to be expected eventually to shoulder a sizable share of the program devised for them, they must first of all be made to feel at home in it, to become aware, in terms closer to their way of thinking, that they belong in it. But how can they experience such a feeling and awareness if they do not initiate the program themselves? Is this a vicious circle? If so, the first step should be to recognize it as such.

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Buddhist Concern in This World: Historical Background

Since the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which marked the end of the Colonial period in what was once called French Indochina, many new political factors have come to the fore in the whole of Southeast Asia. None has taken our experts more by surprise than the role played in many tense circumstances by the various schools of Buddhism in Mahāyānist Viet-Nam, as well as in the countries of Theravāda obedience, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma, all of which claimed Ceylon as their religious metropolis. Although Buddhism there was recognized as having deep roots, governing peoples' lives and behavior, it was reputed to be non-political.

I have attempted to explain elsewhere that this erroneous assessment of the political influence of the Doctrine of the Elders (Theravāda) derives from data, texts, translations, and exegesis mainly established through the sustained activity of the Pali Text Society, first in Ceylon and later in Burma. The British Raj had put an end to the local Buddhist dynasties in these two countries in 1802 and 1885 respectively. In both cases, this left a kind of rump Buddhist society deprived of the vitally important support of the faith which the temporal authority is canonically in charge of. This temporal Buddhism was based on the commemoration and cult of the Master, with the Church, for its part, entrusted with the perpetuation of his teachings.

No critical account seems to have been taken of this grave mutilation. Our vision is of a Southern Buddhist monasticism that has turned its back to the world in quest of an egoistic, personal salvation, to be fulfilled in a monastic career extending over several lives, in accordance with the basic belief in transmigration.

When viewed in this manner, Buddhism becomes a complete enigma. How was it possible for a religion so lamely equipped doctrinally to conquer half the world? In his well known book on *The Religion of India,* Max Weber, noting that the Buddha's teaching gave birth to "one of the great missionary religions on earth," inserts this mystified comment:

> This must seem baffling. Viewed rationally, there is no motive to be discovered which should have destined Buddhism for this. What could cause a monk who was seeking only his own salvation and therefore was utterly self-dependent to trouble himself with saving the souls of others?

According to Hermann Oldenberg, our most authoritative ex-

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pert, "princes and nobles, Brahmans and merchants, we find among those who 'took their refuge in Buddha, the Law and the Order,' i.e., who made their profession as lay believers; the wealthy and the aristocrat, it seems . . . exceeded the poor." Were such people attracted by "the giddiness of annihilation" and by the final negation of self and soul, fading away in the unfathomable vacuity of Nirvana?

Oldenberg asserts that the belief in transmigration had put the last touch to the dreadful picture of the condition that the thought of India, exposed to the woes of a tropical climate, was convulsing itself into. Elaborating on the vedic hymns, most of which concerned, according to him, the legacy of happier times, Oldenberg says that the ritualists

> on all sides . . . descried gloomy formless powers, either openly displayed or veiled in mysterious symbols, contending with each other and like harassing enemies, preparing *contretemps* for human destiny. The tyranny of death also is enhanced in the estimation of the dismal mystic of this age; the power of death over men is not spent with the one blow which he inflicts. It soon comes to be averred that this power over him, who is not wise enough to save himself by the use of the right words and the right offerings, extends even into the world beyond and death cuts short his life yonder again and again; we soon meet the conception of a multiplicity of death-powers of whom some pursue men in the worlds on this side and others in the worlds beyond.

Thus, even death, the supreme recourse of the unfortunate in case of extreme misery, failed the degenerate and endarkened scions of the "tall, blond, dolichocephalic" race that so valiantly had entered the country a few centuries earlier.

In fact, and quite apart from such mistaken ideas of ours, the philosophy and *Weltanschauung* of the Vedas, reflecting the impact of the Indo-European tribes in India, had very strong positive characteristics. To the variegated and at first disconcerting appearance of the Indian world and its denizens, they opposed, as a deliberate counterweight, the massive unity of an ideal world. This world was bolstered by endless sacrifices, the soul and repository of which were to be found in the vedic texts. The epitome of Indo-European traditions and values thus became the cultural program of the invaders. In the course of the centuries, it had to cope with indigenous and mixed traditions and products, such as the belief in local spirits and gods and, above all, transmigration. The outcome was Hinduism, in which the positive values, previously built on sacrifice (*yajña*),

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were transferred to a more personal devotion (*bhakti*) to a personalized cosmic power, Ishvara "The Lord." Ishvara was seen as the Lord of the Universe and, pantheistically, as that universe itself. The self (*ātman*) of the devotee, once built on his sacrificial achievements (*karma*), was now more and more authenticated by, and at the same time finally reabsorbed in, the omnipresence and omnipotence of these Ishvaras (Shiva and Vishnu). The world, in such a perspective, tended to become a mere picture, an illusion (*māyā*), supreme religious values being everywhere. For the initiate, it was a refuge from the real world and its problems.

This is precisely what the Buddhist revelation sweeps out: the whole mental construction is shattered and with it the prestige and profits which the Brahmans derived from it. At the same time, it becomes less surprising that the new doctrine should have rejected the notion of the person (*ātman*), and yet presented itself, to all objective assessment, as the most rigorous "personalism." It builds each individual entirely on himself and his own actions, without ritual alibis or escapes by atonement. Thus, the conventional self of the Hinduistic rites and devotion was definitively eliminated, leaving everyone to face his own responsibilities: "none but the doer of the deed will reap the fruit of the deed." It was a reformation of a kind. The days of the indulgences were past.

The real innovation was to reject final identification with the obscure and unpredictable notion of the cosmic total and to assert that the truth of the transient substantive "states" (*beings*) lay in their very transience, determined by their moral—instead of their ritual—actions (*karma*). Hence the interest shown by early, basic Buddhism in the temporal world. For these early Buddhists, there was (in contrast with the Brahmanical views) no other world on which to rely in order to reach liberation from this one. It is the way in which we handle this world of ours, reducing its beings and finally our being into ways and means of action (*karma*), that leads, thanks to the Buddha's illuminating disclosures, to the "way out" (*nirvana*).

Cosmic Law and World Order: The Burmese Experiment

But was this sufficient to justify a temporal Buddhism, which was overseen by faithful kings and tended to maintain and develop not only order, but prosperity and even abundance in this world—a remarkable anticipation of our "continuing dynamics of development" as the basis for world order? How can such an anticipation

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of our concept of the Welfare State, with which the historical Maurya king, Ashoka (3rd century B.C.), has been especially credited, be reconciled with the strict doctrine of personal action and retribution, clear of all indulgences, recourses to "others," and alibis?

What is a king, but a figurehead in the inexorable, though not fatal, process of transmigration, in which everyone may count on his own actions, and on nothing else whatsoever, to improve his future conditions?

Professor Emanuel Sarkisyanz, in his remarkable exposition of *The Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution*, has found solid reasons for denouncing local attempts at re-enacting the great Maurya king's *saga* as tragically inconsistent with the ethics and teachings of the Master. Under the pretext of emulating Ashoka, whose glory is to have replaced the drum and weapons of war by the weapons and drum of the Law—the sound of which was the signal of his moral conquests—Burmese historical sovereigns ended in a bath of blood their unfruitful attempts to extend their power over their neighbors. One of them went so far as to boast of having built pyramids of heads. If the Buddhist Cosmic Law is, as canonically described, a peaceful, all-embracing ordering of the world, what has it to do with such cruel and unfortunately too authentic stories?

The notion of cosmic law can be derived from several sources in which the proportion of observation and positive verification, in contrast to pure theorizing, varies greatly. The Brahmanical sacrificial approach of pre-Buddhistic times, centering essentially on the typical Aryan family and its head (*pati*), was related to the ultimate abstract power of the sacrificial formula (brahman), in harmony with the seasons of the year. However, the Buddhist mode of salvation took into consideration a finally impersonal sequence of actions and retributions (*karmaphala*), which was mistaken by "unawakened" (lit. "childish") minds for a "self" or "soul" (*ātman*).

In early Vedic times, the ritualistic approach, with its extensive and strict pattern of sacrificial procedures (*karma*) which covered and authenticated all actions and circumstances of human life, could harmoniously organize that society to meet the short-range interests and elements of routine existence. They developed a hand-to-mouth, autarkic economy. There were, of course, occasional wars against the aborigines, the results of which, as the outcome demonstrates, were usually favorable.

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But as soon as we transpose the problem from the simple, comparatively uneventful schedule of a *grihapati*'s life, ancient-style, to what befalls a kingdom, its population, and its cities, especially during the uncertain and agitated centuries that followed the advent of Buddhism, an oversimplified and ritualistic conception of cosmic law and world order can no longer work satisfactorily.

Max Weber, following Oldenberg, appears to strike the right note when he stresses the fact that "rural surroundings, cattle and pasture were characteristic of the ancient Brahmanical teachers and schools, at least in the early times of the Upanishads, whereas the city and the urban palace with its elephant-riding kings were characteristic of Buddha's time." This applies, of course, to Hinduized India as well as to Buddha's time.

Wars, invasions, and political and religious revolutions obscured what had been, for a while, a clear and somewhat monotonous conception of world order as the frame of a prosperous "Aryan" life. The final effect was that all Indian religions from then on had to accommodate themselves to a more intricate, more rhythmic, and broader vision of the world—the theory of the recurrent ages—which might well have originated in the Middle East in connection with early astrology and astronomy. It told of a vanished Golden Age. The turn taken by contemporary history, especially in Northern India, thus announced the cataclysmic approach of an end of the world. Early Buddhism associated these ideas with belief in a gradual recession of the Buddha's teaching, leading to the disappearance of the Doctrine of the Church. It found comfort, however, in the expectation of a new Golden Age, to be brought back to earth by the coming of a new Buddha, Maitreya. Though evidently unfounded scientifically, this way of thinking comes remarkably close to what we would call the graph of a periodic phenomenon—in this case, the phenomenon of phenomena, that is, the phenomenon of the world or worlds as a whole.

If such a graph were known with perfect accuracy, we would be able to predict effectively the turn that our lives and the world's affairs would be expected to take. However, no Indian system has ever claimed this degree of accuracy, least of all Buddhism. It was essential to its doctrine not to submit to any fatalistic predestination: the act (*karma*) was to build the world in accordance with the full responsibility of the actors.

Thus, the Buddhists, in the pangs of the present Iron Age, were bound to attach ever greater importance, just to be able to see ahead

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of themselves, to the exact position of our world as shown on its graph. This made sense of the royal power, of its social activities, its attempts at a peaceful conquest of the earth, establishing a Welfare State that would take charge of the entire world, an ideal nearly attained by Ashoka. Such a reign was a check and, in the case of success, a signal: It meant that the Buddha to come was not indefinitely deferring his coming. There might still be many centuries to wait, but a turning point must have already been reached as things seemed to be improving instead of growing worse. The psychological value of such speculations is not to be slighted. We have recently had ample occasion to appreciate the deep impression made on the Buddhist world by the conviction that we have reached, with the 2500th anniversary of the Buddha's birth, the precise point when we could consider ourselves halfway between his "revelation" and his expected successor, Maitreya.

The West cannot remain indifferent to the fact that so many millions of our contemporary "fellow men" look in that direction in their expectation of an oncoming world order.

The massacres perpetrated by the Buddhist kings who tried to emulate the Maurya Emperor thus make more sense—if a dire and forbidding one. They should be understood as a kind of test or ordeal. Such wars were initiated as a check of the point reached by world affairs on the graph of the ages of the world. The history and, even more clearly, the legend of Ashoka's reign established the pattern of such an experiment. Whatever his final relation to the oncoming Buddha, a point which, in the present state of our documentation, cannot be clearly assessed, after a bloody beginning, a moment had come when—because of his past merits and the accumulated merits of all men and of his contemporaries—the latter spontaneously turned to him and submitted to his sway without further resistance. Such is evidently the signal that the Burmese conquerors sought—and that finally did not come.

There would be great profit in reading Professor Sarkisyanz's remarkable book in the light of such preconceptions, still alive among the masses. This would make it easier to understand why U Nu, commonly taken in 1960 to be the impersonation of the King of the Wheel (*cakravartin*) that forebodes the coming of the Buddha, or even as the "incarnation" of the Buddha himself, should have been quasi-unanimously borne to power, and nevertheless failed in the eyes of his fellow countrymen and found little support among them against General Ne Win, when the latter deposed

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him in 1962. U Nu had remained short of the expected "signal": bringing around the Communists to his charisma. This political or, more accurately, cosmic test had, to all appearances, failed.

Conclusion

Relying largely on Professor Sarkisyanz's admirable analysis of the Buddhistic backgrounds of the Burmese crisis, I have tried to show how difficult it is for Westerners to comprehend a vision of the world and world order which is neither *normative* nor purely *objective*, but, shall we say, *prospective*. Still deeply affected by their traditionally half-Buddhistic, half-folkloristic approach to such problems, the masses bet heavily on what they imagine will or might happen—their stakes being themselves. The closest analogy with our modern methodology would be Claude Bernard's famous *Expérience pour voir*. U Nu has been given precisely that chance and has not lived up to it—his achievements as well as his failure offer a remarkable illustration of both sides of the question.

Thus, far from considering "lay" Buddhism, Ashokan style, as a mere pragmatic accretion to the Theravāda faith, a closer study of its intimate connection with the doctrine will help to reconstruct a more human and convincing picture of both the social and political expansion of the Southern School and the eventual grounds for its reconciliation on such matters with the much more open and active leanings of the Mahāyānist or Northern School which prevails in Central and Eastern Asia, Viet-Nam included.

If, before the arrival and interference of the Westerners, a kind of political, quasi-national Buddhism was established on authentic Theravāda and Mahāyāna values, it would seem possible to build, at least between the various Indochinese denominations, a new covenant on that strong and lasting foundation: the Buddha's message.

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GODFRIED VAN BENTHEM VAN DEN BERGH

Contemporary Nationalism in the Western World

I. *An Exploration*

UNTIL VERY recently the subject of contemporary nationalism in the Western world was considered more or less dead. It seemed as if the mature democracies of the West were moving slowly but surely to establishing the institutions necessary to cope with their mutual dependence. Differences arose not between nationalists and internationalists, but between federalists and functionalists, between regionalists and universalists, or between "Europeans" and "Atlanticists." Nationalism was considered a thing of the past, linked to the unspeakable atrocities committed in its name. Nationalism had to be transcended to build a new world, so it was better to believe it no longer existed.

This was made easier by the fact that nationalism is a very vague concept. It does not imply a precise reference to a phenomenon in the real world. There are as many definitions of nationalism and its object, the nation, as there are writers about nationalism.[1] Nationalism has manifested itself in many historical forms, and the consequences of nationalist strivings have been both beneficial and disastrous. The evaluation of nationalism as a social force is therefore difficult and often determined by the specific forms and consequences with which the observer has come into contact. To give a contemporary example: if the United States government could have established, beyond doubt, that Ho Chi Minh's nationalism would prove stronger than his communism—thus making Viet-Nam a buffer against China's dominance in South East Asia—his nationalism might have been applauded as vigorously as the nationalism of de Gaulle is detested.

Some more specific reasons can be given for the postwar belief that nationalism in the Western world was a negligible factor. In the first place there was a tendency to identify nationalism with the aggressiveness of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Militarist

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Japan. The rational and enlightened democracies could almost by definition not be nationalist. Sentiments which by any objective standard should be called nationalist were thought of as being only patriotic.

Second, a historicist belief in the inevitability of the development of larger units than the nation-state was prevalent. It was thought that it was in the logic of historical development that both those and universal international organizations would arise in response to the functional needs of the modern industrialized and democratized world. The nationalism of the developing countries did not contradict this belief. It was thought that the phase of nation-building and the accompanying nationalism were necessary to give the cohesion to heterogeneous societies that modernization and economic development demanded. Modernization, in turn, would lead to a more rational appreciation of functional needs and to an attitude toward nationalism similar to the attitude in the West. These beliefs were not often made explicit, but they are implicit in much of the writing on regional and international integration.[2] This might also explain why the United Nations, Atlantic cooperation, and European integration were until recently all equally supported by the political élites of the Western world, without much thought being given to the possibility that these might be or become conflicting objectives.

General de Gaulle has forcibly brought nationalism into the limelight again. Although the above-mentioned historicist belief has led some commentators to call his nationalism "anachronistic," others have tried to describe it as neo-nationalism. Both descriptions stem from the idea that nationalism in the Western world has all but disappeared.

But was that idea correct? There is in any case one social scientist who never had any illusions about the disappearance of nationalism in the Western democracies. Gunnar Myrdal, in his book *Beyond the Welfare-State*, has, on the contrary, analyzed the model: "The Welfare-State is nationalistic."[3]

In the pre-World War I period the process of national integration—implying "spatial and social mobility as between regions and classes, equalisation of opportunities, cultural homogenisation and an increasingly perfected political democracy"—proceeded in a partial world community of the rich countries. Between them labor, capital commodities, and services flowed freely. Since then a series of international crises and the great depression have led to in-

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creasingly nationalistic economic policies. These, in turn, have contributed to further international disintegration, which led to even more nationalistic policies. This process is an illustration of Myrdal's well-known idea of circular causation: each change is both the cause and the effect of the other changes, with the result that the changes cumulate.

Although after World War II some effective countermeasures in the field of trade and payments were taken in the context of regional organizations within the zone of the rich countries, the trend toward national economic integration is continuing with "unabating force." In each of the rich countries economic progress is taken more or less for granted; education is continuously being improved; social mobility and sharing in the national culture increase, facilitated by better means of transportation and communication. This has made a further development of the democratic political system possible, so that it now works to bring the economic system into accord with the ideals of liberty and equality of opportunity for all.

The role of the state in economic and social life has become more and more important. From "nightwatchman" or "oppressor" the state has changed into a "provider," into the Welfare or Service state. This development has been accompanied by a modicum of national planning which has "for many reasons, almost by necessity, an autarchic tendency." Economic policies become directed "towards welfare and equality at home, full employment and stability of the national economy, without much thought being given to international integration."

But this process does not operate only at the economic level. Living in a democratic national Welfare state tends to turn people's interests inwards. Their expectations focus on the particular groups and organizations that articulate their interests and take part in the process of collective bargaining by which the decisions in the Welfare state are taken. In this way the Welfare state "builds, ever firmer, its own psychological foundations in people's valuations and expectations." And, "A growing identification with the nation-state, and with all the people within its boundaries, is thus a natural result of the development of the democratic Welfare state." Human solidarity is thereby confined to the boundaries of the nation. When international relations seem to threaten his prosperity or security, the citizen is tempted to assume a nationalistic outlook: "to avoid viewing the international development in a world perspective and from the viewpoint of his ideals of liberty and equality as

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applied to mankind at large, but instead to narrow his vision so as to make it easier for him to put the blame on the foreigners." "In particular," Myrdal adds, "the cold war opens the opportunity to escape responsibility by attributing all threats to a single origin, the world communist conspiracy."

According to Myrdal we must face squarely the fact that "Our democratic Welfare state in the richer countries is protective and nationalist." His remedy is not to eliminate the Welfare state, but to pose the goal of a Welfare world as the logical complement of the Welfare state and to demonstrate that the realization of this goal would be to the advantage of the existing Welfare states.[4] The great merit of Myrdal's analysis is that he focuses our attention on the structural characteristics of the modern nation-state and demonstrates how conducive these are to nationalist behavior and attitudes. The only objection one can make to Myrdal's treatment of nationalism is that he refrains from giving a description of what he understands nationalism to be. Implicit in his analysis, though, is a very broad view of nationalism as both policies and attitudes which are nation-centered, based on a narrow and short-term definition of the national interest. He defines nationalism, one might say, as thinking, attitudes, or behavior which takes the interests of *national* society rather than those of *human* society at heart. Nationalism, in Myrdal's view, contains an element of hypocrisy: it is the application of values held to be universal in a limited "national" framework. He is concerned mainly with *economic* nationalism.

But one can point to a similar process of circular causation with respect to defense. *National survival* is still held to be the ultimate goal of defense,[5] and as long as there is no immediate prospect of a World Order, which can guarantee survival, nation-states will want to defend themselves. Also, because defense implies mobilizing military power, one state's defense is often perceived as a threat to another state's survival. Nuclear weapons have as yet not changed the psychological mechanisms leading to perceptions of threat. As a statement of fact, John Herz is surely right when he points to the extreme "permeability" of the territorial state in the nuclear age.[6] Knowledge of this fact, however, has not only failed to provide us with a solution for the creation of a world-wide institutional framework capable of maintaining peace by having a monopoly of force; it has even seriously hampered defense integration on a regional scale.[7] Nuclear power has not led to the "demise" of the territorial state; it has instead provided a new symbol of national prestige for

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the nation-state. And the nuclear stalemate, while being a constraint for the superpowers, has provided new opportunities for independent action by the smaller ones.

This shows us that a government does not have to be guided by an explicit nationalist ideology or by specific nationalistic aims to behave in a nationalistic manner. The structure of the Welfare state and the intractabilities of security may promote nationalistic behavior even by the most internationalist of statesmen.

But the structure of the Welfare state and the security dilemma do not exhaust the catalogue of factors contributing to nationalist attitudes and behavior. The nation-state has developed as, or from, a "national culture society,"[8] as a unit distinguished by "the complementarity or relative efficiency of communications among individuals."[9] These theoretical statements by distinguished researchers of nationalism point to the extremely complicated clusters of feelings, emotions, symbols, ideologies, role perceptions, historical experiences, and patterns of economic, social, and political communication for which the concept "nation" might be considered a shorthand description. In all nation-states nationalist ideologies are still "available": they may be picked up and used again or their premises may still be so self-evident that political issues, or political goals, may derive from them. The nation-state is commonly identified with the fatherland, with "home" in a larger sense, and for this reason commands the self-evident loyalties of its inhabitants. Individual identity and self-respect are, with few exceptions, still related to the image of their own nation and the respect it can command at home and abroad. Probing deeper than ordinary conversation, one will find in nearly every individual a shifting balance of pride and doubt about the qualities of the nation to which he belongs. Indifference about nationality is rare.

With these complexities in mind, the following descriptions of specific instances of nationalism have been written with the purpose of trying to isolate the "nationalist" aspects of the behavior, ideologies, and attitudes of a number of countries in the Western world. The emphasis is different in each: the ideology of a great actor (de Gaulle); historical experience and Welfare state nationalism (Britain); a specific historical problem (Germany); the experience and social structure of a small country (the Netherlands); attitudes (European nationalism); and the historical experience of a country which suddenly found itself a world power (the United States). The common denominator of all these aspects of nationalism is that

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they focus on ideas, attitudes, and behavior which presume that the nation-state is and will continue to be the most important unit of human organization. The descriptions may sometimes seem slightly one-sided, but that is a result of the perspective taken. Their purpose is to explore the varieties of contemporary nationalism in the Western world, not to give a comparative theory; yet some conclusions will be advanced.

II. *The Nation as Person and Idea: The Nationalism of General de Gaulle*

It cannot be denied that the nationalism of de Gaulle—his policies and ideology—has been beneficial for France itself. After the thirties, full of discord and feuds between the different political and social groupings, marked by an "orgy of self-laceration and doubts";[10] after the humiliation of the quick defeat by Germany; after Vichy and the occupation; after the disastrous colonial wars, Diem Bien Phu, Algeria, and the threat of civil war unleashed by the OAS, France needed someone or something to return to her a certain measure of self-respect, pride, and national cohesion. One has to admit that Stanley Hoffmann is right when he says that the "confident nation" of de Gaulle is better than the "confused and bitter" nation of the thirties and the postwar period.[11]

This judgment, however, implies a view of de Gaulle's nationalism as a means to heal the wounds of the past and as an instrument to make of France a stable, established nation-state.[12] If this were so, would the excessive nationalism characterizing de Gaulle's foreign policy have been necessary? Would it have had to be so dogmatic with respect to supranational forms of organization? It would be misleading to explain de Gaulle's nationalism purely as a pedagogical instrument in which he does not really believe. De Gaulle's nationalism is an essential and deeply ingrained part of his personality and view of the world.

De Gaulle sees himself as having been called to lead France to its destiny. He is able to perceive this destiny by the grace of his special intuition: "Toute ma vie je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France" is the first sentence of the memoirs of de Gaulle. He goes on: "The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, . . . as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. . . . But the positive side of my mind also assures me that France is not really herself unless she is in the front rank . . . . In short, to my mind, France

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cannot be France without greatness."[13] It would be wrong to say that de Gaulle identifies himself with France in the sense that he wants to use France for his own greatness. He sees himself as the inspiration of France, as the executor of her destiny. This gives him the right to speak for France, as he did in 1940 in London without being the "official" representative of his country: "Devant la confusion des âmes françaises, moi, Général de Gaulle, soldat et chef français, j'ai conscience de parler au nom de la France."

De Gaulle's belief in the destiny of nations implies a view of the nation as some kind of organic entity with a distinct personality. It is not this particular biological metaphor, however, which has influenced de Gaulle's thinking, but the biological metaphysics contained in the philosophical writings of Bergson. This becomes clear from de Gaulle's early and, for his political philosophy, most illuminating book, *Le Fil de l'Epée.*

For de Gaulle the nation is the only constant and immutable unit in history. Ideologies go, but nations remain: "Je me refuse à entrer dans une discussion valable sur le sujet de la querelle idéologique entre Pekin et Moscow. Ce que je veux considérer ce sont *les realités profondes qui sont humaines, nationales et par conséquent internationales.* L'étendard de l'idéologie ne couvre en realité que des ambitions."[14]

The nation is a human entity which is also superhuman because it has "duration" (Bergson's concept of time) and forms a continuous stream of life. By belonging to a nation, the individual can participate in a life transcending his own lifetime. He is thus admitted to the continuity of life, to the flow of time.

The nation, like every living being, is a center of action—not of a fixed (determined) amount of action, but of a quantity of potential action. To exhaust these potentialities fully or at least as far as possible gives the nation "grandeur" and leads her on to achieve "gloire." The intellect cannot grasp this truth; the will to "grandeur" finds its source in intuition. Intuition will guide the individual inevitably toward identification with the nation, if he wants to partake of the stream of life. The life-force (élan vital) must lead to national greatness. But national greatness is not achieved by prosperity. Prosperity is a useful result of intellectual effort, but, if prosperity and personal happiness are posited as the ends of life, stagnation and inaction are the undesirable outcome. Alfred Grosser says that for de Gaulle: "The lot of the French is not an end, but a means to improve the destiny of France."[15]

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What should be the goals of the leader of France? Because the world consists of a number of nations—with different destinies and interests—foreign policy must reign supreme. As Grosser has written: "A nation may be regarded as a human entity which acts in a world made up of other such entities. In this perspective, foreign policy is the only true policy. The sole aim of internal policy is to assure order and unity, and to develop an influence to be used abroad."

The first necessity is to give the nation the maximum of "puissance": "Le profond ressort de l'activité des meilleurs et des forts est le désir d'acquérir la puissance."[16] But the nationalism of de Gaulle is not warlike or aggressive. De Gaulle's conception of the role of France has much in common with his ideas on leadership.[17] To the nations which accept France's leadership, the leader is benevolent. But France must be able to raise her voice in the concert of nations—and be listened to—because she is destined to lead. But what France does for her own greatness also serves the world. The mission of France is universal.

Apart from the leader, the nation needs an instrument of authority: the state. But the state is subordinated to the will to greatness of the nation as interpreted by the leader.[18] The state therefore should not be "une juxtaposition d'intérêts particuliers dont ne peuvent sortir jamais que de faibles compromis," but "une institution de *décision, d'action, d'ambition,* n'exprimant et ne servant que l'intérêt national."[19] Above all else, the nation needs an instrument of power: "la situation de la France a profondément changé. Ses institutions nouvelles la mettent en mesure de *vouloir* et *d'agir.* Son développement intérieur lui procure la prospérité et *la fait accéder aux moyens de la puissance.*" The only instrument of power which gives a nation rank in this age is a nuclear force. The "force de frappe" is therefore above all a necessary attribute of the nation, to be acquired by the nation with her own means. Without her own nuclear force, France would not be able to follow her destiny, because she would be hampered in the exercise of her free will by the will of others. Without a nuclear force, France cannot be really independent: "We would no longer be a European power, a sovereign nation, but simply an integrated satellite."[20]

The nation is for de Gaulle thus both the highest value and the most profound reality ("une realité profonde, qui est humaine"). Every nation has a special destiny and therefore specific interests. Human reality is "nationale et par conséquent internationale"; it is

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structured on the nation-state. Federalism and supranational institutions—composed of bureaucrats and technocrats, trying to represent a fictitious common interest instead of the only real, the national, interest—are unnatural and therefore pernicious. Integration is a bad word: nations cannot merge, for they have different destinies and interests. If their interests coincide, they can cooperate and coordinate their policies. That this is a necessity in the age of industrialization and development is very well realized by de Gaulle. But, in his conception, there are definite limits to the possibilities of international cooperation. There must be as little institutionalization as possible, and, when international institutions are necessary, the final say has to remain with intergovernmental institutions. Cooperation and coordination must be based on the autonomy of the participating nations. To integrate the French nuclear force in an Atlantic defense "partnership" or "federation" would be a crime against France, for the destinies and interests of Anglo-Saxons and French cannot remain identical over a longer period. This is the basis of de Gaulle's attitude, and all arguments for the "force de frappe" based on strategic hypotheses (even though they may be rational within their own context) are rationalizations of his overriding concern with "la France."

What kind of foreign policy goals have followed from de Gaulle's type of explicit nationalist ideology?

Defenders of the Gaullist position regarding the necessity of ending American hegemony in the Atlantic framework have often based their defense on de Gaulle's "Europeanism." It can indeed be said that de Gaulle is also a European "nationalist": he thinks that Europe, as "mère de la civilisation," has a special destiny and that Europe's great past ensures her great future. Stanley Hoffmann has, because of this, written that "Europeaniser les Européens" should be considered one of the most important goals of de Gaulle.[21] But the form of the United Europe de Gaulle has wanted to create has given sufficient foundation to the suspicions of his partners in the Six that his European purpose was but a cover for his desire to impose a French instead of an American hegemony on them.

De Gaulle's "Europeanism" has thus suffered from a fatal ambivalence and from considerable confusion. The relations between French nationalism and European nationalism have never been made clear. The only "Europe" that would be able to fulfill de Gaulle's desire for independence from the United States is a Europe de Gaulle cannot imagine. His insistence on the necessity

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of an independent French "force de frappe" has made it much more difficult to defend his version of a political union of the Six. He could probably have attracted more support if he and his ministers had not made it absolutely clear that the French "force de frappe" can become "European" only as a protecting umbrella spread out by France over the Six, but remaining under the exclusive jurisdiction of France.

But de Gaulle's aims for Europe have not been determined solely by his European nationalism. De Gaulle's view of human reality as founded on the continuity and persistence of nations implies that lasting peace can be achieved only by some sort of "equilibrium." It is possible to explain de Gaulle's European policy and his attitude toward the United States and NATO as an attempt to hasten the change from one system of world equilibrium—the bipolar system, which cannot last because it is based on ideological rather than national solidarities—to another system in which France (and Europe) will be able to play a more important role. This has been done in a one-sided, but lucid, and very illuminating book, *L'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural,* written by the theoretical economist and former president of the French European movement, René Courtin.[22]

Courtin believes that the clue to de Gaulle's foreign policy goals can be found in the seemingly elusive formula "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," which de Gaulle has used time and time again.[23] He thinks this implies a view of the future world equilibrium as being based on the coexistence of three great powers: in the West, the group of Anglo-Saxon nations; in the East, China; and, in the center, a reconciled greater Europe. This means that Russia must again have replaced the Soviet Union. Marxist ideology cannot change the essential qualities of the Russian nation. Russia is a "nation blanche d'Europe, conquérante d'une partie de l'Asie . . . en face de la multitude jaune qu'est la Chine, innombrable et misérable, indéstructible et ambitieuse."[24] China will make claims to Siberia, the Algeria of Russia. The Urals have been chosen not only because they are the traditional geographical border of Europe, but also because the real, the white Russia stops there. The Atlantic Alliance will have to disappear: it was anyway but a consequence of the mistakes of Yalta and Potsdam, not a permanent framework in which France would find her destiny.

Courtin thinks that de Gaulle wanted to use the Europe of the Six, led by France as the only nuclear power, as a counterweight

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to Russia in the great European confederation to be. Germany would be lured in because it could be reunified. The attractiveness of this scheme for Russia would lie in the recognition of existing borders, the withdrawal of American troops and weapons from the continent, the dissolution of NATO, and a German pledge never to acquire nuclear weapons. The task of the great European confederation would then be the coordination of foreign policy toward the Anglo-Saxons, China, and the developing world.

Courtin even believes that de Gaulle already saw a chance to achieve this at the time he broke off the negotiations between the EEC and Britain, but that his scheme misfired completely. It seems more probable, however, that de Gaulle, in January 1963, wanted only to explain his vision of the future to the Russians to see whether they had any interest in this conception—and was rebuffed. But it is entirely plausible that de Gaulle indeed considers the kind of world equilibrium described by Courtin as the ideal situation for France to play an important role in a stable world of nation-states. De Gaulle's style of politics, and the fact that only *he* determines foreign policy, makes it possible for him to entertain both long-term objectives and goals which are intermediate from the point of view of the long-term objective, but have direct advantages in the transitory period. For example an independent "force de frappe" provides France with diplomatic and bargaining power both in the Atlantic Alliance and in the great European confederation of the future; a political union of the Six on de Gaulle's terms would enhance the power of France, could become a focus of attraction for other European countries, and could serve eventually as a counter-weight against Russia in the great European confederation. But, as it is not certain how long the thawing of the Soviet Union and the reassertion of the Russian nation will take, the transitory period might last a long time. This means that one should always provide oneself with fall-back positions; a position of leadership in the "tiers monde," good relations with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and even China. Nevertheless, it seems that there is less emphasis on "Europe" now in French foreign policy than before. De Gaulle's ambitions for Europe have been frustrated, and the new world equilibrium is, in any case, distant. It seems that de Gaulle has given up wanting to change the international system and has fallen back on a policy which tries to maximize French prestige and influence in the existing international environment.

The Europe of the Six is now considered useful only as a means

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to give France some economic advantages. The supranational ambitions of the EEC, until recently acquiesced in because the Six might have developed into the independent political unit de Gaulle wanted it to become, must now disappear. If the European Commission were to become the strong political body which it could and if the EEC were to develop further along the lines of the Treaty of Rome, France might find itself severely limited in its liberty of action. The role of the Commission must therefore be curtailed for both ideological and practical reasons.

De Gaulle's provocation of the 1965 crisis in the Common Market[25] provides a severe test for the theory of supranational integration, which is based on the conception of a process which moves forward until the supranational and national arenas of decision-making have become inextricably linked, and which acquires its dynamism from the rewards which the participants receive.[26] The interest groups in France behave according to this theory, that is, they disapprove of de Gaulle's actions. But it is now doubtful whether the economic rewards of the supranational method—which leaves unresolved the crucial questions of human identity and solidarity which nationalism answers—will prevail over the socio-psychological rewards of nationalism from which de Gaulle derives his power.

III. *British Nationalism: "The Lion, the Ostrich and the Gentleman"*[27]

The British empire could not have been built—and certainly not maintained—if its growth had not been accompanied by the awakening of the nation and of nationalism. But, in Britain, nation and state were contained within "natural borders." British insularity is an important determining factor of the character of British nationalism. The security of the insular position has contributed to the relative smoothness with which the British political system could evolve gradually toward tolerance, freedom, and democracy. The Puritan revolution was too early to upset continuity as much as the French revolution did, and it gave Britain a national ideology: the messianic belief in the British mission to bring religious freedom and political liberty to the world. In the nineteenth century this ideology was put forward in a secularized form by John Stuart Mill, who considered the British nation to be the most suited to spread his ideas "on liberty" to the other peoples of

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Europe. If British influence in the world were weakened, the cause and practice of freedom would be weakened too.[28]

A revolution was not required, however, for the political emancipation of the British people, but evolution instead of revolution has lent the British establishment its peculiar conservative and octopus-like character. This characteristic of the British social structure might have led to the complacency which made Arthur Koestler compare the British nation in peacetime with an ostrich taking its head out of the sand only in wartime to change miraculously into a lion.

Most of the British empire was built before the heyday of nationalism in the period 1870-1914. British parliamentary government, even before the French revolution, was admired and misinterpreted by Montesquieu as the "trias politica" model for France to follow. Britain led the industrial revolution: it had in London the first world financial center and the first big modern navy; it was also the first world policeman. Britain was already a *status-quo* power in the nineteenth century.

For these reasons British nationalism has never been rancorous or shrill: it has always been confident, dignified, and a bit arrogant.[29] The British are not conscious of being nationalists. A gentleman is a patriot, not a nationalist.[30]

After 1945 the lion quickly calmed down. Was it the lion or the ostrich that elected Labour? It is difficult to say: Certainly, the king of lions was deposed, but do ostriches like to experiment with nationalization? In any case, the fact that Britain was the only allied country in Europe not occupied during the war (on the Continent the resistance played an important role in the development of the European idea) made British political opinion much less inclined to see the future in terms of becoming part of a supranational entity, of a European federation. On the contrary, Britain still aspired to an independent role in world politics which over the years has been defined in different ways: as leader of the Commonwealth; as junior, but diplomatically more experienced, partner of the United States; or as mediator in the Cold War. It was much more difficult for Britain to admit decline than it was for the Continental powers, which had to start from scratch after 1945. The early decision to build a separate nuclear force was indicative of British aspirations. There were, of course, also more rational reasons[31] for the British search to remain one-up on Europe, but plain nationalism has certainly been an important cause. British hostility to supranational

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integration had manifested itself before the days of the Schuman plan. In the Council of Europe, itself a compromise between British pressure (the Committee of Ministers) and federalist ideas (the Consultative Assembly), the British were the leaders of the "functionalists" as opposed to the "federalists." The nationalism of the Welfare state, as referred to in the first part of this article, heavily influenced the attitude of the Labour government. According to Northedge: "There was concern in Labour Party circles lest the postwar mood in western Europe revolt against national sovereignty should sweep Britain into supranationalist arrangements at the moment when the main levers of her economy were being brought, for the first time in peace, under state control at home." Northedge mentions two other reasons for Britain's attitude toward Europe: Britain as a member of a united Europe "might be wholly unable to influence the larger forces outside Europe which were coming to shape the world as a whole" and "it was hard to believe that the Europeans . . . really had the political ability to make a fundamentally constructive advance."

Both Welfare-state nationalism and a traditional nationalist desire to keep "rank" and play a prestigious role in world politics were thus behind Britain's refusal to have anything to do with the integrative efforts undertaken on the "European Continent." The Schuman Plan, the abortive European Defense Community, and the European Economic Community were equally opposed by Britain because of their supranational ambitions. Attlee declared, for example, apropos of the Schuman Plan, "We on this side were not prepared to accept the principle that the most vital forces of this country should be handed over to an authority that is utterly undemocratic and responsible to nobody."[32] The fact that Britain had to remain "independent" was taken so much for granted by Labour and Conservative alike that serious debate on the question of joining Europe started only after the government had already taken the decision to apply for membership in the EEC.[33]

On the other hand, it is perhaps not quite fair to attribute British opposition to forming a part of a federated Europe only to stubborn nationalism. Many Britons would not object to becoming part of an Atlantic federation and some would not even mind if Britain were to become the fifty-first state of the United States.[34] As John Mander remarks: "Frenchmen are foreigners: Americans are not. It is irrational that Englishmen feel this way, but they do."[35] It is not only joining a *supranational* Europe that Britain objected

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to, but also joining *Europe*. But there is a certain difference between Labour and Conservative in this respect. The Conservative government took the decision—mainly defended on economic grounds, and without spelling out the political implications—to link Britain to Europe, but Macmillan went out of his way to save the formal independence of the British deterrent at the ill-fated conference at Nassau. And Conservative defenders of the "independent" British deterrent often sound exactly like Gaullists, although they claim to want the "extra diplomatic weight" that the bomb insures mainly to sit in on disarmament negotiations. Labour, on the other hand, was much more ready to give up the independence of the British deterrent—in return for more influence on American decision-making. But, with respect to Europe, Labour has been —no doubt also for domestic political reasons—more nationalistic than the Conservatives. In a speech given at the Labour Party Conference in October 1962 Gaitskell commented that Britain's entry into EEC might be "the end of Britain as an independent nation" and that "as a province of Europe" Britain could not remain the "mother country" of the Commonwealth. To join EEC "would mark the end of a thousand years of history."[36] As Nora Beloff rightly remarks: "The European issue had muddled things up."[37]

The new Labour government at first conformed to the predictions of those Europeans opposed to British entry into the EEC by deciding on the 15 per cent surcharge on imports without prior consultation, not even with its EFTA partners. This "nationalistic" behavior—apart from violating EFTA—was considered contrary to the postwar European code of economic policy. How could a government like that understand the "community method"? But it seems that the Labour government has now made a more realistic assessment of the future of British relations with Europe. And there are no indications that Britain might want to follow the pattern of de Gaulle's nationalist policies, that is, exploit the international constellation for its own ends. The 1961-1962 debate has in any case had the healthy effect of making the alternatives for Britain much clearer.

IV. *The Seduction of the Nation-State: Nationalism in Germany*

The unification of Germany in 1870-71 was supported by popular German nationalism, but brought about by Bismarck with the

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interests of the Prussian state in mind. On the basis of the linguistic definition of the German nation—the ideal model of the nation according to Rupert Emerson[38]—however, the German nation-state did not come into being before Hitler's "Grossdeutschland" in 1938. Only then were all those settlements considered as German (the German-speaking part of Switzerland being an obvious exception) caught within German borders. But, as Lemberg remarks, precisely that solution demonstrated that a German nation-state comparable with the French or Spanish nation-states did not belong to the realm of possibilities.[39] It did in any case last only seven years. But the idea of the German nation-state lived on.

Immediately after World War II, however, every German of good will was consciously anti-nationalist. This feeling was so strong in the younger generation that it prohibited any identification with Germany and, therefore, also with the society in which these young Germans had to live. "Ohne mich" (without me) was a widespread answer to a past for which they felt the German nation as a whole should be held responsible. European unification therefore had a particular significance for Germany. On the one hand, "Europe" could be welcomed by many Germans as a new fatherland; on the other hand, because the supranational principle made it possible for Germany to be accepted as an equal partner in the new European organizations, the Germans could feel that "Europe" was not forced upon them. "Europe" not only provided the Germans with a new focus of identification, but also returned to them some self-respect *as Germans*. The enthusiasm for Europe has for these reasons been very strong in Germany.

But it was difficult for Germany to enter Europe without any qualms. Germany was burdened with an old-fashioned nineteenth-century problem that also had to be solved. According to nationalist doctrine, state and nation should coincide: and, since Germany was divided, "reunification" was both morally and politically desirable and necessary. West Germany was an unnatural state, and the G.D.R. did not even exist. Adenauer once declared (during his visit to Moscow): "The division of Germany is abnormal. It is against human and divine law and nature."[40] This nationalist assertion seems so self-evident that most Germans would be reluctant to consider reunification a nationalist issue.

The German national problem has regrettably been intensified by the ideological struggle and by the kind of regime the G.D.R. had to suffer. It was furthermore both symbolized and intensified

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by the divided former capital, Berlin. But the successive German governments have not given priority to "reunification." They have tried—within the framework of tight relationships with the movement toward European integration and narrow Atlantic relations—to let the political goals of the Atlantic allies coincide with those of Germany.[41] But, they have not seriously tried to dispose of the "nationalist" problem by replacing the goal of "reunification" by the goal of achieving for the East Germans an existence worthy of human beings.[42] On the contrary, even in German trains, one can still read that there are parts of Germany—of which the borders of 1937 are drawn—"zur Zeit unter Fremdverwaltung" (temporarily administered by foreigners).

But "reunification" has been promoted more by words than by deeds. German foreign policy should, according to its makers, not only be a "reaction to the behavior of the environment . . . but also a reaction to the German past."[43]

Given the definition of "reunification" as at least to a large extent the nationalist problem of recreating a German nation-state, it is possible to use reunification as a thermometer to measure German nationalism: when public and political concern about reunification increases, the temperature of German nationalism rises. That this is in fact the case can, apart from the results of recent public opinion polls, also be concluded from the efforts of German politicians to make nationalism respectable again.[44] To give one example of many: Defense Minister Von Hassel declared that he would like to see an increase of "Heimatliebe" (love of the fatherland) and added: "How open the world may be and how far the free nations may go in their cooperation, only the soil of the fatherland can give the solid basis for personal uprightness and political behavior. The abstract idea does not have the power to bring men and peoples together."[45]

To the desire for reunification and the need for a new German self-respect, as forces which might lead to a resurgence of nationalism, should the influence of the example of de Gaulle on German political thinking be added? "Why shouldn't Germany start pursuing a more active foreign policy directed mainly to the defense of her own interests?" One finds this attitude primarily among the politically interested of the young generation.[46] The so-called German "Gaullists," however—their most important representatives being Strauss and zu Guttenberg—do not defend a nationalist policy in this sense. They do not advocate German behavior

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modeled on de Gaulle's foreign policy, but they want what they conceived of as a Gaullist Europe, politically and militarily strong and less dependent on the United States. But one cannot separate this desire from their criticism of the United States. They think that the United States, by wanting to maintain a détente in its relations with the Soviet Union, will be forced to accept the *status quo* of a divided Germany and so act against the German national interest, which they interpret as reunification.[47] The successive German governments, however, have certainly not been led by a nationalist ideology. On the other hand, German policy toward the EEC has often been hesitant, and the German government has—as have all the other member governments—usually held back from widening the powers of the European Commission. To conclude: German nationalism after the war has understandably been very weak, but there are disconcerting danger signals. (Mr. Strauss's raising of the spectre of a new Hitler if Germany were not treated as equal in the nuclear field has been a recent addition.) The future of German nationalism will very much depend on the evolution of domestic politics and the treatment by the German government and political parties of the reunification issue.

V. *The Nationalism of Small Nations: Dutch Nationalism*

There is a qualitative difference between the position of nations which, because of the nature of their nationalism, their history, their geographic position, and their power potential, are able to fulfill—or to aspire to—an independent role in world politics and nations which are forced to link their destiny to a large whole.[48] It is, therefore, necessary to give at least one example of the latter category, for which I have chosen a country with which I am reasonably familiar.

It can be—and has been—maintained that Great-Netherlands (including most of Belgium and part of the Northwest of France) is a more "natural" nation than the Netherlands. The well known historian Pieter Geyl, after a polemic against the "Belgian" historian Henri Pirenne, published in 1930 the first volume of his *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Stam*, which, although "stam" means literally "tribe," can best be translated as "History of the Netherlands Nation."[49] (Geyl could, of course, not use the word "nation" because it would seem as if he had written a book about the Netherlands, whereas with "stam" he meant the area where

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Dutch was spoken.) Geyl tried to demonstrate that the links between North and South had been much stronger—politically, culturally, and economically—than was commonly supposed and that the separation had been due to accidental, mainly strategic circumstances. The implication was that the "real" nation still existed, but did not coincide with the state boundaries.

The fact that this was written as late as 1930 demonstrates that irredentist nationalism has been extraordinarily weak in the Netherlands. There has never been strong support for the Flemish movement in the Netherlands. During World War I the Flemish "activists" turned in desperation to Germany for support—which was repeated by the "Flemish National League" (VNV) during World War II. In the Netherlands only historians, writers—one of the best prewar literary journals was called *Groot Nederland* ("Great Netherlands")—and national-socialist and fascist groups showed interest in the Flemish cause.[50] Why? Apart from the historical development as described by Geyl, a possible answer to this question may be found in the Dutch social structure. Dutch society is characterized by the phenomenon of pillarization:[51] the whole of social and political life is still organized on the basis of religious and quasi-religious affiliations. But this phenomenon is the consequence of the struggle for emancipation of three religious and political-ideological movements: Catholics, Workers (Socialists), and Orthodox-Protestants against the Liberal-Protestant patrician establishment. I would suggest that all the energies of the emancipating groups, which otherwise could have turned to "nationalist" causes, were consumed in this struggle, whereas the patrician establishment could not care less about the Catholic peasants of the Flemish provinces of Belgium.

In its foreign policy, the Netherlands followed a policy of strict neutrality from 1830 until 1940. Even Hitler could not change that. In 1939, the majority of the Dutch population, including government and political élite, still believed that the Netherlands would be able to keep out of the war.[52] Dutch nationalism therefore took the form of moral complacency, of the feeling that Dutch peacefulness was due to moral virtue and a superior governmental and legal system. The Netherlands has a famous tradition of international law based on the excellent legal faculties of the Dutch universities, but has no tradition of political science or the study of international relations.

After 1945, the break with the past was complete. The Dutch

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foreign minister, van Kleffens, declared in the plenary session of the United Nations preparatory conference in San Francisco:

> We are ready to accept certain limitations of that more or less complete freedom of action which hitherto has characterized a sovereign State. We should like to see those limitations accepted in the same measure by all States, great and small. If this cannot be obtained at once, and if, together with the other medium and smaller states, we are to set an example in this respect, we shall be proud to do it.[53]

In the Dutch constitution a provision has subsequently been enacted which makes it possible for the Dutch government to give by agreement legislative, executive, and judicial competences to supranational or international organizations (art. 67). Thereafter, the Netherlands has consistently supported (and stimulated: the Messina Conference) European integration, Atlantic cooperation, and international organization.

But the advent of General de Gaulle on the European political scene has brought the Dutch government into serious difficulties. The Dutch do not see Europe as a new fatherland, but conceive of a functional relation between European integration and Atlantic cooperation as two means of achieving a closer bond between the nations of the Western world (of which Atlantic cooperation should have—at least in the near future—priority). But the nationalist de Gaulle has awakened nationalist feelings in the Netherlands too. It is easily acceptable to see one's future as part of a supranational Europe, with ample guarantees for being able to influence the decision-making process, or as part of an Atlantic defense federation led by the benevolent giant on the other side of the ocean. But the prospect of being part of a European political union, dominated by an old-fashioned nationalist or maybe later by a Germany hungry for reunification, makes the Dutch think—and sometimes say—"over our dead bodies." In defense of the Dutch position, "balance of power" arguments sometimes turn up: The leading newspaper *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant* wrote, for example, after Labour won the British elections, that this would not have to influence the negative Dutch attitude with respect to a political union of the Europe of the Six, "because it has always been and still remains a Dutch interest, that our country maintains a certain balance in its relation with the three surrounding big states" and "even a supranational Europe should have an internal equilibrium." This attitude comes close to that of de Gaulle but is in absolute opposition to his political

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goals, because the parts of the desired equilibrium are different. But precisely for Gaullists it should be easy to understand how deep Dutch opposition to a Gaullist Europe goes.

VI. *European Nationalism: Supra-nationalism or Anti-Americanism?*

Whether or not it will be possible to call a European federation into being without a nationalism based on the idea of a nation "Europe" is still an open question. But such a nationalism does not exist at the moment. There is no widespread political movement which has as its main goal the making of a new national state out of "Europe." This fact is, no doubt, connected with the difficult problem of the geographical delimitation of "Europe." The Europe of the Six, in any case, "are not—they are not even in the process of becoming—a national community."[54] It seems difficult to conceive of the Europe of the Six as a prospective nation. Stanley Hoffmann discusses the postulate "that Europe is not only a geographical expression but an entity capable of overcoming its divisions . . . ." Although he later speaks of the need for "a sort of collective European nationalism," he does not mention the postulate of a European nation.[55] The explanation for this omission can again be only the arbitrary geographical delimitation of the Europe of the Six.

But it is possible to speak of European nationalism in a negative sense: as an attempt to consolidate the uniqueness and superiority of Europe as "mère de la civilisation" (de Gaulle) and to return to the European countries as a united Europe the power "which it deserves" by making Europe militarily and diplomatically independent of the United States. This type of European nationalism is negative because its only content is the postulate of European distinctiveness from the United States, which turns but too easily into outright anti-Americanism. In fact, anti-Americanism more often than not contains a reference to Europe rather than to the separate nations, perhaps because it is felt that only the resources of superiority of the whole of Europe can justify anti-American assertions.

The first phase of European nationalism in the form of anti-Americanism occurred in the immediate postwar period, when it was demonstrated that Europe could not recover without the aid of the United States. As Max Beloff says: "We must admit that

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much of the early propaganda for the European idea had a definitely anti-American flavour and that the idea of resisting 'Americanization' [was] part of it."[56] Europeans asserted that political and economic power do not determine the *real* value of a country: spiritual and cultural achievements are much more important.[57] Americans were gum-chewing barbarians, bad-mannered, rude, and materialistic. Everything that embellishes life and makes it worth living comes from Europe. The Americans were also considered politically naive and diplomatically inexperienced: these do-gooders had much to learn from the Europeans. In this way both right and left could partake of anti-Americanism. The left had the added reason of holding the Americans largely responsible for the cold war. The right disapproved of American support for independence movements in the colonies and became livid when the United States opposed the Suez adventure of Britain and France. Anti-Americanism has been particularly strong in France, according to Michel Crozier, partly because "America, whose universalistic ideal is so close to the French, seemed in the process of taking over what used to be the glory of French culture."[58]

The European idea has, over the years, been fed by the compensation ideology which I have called European nationalism. A typical nationalist instrument is also the rewriting of history, which, for Europe, has been done by scholars like Henri Brugmans and Denis de Rougemont. Nationalist attitudes without a nation to refer to is perhaps the best description of current European nationalism. Although Hallstein might go a little too far when he says "Everything that has been done in the field of European unification is in the last analysis based on the objective to return to Europe a role in accordance with its traditions, possibilities and self-respect,"[59] it is certainly true that many "Europeans" cherish not only the idea of a European federation, but also the ideal of a powerful Europe.

VII. *American Nationalism: The Power Without Glory*

American nationalism has, for obvious reasons, not been able to refer itself to the attributes of the nation used by the various nationalisms in Europe: a grandiose history and culture, common ancestors and language, and a classical literature and religion.[60] But a "melting pot" society still needs an ideology to foster national

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cohesion. What else could this be but the belief in a special mission? It is possible, however, to discern in the beginning of American history two elements in the American national ideology. Living in a "new world" implied not only the possibility of building an exemplary society based on individual freedom and equality, but also the idea of the "manifest destiny" of the United States to spread the American "nation" over the whole American continent.[61] But the last element lost much of its importance after the "Frontier" had reached the Pacific. Thereafter, only the idea of a special—and universal—mission of the American nation remained.[62] America should bring freedom and democracy to the peoples of the world by example, education, and influence. The American intervention in two world wars was legitimized by the belief in the American mission: see Wilson's fourteen points and, in a somewhat weakened form, the Atlantic Charter. After World War II, the American national ideology remained operative as the solid foundation on which American involvement in the affairs of the world was based. This ideological basis did not cause any embarrassment for the role of the United States in Europe, where the American commitment to defend freedom against modern totalitarianism, at least for a time, had content and significance. But the American mission to defend or bring freedom to other parts of the world is becoming rather hard to defend as the difficulty of defining American objectives in Viet-Nam has demonstrated. In a recent, more sophisticated implicit definition of the American mission, one therefore sees the replacement of "freedom" by "international stability."[63]

The idea that America is the model of a democratic society has also contributed to American support for European unification: a United States of Europe would not only be the best way to get rid of the disastrous nationalisms of the separate European powers, but would also imply the emulation of the American political system, and thus democracy. In August 1948, the State Department declared that the United States "strongly favors the progressively closer integration of the free nations of western Europe . . . it does not make sense to us to contemplate a democratic Europe attempting economic unity without political agreement."[64] Lemberg thinks that this American feeling of superiority in the postwar period has contributed to the development of a compensation ideology in Europe, to the ideas which I have called European nationalism.[65]

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After World War II, the sudden global responsibility of the United States and the struggle against communist power and ideology have also led to the continuous frustration of those who took the American national ideology really seriously. The fact that America was not omnipotent, and that her superior nuclear arsenal was of very little positive use, was difficult for these people to bear. True believers always have to attribute occurrences they do not like to esoteric causes: and so the federal government, and especially the State Department, must be part of an "un-American" communist conspiracy. The supporters of the new radical right —as the McCarthyites before them—are not only extremely conservative, but also extremely nationalistic. But not only the rightist fringe suffers from frustration. Disillusionment with allies and aid is a constant and recurring danger for American foreign policy. The American national ideology implies a certain self-righteousness and a penchant for "dramatic" results. Both can be highly dangerous: the first in relations with allies and the second in the administration and the defense of foreign aid programs. To be the strongest, but probably also the most constrained, power in the world is not easy, and the American national ideology certainly does not contribute to the acceptance of that situation.

If one also defines as nationalism the unwillingness of a country to take part in supranational organizations or to accept in other ways certain limitations of sovereignty, the United States has certainly remained more nationalist than most European countries. A good example is the declaration with which the United States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which contains the reservation that this shall not apply to: "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America *as determined by the United States of America.*"[66]

Neither has the United States made it clear that it would be willing to go further than inter-governmental cooperation in an Atlantic framework. It is always being said that Congress would never accept genuine sharing of competences in the fields of economics and defense with Europe unless it were forced to do so. Because of this attitude, the unofficial conference of NATO parliamentarians could not evolve into a NATO parliamentary assembly. But there is no reason to believe that the American government is more disposed to relinquishing sovereignty, especially in the fields of foreign policy and defense.

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VIII. *Some Concluding Remarks on Nationalism and World Order*

The preceding descriptions have been an attempt to demonstrate the persisting significance of nationalism—ideas, attitudes, behavior—in the group of nation-states which, according to all the typologies of development and modernization, are the most advanced. These were thought to be the most likely candidates to transcend nationalism and the nation-state; and, for some time, it appeared that they would. In the period 1961-1962—when Britain was negotiating with the EEC—it was not terribly farfetched to view EEC as the nucleus and catalyst for a process of functional international integration: European integration would lead to Atlantic partnership and to institutionalized relations between the West and various regional groups of developing nations, which would then be forced to organize themselves. More and more "interests" in integration would be created, and these would form the secure foundation for a future world order. This seemed a relevant if not a realistic utopia.

But what Pierre Hassner has aptly called "la surprise nationaliste" has proved this vision to have been an illusion.[67] But the Gaullist vision—that it would be possible to reconcile French and European nationalism through the creation of an "independent" European confederation—has also proved to be an illusion. The effect of his explicit nationalism has been to rule out political union of the Six.

To put the European example in more general terms: even when the government of a country is not led by an explicitly nationalist ideology, there are in every nation certain dominant views of the most desirable future for itself and its environment. When a group of nations agrees on establishing a "common market" with certain attributes of supranationality, not only might they do this for different reasons and with different motives, but their views of the future of the possible political outcome of such a venture might differ so radically that, instead of getting politically closer because of their common enterprise, they might be driven apart. These views of the future are connected with the respective nationalisms of the participants, which implies that it does not exactly help when one of them starts basing its policy on nationalist criteria first. When this is one of the more prominent partners, the nationalist sensibilities of the others are soon awakened too. Ultimate goals then become more important than pragmatic

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progress. Attitudes polarize, and progress is halted. Whether it is possible to generalize on the basis of this example or not, it does show that, for a consideration of the feasibility of alternative international or supranational structures, the precise content of the different nationalisms, namely the views of the world and the future which they imply, can be important.[68] It also shows the danger of explicit nationalism: it has a boomerang effect.

From the discussion in the above sections it seems to follow that as long as nation-states exist—or, rather, as long as states exist, since states will try to create nations out of their populations, as the new states, especially those in Africa, so clearly demonstrate—nationalism will remain alive, or at least dormant. Since nationalism wants to separate or to keep separate, it seems almost by definition disintegrative, dysfunctional, for world order. But this statement needs to be qualified. Nationalism is only one of the potential sources of international conflict. We have lived since 1945 in a world dominated by tension not so much between nationalisms as between ideologies. Ideological differences—although they have not prevented (probably as a result of the nuclear stalemate) the maintenance of a minimum world order (we survive)[69] —are still the most important potential causes of conflict, especially because they have entered into symbiotic relationships with the nationalisms of the superpowers. By disrupting ideological bloc solidarities and loyalties, the nationalisms which reassert themselves in Western and Eastern Europe alike might contribute to weakening the ideologies themselves—especially the perception of the enemy which they contain, but not necessarily the values which rule domestic politics. They then might actually contribute to strengthening the existing world order. One might express this in more general terms by saying that under certain conditions nationalism might be functional for world order.[70] From this statement it is but one step—but an unjustified one on the basis of the existing empirical material—to reassert the claims of nineteenth-century liberal nationalism in a somewhat more sophisticated form. The reasoning goes as follows:

The best possible world order humanity will be able to achieve will have to be based on states. But the requirements of legitimacy, loyalty, solidarity, and development make it necessary that states be based on nations. If this is not the case, domestic conflicts will erupt, and in the present world these have dangerous international implications. Nationalism gives citizens and political élites

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alike a firm sense of identity and self-respect. Stable mature nation-states, made up of stable mature individuals, will not harbor aggressive tendencies. Humanity's best chance for achieving a stable world order is, therefore, to create a world of stable nation-states, inspired by creative nationalisms. And, if some fear still remains that nation-states might not always stay stable, let each nation have its own nuclear force to deter military adventures of others; then peace will be assured.

This utopia is refuted by the historical development of nationalism. The liberal nationalist, well-intentioned though he may have been, was a sorcerer's apprentice. The development of a nationalism has never been halted at its point of "maturity," at the point when it fulfills only the positive functions of identity, self-respect, solidarity, and legitimacy procurement and none of the negative functions of being a source of international conflict (through projection of feelings of superiority, missionary zeal, desire for hegemony or spheres of influence or, at its worst, through imperialism), of oppressing other nations or minorities, and of prohibiting more rational—regional or international—forms of organization. Neither has it been proved that nationalism is the *only* way of procuring identity, self-respect, and the like. There are other forms of organization (churches, political parties, voluntary groups) and also certain kinds of activity (science, art, literature) which can, and already do, take the place of the nation in this respect. To admit the positive functions of nationalism, therefore, does not have to imply its endorsement. For this reason, I disagree strongly with Stanley Hoffmann's defense of (de Gaulle's) nationalism, which sounds so perfectly reasonable:

> As long as no form of social organisation has yet appeared to replace the nation-state, or as long as the "general society of mankind," whose absence Rousseau noted, is not in sight, the only kinds of nationalism that are unquestionably evil are aggressive nationalism and a nationalism of resentment—Hitler's partook of both. Barring these, the alternative to a sane and sound nationalism of self-respect or pride is apt to be defeatism.[71]

I do not see why the alternative of functional and international integration has to imply defeatism. My own negative attitude toward nationalism is also explained by the fact that it offers no intellectual satisfaction. Nationalism nearly always implies looking for the mistakes of others and glossing over one's own faults. Discussions with nationalists are therefore usually singularly fruitless and annoying. One is often forced into an exchange of accusations,

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justifications, and apologies. Nationalism leads to a falsified view of the world and may therefore corrupt the best of intentions.[72]

But no matter how strongly one may disapprove of nationalism, it remains to be said that it still has much stronger assets than internationalism. The international integration ideology can offer only a utopia, a "process," and universal values (the same as are being applied within national societies) as the basis for its appeal. Nationalism as an integration ideology has a much stronger foundation in language, culture, history, assertions of independence, a sense of "home," and a richness of symbols. The regional movement that can appeal to nationalist feelings and symbols—the European movement—has better chances for success than a similar movement operating in the same setting—the Atlantic movement—which is unable to do this.

In the search for alternatives to the anarchic structure of decision-making by nation-states, we should not limit ourselves to looking for institutional solutions. We should perhaps also try to strengthen the alternatives to nationalism.

References

1. For a useful, but deliberately confusing, survey of the most important definitions, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 1-14. A systematic analysis of the semantic confusion surrounding nationalism and related concepts and the ideological use made thereof is given in Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics* (London, 1944), Ch. I.

2. Not all writers have accepted this historicist belief as given. There can indeed be made a strong case for the idea that there are strong socioeconomic and political forces at work in the European democracies leading to the acceptance of supranational institutions as a stable form of government. See Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.), *A New Europe?* (Boston, 1964), pp. 62-89; for a thorough analysis of the relation between functional needs and institutional international integration, see Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, Calif., 1964).

3. Gunnar Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (New Haven, Conn., 1960), p. 159. The following quotations are from an earlier version, *Economic Nationalism and Internationalism* (Melbourne, 1957).

4. For a critique of Myrdal's "functionalist utopia," see Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State, op. cit.*, pp. 461-464.

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5. For some time it seemed as if the goal of national survival had been replaced in the West by anti-communism, or in the positive formulation: the defense of Western values. This ideological cohesion, making a partly supranational defense effort possible, is now under severe strain. Even in a staunchly "Atlanticist" country like the Netherlands, in a recent publication the question, "Why do we defend ourselves?" was, after an analysis of the possible supranational motivations, answered by stating "to maintain our national, our own Dutch identity." H. J. A. Hofland. "Waarom verdedigen wy ons," published by "Stichting Volk en Verdediging" (Foundation "People and Defense"), 1964.

6. John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July 1957), pp. 477-493. Herz's proposition that the territorial state became the basic protective unit and therefore the basic political unit in Europe after 1648, because of the "hard shell of fortifications" built along the respective borders, seems to me to need historic verification. His only reference is to Meinecke's "Die Idee der Staatsraison in der Neuere Geschichte."

7. Since the United States could be penetrated by Soviet nuclear weapons, the argument that the United States would not use nuclear weapons to defend Europe has constantly been used to justify national deterrents. Raymond Aron has written: "Les alliances évolueront vers des communautés ou elles se dissoudront: elles ne reviendront pas aux pratiques préatomiques." (*Le Grand Débat* [Paris, 1963], p. 272.)

8. Florian Znaniecki, *Modern Nationalities* (Urbana, Ill., 1952).

9. Karl W. Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

10. Stanley Hoffmann, "The French Political Community," in *In Search of France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 35. On the thirties see especially pp. 21-34.

11. Stanley Hoffmann, "Cursing de Gaulle is Not a Policy," *The Reporter*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (January 30, 1964).

12. That stability is not de Gaulle's major goal also follows from his neglect of the problem of the stability of the French political system after his own death.

13. Citation from the translation of *L'Appel*, "The Call to Honour," (London, 1955), p. 9.

14. Press conference, July 29, 1963. *Le Monde*, July 31, 1963. My italics in this and the following quotations.

15. Alfred Grosser, "General de Gaulle and the Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic," *International Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April 1963), pp. 198-213.

16. Charles de Gaulle, *Le Fil de L'Epée*, Ed. 10-18 (Paris, no date), p. 39.

17. *Le Fil de l'Epée* contains a host of prescriptions for leadership, which read as descriptions of de Gaulle's present behavior.

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18. There is also a definite streak of Rousseau in de Gaulle's thought. In his press conference of May 31, 1960, he cited the Rousseauan premise: "Man limited by his nature is infinite in his desires." (Cited in Edgar S. Furniss, *De Gaulle and the French Army* [New York, 1964], p. 247.)

19. Press conference, July 29, 1963. *Le Monde*, July 31, 1963. The disdainful remark against "les intérêts particuliers" is of course directed against political parties and pressure groups. The politics of the "end of ideology" is sacrilege to de Gaulle's conception of politics which for him is the art of action as guided by intuition.

20. Cited in Furniss, *op. cit.*, p. 106. Furniss goes on to explain how attractive statements like this are for the anti-Gaullist nationalists, who were bitterly opposed to de Gaulle over his "abandonment of Algeria." He cites Jacques Gagliardi: "My comrades and myself . . . passionately resisted the abandonment of Algeria. We nourish no excessive tenderness for the Chief of State. . . . But de Gaulle for some years will constitute the only obstacle to the dilution of France in a vast Atlantic market where we will only be a subsidiary of the United States." Furniss thinks that the new weapons and the new military mission, that is, "the contribution of the army to de Gaulle's European statecraft" (p. 243), have provided the French military with a new sense of purpose, thus solving de Gaulle's difficulties with the rebellious army over Algeria.

21. "De Gaulle, l'Europe et l'Alliance," *Esprit*, Vol. 31, No. 318 (June 1963), p. 1058.

22. Paris, 1963.

23. Courtin has collected thirty pages of declarations of de Gaulle concerning this "formule aveuglante de clarté" (pp. 112-142). For a recent statement of his explanation of the French attitude toward German reunification, see his press conference of February 4, 1965. (Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 216, p. 12).

24. Press conference of November 10, 1959. Cited in Courtin, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

25. For this view of the events there is support in a statement by de Gaulle which was made in a conversation with the former President of the High Authority of ECSC, René Mayer, who started to tell de Gaulle how much he had learned from his experiences in Luxemburg. De Gaulle cut him short by saying, "Eh bien! Maintenant il faut tout oublier. J'efface tout et on recommence." *Le Monde*, September 16, 1965.

26. This theory was first developed in Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, Calif., 1958). It has been refined and applied to the EEC by Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Integration* (Stanford, Calif., 1963); and by Ernst Haas himself in *Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe, op. cit.*

27. The metaphor of the lion and the ostrich was taken from Arthur Koestler's

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introduction to the special "state of the nation" issue of *Encounter*. "Suicide of a Nation?" Vol. 21, No. 7 (July 1963).

28. Eugen Lemberg (*Nationalismus*, Vol. I [Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1964], p. 127) points to the emigration of the Puritan nationalist ideology to the United States. One could add that Mill's argument is still being echoed often in Washington.

29. Not long after the end of the Hundred Years' War, an Italian envoy to the English court observed that Englishmen "think that there are no other men than themselves; and, whenever they see a handsome foreigner they say he looks like an Englishman." Cited in Sir Reginald Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism* (London, 1954), p. 7.

30. The Earl of Sandwich, writing in the *Observer* as part of a series of articles called "What's Left for Patriotism," January 27, 1963, states explicitly that patriotism "is not the same as nationalism" and "In fact, there is nothing 'wrong' about patriotism. It is natural and healthy. . . . But what can a man feel about a group of nations? . . . Human nature does not permit the extension of this basic emotion to a series of initials such as EEC."

31. Among those, during the period of Labour government, domestic political reasons. For the history of British relations with European unity see for the period to 1954, F. S. Northedge, *British Foreign Policy. The Process of Adjustment 1945-1961* (London, 1962), Ch. 5, "Britain and European Unity," pp. 122-167; and, for the period after 1954, see Miriam Camps' fascinating *Britain and the European Community 1955-1963* (Princeton, N. J., 1964).

32. Cited in Karl Kaiser, *EWG und Freihandelszone* (Leiden, 1963), p. 72.

33. Miriam Camps rightly considers this to have been one of the main weaknesses in the British negotiating position, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

34. For example, Kingsley Amis in the *Observer*, January 20, 1962.

35. John Mander, *Great Britain or Little England* (Boston, 1964), p. 21.

36. Cited in Nora Beloff, *The General Says No* (London, 1963), p. 140.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 141. The muddle is very well reflected in the *Encounter* inquiry among British intellectuals. "Going Into Europe" (December 1963-March 1964). Even though the result was 77 for, 17 against, and 16 indifferent or undecided, the motives for going in were often "nationalist" in the sense that only Britain was considered to be able to pull EEC away from its dangerous "inward-looking" course and to save the Continent for democracy.

38. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston, 1962), p. 132.

39. Lemberg, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

40. As cited in Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

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41. In the Berlin question, this policy found its apex in Kennedy's speech in Berlin: "Ich bin ein Berliner."

42. As has been proposed by Karl Jaspers. See for example his "Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung," in Hans-Adolf Jacobson and Otto Stenzl (eds.), *Deutschland und die Welt* (Munchen, 1964), pp. 189-197.

43. *Deutschland und die Welt, op. cit.*, p. 12.

44. They seem to have two reasons for this effort: to raise the low esteem in which the German army is held by the population at large and, paradoxically, not to let the younger generation lose interest in reunification.

45. Cited in *Die Welt*, February 7, 1964.

46. According to Albrecht von Kessel, "Zweifel oder Bewunderung," *Die Welt*, September 30, 1964.

47. See K. T. Baron von und zu Guttenberg, "NATO and the Need for a New Policy," in David S. Collier and Karl Glaser (eds.), *Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe* (Chicago, 1964).

48. See the remarks of Achille Albonetti, "The New Europe and the West," in *A New Europe? op. cit.*, pp. 1-37 (esp. pp. 13 and 23).

49. P. C. Geyl, *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Stam* (Amsterdam, 1930-37), 3 vols.

50. For the latter, see the brilliant study of I. Schoffer, *Het Nationaal-Socialistische beeld van de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (The National-Socialist Image of the History of the Low Countries), (Arnhem, no date [after 1955]). The Dutch Nazi leader, Mussert, hoped to become fully accepted by Hitler as "leader" of the greater Netherlands: "Then it will be possible to build something really great: The Dutch imperium, stretching from the Dollart to Kales [Dutch for Calais], with the Indies, the Congo, friend of South Africa, and cooperating closely with the big German brother."

51. With the translation of "verzuiling" into "pillarization" I follow the example of William Petersen, "A Nation Adrift, or On Which Course," in *Sociologische Gids*, Vol. II (January-April 1964), pp. 84-91.

52. When the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major Sas, warned the Dutch government of the pending invasion in the first days of May 1940, he was not believed by the government.

53. Cited by I. Samkalden, "A Dutch Retrospective View on European and Atlantic Cooperation," in "European and Atlantic Cooperation. The Dutch Attitude." Special issue of *Internationale Spectator*, Vol. 19, No. 7 (April 8, 1965), pp. 626-643.

54. Raymond Aron, "Old Nations, New Europe," in *A New Europe?*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

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55. See "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America," *Dædalus* (Fall 1964), pp. 1244-1297.

56. Max Beloff, *Europe and the Europeans* (London, 1957), p. 24.

57. This is a means of compensation often used in the history of nationalism. After the French revolution, which gave rise to the idea of the mission of France, when Napoleon's armies crossed Europe, the difficult question of the content of German greatness was answered by Schiller's dictum, that only the "geistige Gestalt" (the spiritual and intellectual form) counted, not the political. See Lemberg, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

58. Michel Crozier, "The Cultural Revolution: Notes on the Changes in the Intellectual Climate of France," in *A New Europe?*, *op. cit.*, pp. 602-630. See especially, pp. 618-622.

59. Walter Hallstein, "1963, Jahr der Bewahrung," in *Deutschland und die Welt*, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

60. See Lemberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-264. Also Hans Kohn, *American Nationalism* (New York, 1957).

61. Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History* (Gloucester, 1958).

62. Edward McNall Burns, *The American Idea of Mission: Concepts of National Purpose and Destiny* (New Brunswick, 1957).

63. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Peace, Morality and Vietnam," in *The New Leader*, Vol. 47, No. 8 (April 12, 1965), pp. 8-10.

64. Cited in Northedge, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

65. Lemberg, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

66. Text in *United Nations Textbook* (Leiden, 1958), p. 268.

67. Pierre Hassner, "Nationalisme et Relations Internationales" in *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (June 1965), pp. 499-528. Hassner thinks the surprise was "la rencontre entre les idéologies universalistes et le nationalisme, et la relative victoire du second," but the term may just as well be applied to the relative (or temporary?) victory of nationalism over European political integration.

68. It might in this respect be possible to push the analysis of the content of the different nationalisms somewhat further than Ernst Haas does in his "eclectic theory of nationalism that stresses ontology and developmental types" (*Beyond the Nation-State*, *op. cit.*, pp. 464-475), which he uses for a similar purpose, namely, of projecting the future international environment and system. Another example that comes to mind is that of Nkrumah, who has defined the mission of Ghana as bringing about African unity.

69. This is not to say that they would have caused the outbreak of a general war if there had not been a nuclear stalemate. Both ideologies claim the

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enemy—imperialism or communism—is inherently militarily expansionist. In both cases these assertions have not been proved.

70. This might also be said of the nationalism of the new states insofar as they have prevented the enlargement of the ideological blocs.

71. In "Cursing de Gaulle is not a Policy," *op. cit.*

72. How this process works in an individual case can be read in the autobiography of a Hitler youth official, Melita Maschmann, *Account Rendered* (New York, 1965).

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STANLEY HOFFMANN

Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe

I

THE CRITICAL issue for every student of world order is the fate of the nation-state. In the nuclear age, the fragmentation of the world into countless units, each of which has a claim to independence, is obviously dangerous for peace and illogical for welfare. The dynamism which animates those units, when they are not merely city-states of limited expanse or dynastic states manipulated by the Prince's calculations, but nation-states that pour into their foreign policy the collective pride, ambitions, fears, prejudices, and images of large masses of people, is particularly formidable.[1] An abstract theorist could argue that any system of autonomous units follows the same basic rules, whatever the nature of those units. But in practice, that is, in history, their substance matters as much as their form; the story of world affairs since the French Revolution is not merely one more sequence in the ballet of sovereign states; it is the story of the fires and upheavals propagated by nationalism. A claim to sovereignty based on historical tradition and dynastic legitimacy alone has never had the fervor, the self-righteous assertiveness which a similar claim based on the idea and feelings of nationhood presents: in world politics, the dynastic function of nationalism is the constitution of nation-states by amalgamation or by splintering, and its emotional function is the supplying of a formidable good conscience to leaders who see their task as the achievement of nationhood, the defense of the nation, or the expansion of a national mission.[2]

This is where the drama lies. The nation-state is at the same time a form of social organization and—in practice if not in every brand of theory—a factor of international non-integration; but those who

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argue in favor of a more integrated world, either under more centralized power or through various networks of regional or functional agencies, tend to forget Auguste Comte's old maxim that *on ne détruit que ce qu'on remplace:* the new "formula" will have to provide not only world order, but also the kind of social organization in which leaders, élites, and citizens feel at home. There is currently no agreement on what such a formula will be;[3] as a result, nation-states—often inchoate, economically absurd, administratively ramshackle, and impotent yet dangerous in international politics—remain the basic units in spite of all the remonstrations and exhortations. They go on *faute de mieux* despite their alleged obsolescence; indeed, not only do they profit from man's incapacity to bring about a better order, but their very existence is a formidable obstacle to their replacement.

If there was one part of the world in which men of good will thought that the nation-state could be superseded, it was Western Europe. One of France's most subtle commentators on international politics has recently reminded us of E. H. Carr's bold prediction of 1945: "we shall not see again a Europe of twenty, and a world of more than sixty independent sovereign states."[4] Statesmen have invented original schemes for moving Western Europe "beyond the nation-state,"[5] and political scientists have studied their efforts with a care from which emotional involvement was not missing. The conditions seemed ideal. On the one hand, nationalism seemed at its lowest ebb; on the other, an adequate formula and method for building a substitute had apparently been devised. Twenty years after the end of World War II—a period as long as the whole interwar era—observers have had to revise their judgments. The most optimistic put their hope in the chances the future may still harbor, rather than in the propelling power of the present; the less optimistic ones, like myself, try simply to understand what went wrong.

My own conclusion is sad and simple. The nation-state is still here, and the new Jerusalem has been postponed because the nations in Western Europe have not been able to stop time and to fragment space. Political unification could have succeeded if, on the one hand, these nations had not been caught in the whirlpool of different concerns, as a result both of profoundly different internal circumstances and of outside legacies, and if, on the other hand, they had been able or obliged to concentrate on "community-building" to the exclusion of all problems situated either outside their area or within each one of them. Domestic differences and different

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world views obviously mean diverging foreign policies; the involvement of the policy-makers in issues among which "community-building" is merely one has meant a deepening, not a decrease, of those divergencies. The reasons follow: the unification movement has been the victim, and the survival of nation-states the outcome, of three factors, one of which characterizes every international system, and the other two only the present system. Every international system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the *diversity* of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims among its units; any international system based on fragmentation tends, through the dynamics of unevenness (so well understood, if applied only to economic unevenness, by Lenin) to reproduce diversity. However, there is no inherent reason that the model of the fragmented international system should rule out by itself two developments in which the critics of the nation-state have put their bets or their hopes. Why must it be a diversity of nations? Could it not be a diversity of regions, of "federating" blocs, superseding the nation-state just as the dynastic state had replaced the feudal puzzle? Or else, why does the very logic of conflagrations fed by hostility not lead to the kind of catastrophic unification of exhausted yet interdependent nations, sketched out by Kant? Let us remember that the unity movement in Europe was precisely an attempt at creating a regional entity, and that its origins and its springs resembled, on the reduced scale of a half-continent, the process dreamed up by Kant in his *Idea of Universal History*.[6]

The answers are not entirely provided by the two factors that come to mind immediately. One is the legitimacy of national self-determination, the only principle which transcends all blocs and ideologies, since all pay lip service to it, and provides the foundation for the only "universal actor" of the international system: the United Nations. The other is the newness of many of the states, which have wrested their independence by a nationalist upsurge and are therefore unlikely to throw or give away what they have obtained only too recently. However, the legitimacy of the nation-state does not by itself guarantee the nation-state's survival in the international state of nature, and the appeal of nationalism as an emancipating passion does not assure that the nation-state must everywhere remain the basic form of social organization, in a world in which many nations are old and settled and the shortcomings of the nation-state are obvious. The real answers are provided by two unique features of the present international system. One, it is the first truly *global*

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international system: the regional subsystems have only a reduced autonomy; the "relationships of major tension" blanket the whole planet, the domestic polities are dominated not so much by the region's problems as by purely local and purely global ones, which conspire to divert the region's members from the internal affairs of their area, and indeed would make an isolated treatment of those affairs impossible. As a result, each nation, new or old, finds itself placed in an orbit of its own, from which it is quite difficult to move away: for the attraction of the regional forces is offset by the pull of all the other forces. Or, to change the metaphor, those nations that coexist in the same apparently separate "home" of a geographical region find themselves both exposed to the smells and noises that come from outside through all their windows and doors, and looking at the outlying houses from which the interference issues. Coming from diverse pasts, moved by diverse tempers, living in different parts of the house, inescapably yet differently subjected and attracted to the outside world, those cohabitants react unevenly to their exposure and calculate conflictingly how they could either reduce the disturbance or affect in turn all those who live elsewhere. The adjustment of their own relations within the house becomes subordinated to their divergences about the outside world; the "regional subsystem" becomes a stake in the rivalry of its members about the system as a whole.

However, the coziness of the common home could still prevail if the inhabitants were forced to come to terms, either by one of them, or by the fear of a threatening neighbor. This is precisely where the second unique feature of the present situation intervenes. What tends to perpetuate the nation-states decisively in a system whose universality seems to sharpen rather than shrink their diversity is the new set of conditions that govern and restrict the rule of force: Damocles' sword has become a boomerang, the ideological legitimacy of the nation-state is protected by the relative and forced tameness of the world jungle. Force in the nuclear age is still the "midwife of societies" insofar as revolutionary war either breeds new nations or shapes regimes in existing nations; but the use of force along traditional lines, for conquest and expansion—the very use that made the "permeable" feudal units not only obsolete but collapse and replaced them with modern states often built on "blood and iron"—has become too dangerous. The legitimacy of the feudal unit could be undermined in two ways: brutally, by the rule of force—the big fish swallowing small fish by national might; subtly

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or legitimately, so to speak, through self-undermining—the logic of dynastic weddings or acquisitions that consolidated larger units. A system based on national self-determination rules out the latter; a system in which nations, once established, find force a much blunted weapon rules out the former. Thus agglomeration by conquest or out of a fear of conquest fails to take place. The new conditions of violence tend even to pay to national borders the tribute of vice to virtue: violence which dons the cloak of revolution rather than of interstate wars, or persists in the form of such wars only when they accompany revolutions or conflicts in divided countries, perversely respects borders by infiltrating under them rather than by crossing them overtly. Thus all that is left for unification is what one might call "national self-abdication" or self-abnegation, the eventual willingness of nations to try something else; but precisely global involvement hinders rather than helps, and the atrophy of war removes the most pressing incentive. What a nation-state cannot provide alone—in economics, or defense—it can still provide through means far less drastic than hara-kiri.

These two features give its solidity to the principle of national self-determination, as well as its resilience to the U.N. They also give its present, and quite unique, shape to the "relationship of major tension": the conflict between East and West. This conflict is both muted and universal—and both aspects contribute to the survival of the nation-state. As the superpowers find that what makes their power overwhelming also makes it less usable, or rather usable only to deter one another and to deny each other gains, the lesser states discover under the umbrella of the nuclear stalemate that they are not condemned to death, and that indeed their nuisance power is impressive—especially when the kind of violence that prevails in present circumstances favors the porcupine over the elephant. The superpowers experience in their own camps the backlash of a rebellion against domination that enjoys broad impunity, and cannot easily coax or coerce third parties into agglomeration under their tutelage. Yet they retain the means to prevent other powers from agglomerating away from their clutches. Thus, as the superpowers compete, with filed nails, all over the globe, the nation-state becomes the universal point of salience, to use the new language of strategy—the lowest common denominator in the competition.

Other international systems were merely conservative of diversity; the present system is profoundly conservative of the diversity of nation-states, despite all its revolutionary features. The dream of

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Rousseau, concerned both about the prevalence of the general will —that is, the nation-state—and about peace, was the creation of communities insulated from one another. In history, where "the essence and drama of nationalism is not to be alone in the world,"[7] the clash of non-insulated states has tended to breed both nation-states and wars. Today, Rousseau's ideals come closer to reality, but in the most un-Rousseauan way: the nation-states prevail in peace, they remain unsuperseded because a fragile peace keeps the Kantian doctor away, they are unreplaced because their very involvement in the world, their very inability to insulate themselves from one another, preserves their separateness. The "new Europe" dreamed by the Europeans could not be established by force. Left to the wills and calculations of its members, the new formula has not jelled because they could not agree on its role in the world. The failure (so far) of an experiment tried in apparently ideal conditions tells us a great deal about contemporary world politics, about the chances of unification movements elsewhere, and about the functional approach to unification. For it shows that the movement can fail not only when there is a surge of nationalism in one important part, but also when there are differences in assessments of the national interest that rule out agreement on the shape and on the world role of the new, supranational whole.

The word nationalism is notoriously slippery. What I suggest is the following threefold distinction, which may be helpful in analyzing the interaction between the nation-state and the international system:

1. There is *national consciousness* (what the French call *sentiment national*)—a sense of "cohesion and distinctiveness,"[8] which sets one off from other groups. My point is that this sense, which tends to have important effects on international relations as long as it is shared by people who have not achieved statehood, is rather "neutral" once the nation and the state coincide: that is, the existence of national consciousness does not dictate foreign policy, does not indicate whether the people's "image" of foreigners will be friendly or unfriendly (they will be seen as different—nothing else is implied), nor does it indicate whether or not the leaders will be willing to accept sacrifices of sovereignty. One cannot even posit that a strong national consciousness will be an obstacle for movements of unification, for it is perfectly conceivable that a nation convinces itself that its "cohesion and distinctiveness" will be best

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preserved in a larger entity. Here, we must turn to the second category.

2. For lack of a better phrase, I shall call it the *national situation.* Any nation-state, whether pulsing with a strong "national consciousness" or not—indeed, any state, whether a true nation-state or a disparate collection of unintegrated groups—is, to borrow Sartre's language, thrown into the world; its situation is made up altogether of its internal features—what, in an individual, would be called heredity and character—and of its position in the world. The state of national consciousness in the nation is one, but only one, of the elements of the situation. It is a composite of objective data (inside: social structure and political system; outside: geography, formal commitments) and subjective factors (inside: values, prejudices, opinions, reflexes; outside: one's own traditions and assessments of others, and the other's attitudes and approaches toward oneself); some of its components are intractable, others flexible and changeable. Any statesman, whether he is a fervent patriot or not, must define the nation's foreign policy by taking that situation into account; even if he is convinced of the obsolescence of *the* nation-state (or of *his* nation-state), the steps he will be able and willing to take in order to overcome it will be shaped by the fact that he speaks—to borrow de Gaulle's language this time—for the nation as it is in the world as it is. He cannot act as if his nation-state did not exist, however sorry its shape may be, or as if the world were other than it is. The national situation may facilitate unification moves, even when national consciousness is strong. It may prove a formidable obstacle, even when national consciousness is weak. The point is that even when the policy-maker tries to move "beyond the nation-state" he can do it only by taking along the nation with its baggage of memories and problems—with its situation. I do not want to suggest that the situation is a "given" that dictates policy; but it sets complicated limits that affect freedom of choice.[9]

3. I will reserve the term "*nationalism*" for a specific meaning: it is one of the numerous ways in which political leaders and élites can interpret the dictates, or rather the suggestions, of the national situation, one of the ways of using the margin it leaves. Whereas national consciousness is a feeling, and the national situation a condition, nationalism is a doctrine or (if one uses a broad definition) an ideology—the doctrine or ideology that gives to the nation in world affairs absolute value and top priority. The consequences of

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such a preference may vary immensely: nationalism may imply expansion (that is, the attempt at establishing the supremacy of one's nation over others) or merely defense; it may entail the notion of a universal mission or, on the contrary, insulation. It may be peaceful or pugnacious.[10] It is less an imperative determinant of choice than a criterion of choice and an attitude which shapes the choices made. But whatever its manifestations, its varying content, it always follows one rule common to all the former, it always pours the latter into one mold: the preservation of the nation as the highest good. Nationalism thus affects, *at least* negatively, the way in which the freedom of choice left by the national situation will be used; indeed, it may collide with, and try to disregard or overcome, the limits which the situation sets.

The relation between nationalism and the two other factors is complicated. Nationalism (in the sense of the will to establish a nation-state) is triggered by, and in turn activates, national consciousness in oppressed nationalities; but nationalism, in colonial areas as well as in mature nation-states, can also be a substitute for a still weak or for a fading national consciousness. In nation-states that are going concerns, national consciousness breeds nationalism only in certain kinds of national situations. The national situation may be assessed by a nationalist leader exactly in the same way as by a non-nationalist one; however, nationalism may lead the former to promote policies the latter would have rejected and to oppose moves the former would have undertaken. That bane of international relations theory, the national interest, could be defined as follows:

N.I. = National situation X outlook of the foreign policy-makers.

It is obvious that the same situation can result in different policies, depending in particular on whether or not there is a nationalist policy-maker. It is obvious also that national interests of different nations will not be defined in easily compatible terms if those respective outlooks are nationalist, even when the situations are not so different. But the same incompatibility may obtain, even if the outlooks are not nationalistic, when the situations are indeed very different.[11]

II

Let us now look at the fate of the nation-states in the part of Europe occupied by the so-called Six, that is, the continental part

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of Western Europe, first by examining the basic features of their national situations, then by commenting upon the process of unification, later by discussing its results, and finally by drawing some lessons.

Western Europe in the postwar years has been characterized by three features which have affected all of its nations. But each of those features has nevertheless affected each of the six nations in a different way because of the deep differences that have continued to divide the Six.

1. The first feature—the most hopeful one from the viewpoint of the unifiers—was the temporary demise of nationalism. In the defeated countries—Germany and Italy—nationalism had become associated with the regimes that had led the nations into war, defeat, and destruction. The collapse of two national ideologies that had been bellicose, aggressive, and imperialistic brought about an almost total discredit for nationalism in every guise. Among the nations of Western Europe that were on the Allied side, the most remarkable thing was that the terrible years of occupation and resistance had not resulted in a resurgence of chauvinism. Amusingly enough, it was the Communist Party of France that gave the most nationalistic tone to its propaganda; on the whole, the platforms of the Resistance movements show an acute awareness of the dangers of nationalist celebrations and national fragmentation in Western Europe. The Resistance itself had had a kind of supranational dimension; none of the national resistance movements could have survived without outside support; the nations whose honor they had saved had been liberated rather than victorious. All this prevented the upsurge of the kind of cramped chauvinism that had followed the victory of World War I, just as the completeness of the disaster and the impossibility of putting the blame on any traitors crushed any potential revival in Germany of the smoldering nationalism of resentment that had undermined the Weimar Republic. There was, in other words, above and beyond the differences in national situations between indubitable losers and dubious winners, the general feeling of a common defeat, and also the hope of a common future: for the Resistance platforms often put their emphasis on the need for a union or federation of Western Europe.

However, the demise of nationalism affected differently the various nations of the half-continent. On the one hand, there were significant differences in national consciousness. If nationalism was

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low, patriotic sentiment was extremely high in liberated France. The circumstances in which the hated Nazis were expelled and the domestic collaborators purged amounted to what I have called elsewhere a rediscovery of the French political community by the French:[12] the nation seemed to have redeemed its "cohesion and distinctiveness." On the contrary, in Germany especially, the destruction of nationalism seemed to have been accompanied by a drop in national consciousness as well: what was distinctive was guilt and shame; what had been only too cohesive was being torn apart not by internal political cleavages, but by partition, zones of occupation, regional parochialisms blessed by the victors. The French national backbone had been straightened by the ordeal, although the pain had been too strong to tempt the French to flex nationalistic muscles; the German national backbone appeared to have been broken along with the strutting jaw and clenched fist of Nazi nationalism. Italy was in slightly better shape than Germany, in part because of its Resistance movements, but its story was closer to the German than to the French.

However, there were other elements in the national situation, besides patriotic consciousness, that also affected differently the various nations' inclination to nationalism. The defeated nations—Germany in particular—were in the position of patients on whom drastic surgery had been performed, and who were lying prostrate, dependent for their every movement on the surgeons and nurses. Even if one had wanted to restore the nation to the pinnacle of values and objectives, one could not have succeeded except with the help and consent of one's guardians—who were not likely to give support to such a drive; in other words, the situation itself set the strictest limits to the possibility of any kind of nationalism, expansive or insulating. The lost territories were beyond recuperation; a healing period of "*repli*" comparable to that which had marked the early foreign policy of the Third Republic was not conceivable either. One could not get anything alone, and anything others could provide, while limited, would be something to be grateful for.

On the other hand, France and, to a lesser extent (because of their much smaller size), Belgium and Holland were not so well inoculated. For, although the prevalence of the nation meant little in the immediate European context, it meant a great deal in the imperial one: if the circumstances of the Liberation kept national consciousness from veering into nationalism in one realm, the same circumstances tended to encourage such a turn with respect to the

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colonies. Cut down to size in Europe, these nations were bound to act as if they could call upon their overseas possessions to redress the balance; accustomed, through their association of nationalism with Nazi and Fascist imperialism, to equate chauvinism only with expansion, they would not be so easily discouraged from a nationalism of defense, aimed at preserving the "national mission" overseas. The Dutch lost most of their empire early enough to find themselves, in this respect, not so different from the German and Italian amputees; the Belgians remained serene long enough not to have nationalistic fevers about the huge member that seemed to give them no trouble until the day when it broke off—brutally, painfully, but irremediably. The French, however, suffered almost at once from dis-imperial dyspepsia, and the long, losing battle they fought gave rise continuously to nationalist tantrums of frustration and rage. Moreover, the French inclination to nationalism was higher because of an internal component of the national situation as well: there was in France one political force that was clearly nationalist, that had indeed presided over the Liberation, given whatever unity they had to the Resistance movements, and achieved in the most impressive way a highly original convergence of Jacobin universalist nationalism and of "traditionalist," right-wing, defensive nationalism—the force of General de Gaulle. His resignation had meant, as Alfred Grosser suggests,[13] the defeat of a doctrine that put not only a priority mark on foreign affairs but also a priority claim on *Notre Dame la France*. The incident that had led to his departure —a conflict over the military budget—had been symbolic enough of the demise of nationalism referred to above. But his durability, first as a political leader, later as a "capital that belongs to all and to none," reflected a lasting nostalgia for nationalism; and it was equally symbolic that the crisis which returned him to power was a crisis over Algeria.

2. The second feature common to all the West European national situations, yet affecting them differently, was the "political collapse of Europe." Europe did not merely lose power and wealth: such losses can be repaired, as the aftermath of World War I had shown. Europe, previously the heart of the international system, the locus of the world organization, the fount of international law, fell under what de Gaulle has called "the two hegemonies." The phrase is, obviously, inaccurate and insulting: one of those hegemonies took a highly imperial form, and thus discouraged and prevented the

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creation in Eastern Europe of any regional entity capable of overcoming the prewar national rivalries. Nothing is to be gained, however, by denying that U.S. hegemony has been a basic fact of life. American domination has indeed had the kinds of "domination effects" any hegemony produces: the transfer of decision-making in vital matters from the dominated to the dominator breeds a kind of paternalism in the latter, and irresponsibility (either in the form of abdication or in the form of scapegoatism) in the former. But the consequences of hegemony vary according to its nature. The peculiar nature of this domination has also had unique consequences —better and worse than in the classical cases. One may dominate because one wants to and can; but one may also dominate because one must and does: by one's weight and under the pressures of a compelling situation. This has been America's experience: its hegemony was "situational," not deliberate.

The effects have been better than usual, insofar as such hegemony restricted itself to areas in which European nations had become either impotent or incapable of recovery by self-reliance. It left the dominated with a considerable freedom of maneuver, and indeed prodded them into recovery, power recuperation, and regional unity; it favored both individual and collective emancipation. But the effects have been worse precisely because this laxity meant that each party could react to *this* common feature of the national situations (that is, American hegemony) according to the distinctive *other* features of his national situation, features left intact by the weight and acts of the U. S., by contrast with the U.S.S.R. American domination was only one part of the picture. Hence the following paradox: both America's prodding and the individual and collective impotence of Western European nations, now reduced to the condition of clients and stakes, ought logically to have pushed them into unity-for-emancipation—the kind of process Soviet policy discouraged in the other half of Europe. But the very margin of autonomy left to each West European nation by the U. S. gave it an array of choices: between accepting and rejecting dependence, between unity as a weapon for emancipation and unity as merely a way to make dependence more comfortable. It would have been a miracle if all the nations had made the same choice; the diversity of national situations has ultimately prevailed. To define one's position toward the U. S. was the common imperative, but each one has defined it in his own way.

At first, this diversity of domestic outlooks and external positions

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did not appear to be an obstacle to the unification movement. As Ernst Haas has shown,[14] the movement grew on ambiguity, and those who accepted American hegemony as a lasting fact of European life as well as those who did not could submerge their disagreement in the construction of a regional entity that could be seen, by the former, as the most effective way for continuing to receive American protection and contributing to America's mission and, by the latter, as the most effective way to challenge American predominance. However, there are limits to the credit of ambiguity. The split could not be concealed once the new entity was asked to tackle matters of "high politics"—that is, go beyond the purely internal economic problems of little impact or dependence on the external relationship to the U. S.[15] It is therefore no surprise that this split should have disrupted unification at two moments—in 1953-54, when the problem of German rearmament was raised; and in 1962-65, when de Gaulle's challenge of the U. S. became global.[16]

This is how the diversity of national situations operated. First, it produced (and produces) the basic split between those I would call the resigned ones, and those I would call the resisters. The resigned ones were, on the one hand, the smaller nations, aware of their weakness, realizing that the Soviet threat could not be met by Europeans alone, accustomed to dependence on external protectors, grateful to America for the unique features of its protection, and looking forward to an important role for Europe but not in the realm of high politics. Italy had, in the past, tried to act as a great power without protectors; yet not only were those days over, but also the acceptance of American hegemony provided the creaky Italian political system with a kind of double cushion—against the threat of Communism, but also against the need to spend too much energy and money on Italian rearmament. For the smaller states as well as for Italy, the acceptance of U. S. hegemony was like an insurance policy, which protected them against having to give priority to foreign affairs. On the other hand, Germany accepted dependence on the U. S. not merely as a comfort, but as a necessity as vital as breathing. West Germany's geographical position had turned it into the front line, its partition has contributed to imposing security as the supreme goal, the staunch anti-Communism of its leadership had ruled out any search for security along the lines of neutrality. There followed not only the acceptance of U. S. leadership but also the need to do everything possible in order to tie the United States to Western Europe. Moreover, in West Germany's helpless

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position, the recovery of equality was another vital goal, and it could be reached only through cooperation with the most powerful of the occupying forces. Defeat, division, and danger conspired to making West Germany switch almost abruptly from its imperialistic nationalism of the Nazi era to a dependence which was apparently submissive, yet also productive (of security and status gains) under Adenauer.

As for the resisters, they, like the West Germans, gave priority to foreign affairs—only not in the same perspective. The French reading of geography and history was different.[17] To be sure, the present need for security against the Soviet Union was felt. But there were two reasons that the "tyranny of the cold war" operated differently in France. One, French feelings of hostility toward Russia were much lower than in Germany, and, although it may be too strong to speak of a nostalgia for the wartime grand alliance, it is not false to say that the hope of an ultimate détente allowing for European reunification, for a return of the Soviets to moderation, and for an emancipation of the continent from its "two hegemonies" never died. The French time perspective has been consistently different from, say, the German: the urgency of the threat never overshadowed the desire for, and belief in, the advent of a less tense international system. This may have been due not only to France's location, but also to other elements in France's national situation. Whereas Germany's continuity with its past was both wrecked and repudiated, France (like England) looked back to the days when Europe held the center of the stage and forward to the time when Europe would again be an actor, not a stake: the anomaly was the present, not the past. Also, on colonial matters, France (more than England) often found little to distinguish America's reprobation from Soviet hostility. Two, France continued to worry not only about possible Soviet thrusts but also about Germany's potential threats: the suspicion of a reborn German national consciousness and nationalism has marked all French leaders. An additional reason for fearing the perpetuation of American hegemony and the freezing of the cold war, for hoping for a détente that would help Europe reunite, was thus provided by the fear that any other course would make Germany the main beneficiary of America's favors. Germany looked East with some terror, but there was only one foe there; when the French looked East, they saw two nations to fear; each could be used as an ally against the other—but for the time being the Soviet danger was the greater, and, should Germany be

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built up too much against the Soviets, the security gained by France in one respect would be compromised in another.[18]

There was a second way in which the diversity of national situations operated. As I have suggested, situations limit and affect but do not command choices. A general desire for overcoming the cold war and American hegemony did not mean a general agreement on how to do so. What I have called "the resistance" was split, and it is this split that has become decisive for an analysis of the obstacles to European unification. Had all the resisters calculated that the best way to reach France's objectives was the construction of a powerful West European entity, which could rival America's might, turn the bipolar contest into a triangle, and wrest advantages from both extra-European giants, the "ambiguity" of a movement led by resigned as well as resisting forces might not have damaged the enterprise until much later. However, there was a sharp division over methods between those who reasoned along the lines just described —like Jean Monnet—and those who feared that the sacrifice of national sovereignty to supranational institutions might entail a loss of control over the direction of the undertaking. The latter consisted of two kinds of people: on the one hand, the nationalists who, as indicated above, were still very much around, exasperated by the colonial battles, anxious to preserve all the resources of French diplomacy and strategy in order, in the present, to concentrate on the fronts overseas and, later, to promote whatever policies would be required, rather than let a foreign body decide; on the other hand, men like Mendès-France, who were not nationalists in the sense of this paper, but who thought that the continental European construction was not France's best way of coping with her situation—they thought that priority ought to go to more urgent tasks such as the search for a détente, the liberalization of the Empire, the reform of the economy.[19]

The success of the European movement required, first, that the "resisters" suspicious of European integration remain a minority—not only throughout the six but in the leadership of every one of the six, not only in Parliament but above all in the Executive, the prime decision-making force in every state: a requirement which was met in 1950-53 and in 1955-58, but not in the crucial months for E.D.C. in 1953-54, and no longer after 1958. The movement proceeded after 1958 because of the dialectic of ambiguity; however, there was a second requirement for success: that the "minute of truth"—when the European élites would have to ask themselves questions about

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the ultimate political direction of their community—be postponed as long as possible; that is, that the cold war remain sufficiently intense to impose even on the "resisters" a priority for the kind of security that implied U. S. protection—a priority for the *urgent* over the *long-term important* as they saw it. This is precisely what was already, if temporarily, shaken by the brief period of nervous demobilization that followed Stalin's death, in 1953-54, and then gradually undermined by the third basic feature of Europe's postwar situation. But before we turn to it, one remark must be made: in French foreign policy, "resistance by European integration" prevailed over "resistance by self-reliance" only as long as France was bogged down in colonial wars; it was this important and purely French element in France's national situation whose ups and downs affected quite decisively the method of "resistance."[20]

3. The divisions and contradictions described above were sharpened by the third common feature, which emerged in the mid-1950's and whose effects have developed progressively since: the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers. The impact of the "balance of terror" on the Western alliance has been analyzed so often and well[21] that nothing needs to be added here; but what is needed is a brief explanation of how the two splits already discussed have been worsened by Europe's gradual discovery of the uncertainties of America's nuclear protection (now that the U. S. could be devastated too), and how some new splits appeared. For to the extent to which the stalemate has loosened up a previously very tight situation—tight because of the threat from the East and the ties to the U. S.—it has altogether sharpened previous differences in national situations *and* increased the number of alternatives made available to élites and statesmen. Greater indeterminacy has meant greater confusion.

First, the split between French "resistance" and German "resignation" has become deeper. The dominant political élites in Germany have interpreted the new national situation created by the balance of terror as merely adding urgency to their previous calculation of interest. The nuclear stalemate was, given Germany's position, deemed to increase the danger for the West: the U. S. was relatively less strong, the Soviet Union stronger, that is, more of a threat. Indeed, the Socialists switched from their increasingly more furtive glances at neutrality to an outright endorsement of the Christian Democratic interpretation. If America's monopoly was broken,

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if America's guarantee was weakened thereby, what was needed—in a world that was not willing to let Germany rearm with nuclear weapons, in a continent that could not really develop a nuclear force of its own capable of replacing America's and of matching Russia's —was a German policy so respectful of America's main concerns, and also so vigilant with respect to the Soviet Union, that the U. S. would both feel obligated to keep its mantle of protection over Germany and not be tempted into negotiating a détente at Germany's expense. German docility would be the condition for, and counterpart of, American entanglement. The German reaction to a development that could, if General Gallois' logic were followed, lead to the prevalence of "polycentrism" at bipolarity's expense was the search for ways of exorcising the former and preserving the latter. On the whole, the smaller nations and Italy, while not at all fearful about the consequences of polycentrism (on the contrary), were nevertheless not shaken out of their "resignation"; the mere appearance of parity of nuclear peril was not enough to make them anxious to give, or to make them domestically capable of giving, priority to an active foreign policy.

In France, on the contrary, the balance of terror reinforced the attitude of resistance: what had always been a goal—emancipation —but had in fact been no more than a hope, given the thickness of the iron curtain, the simple rigidity of the superpowers' policies in the days of Mr. Dulles, and Europe's inability to affect the course of events, now became a possibility; for the giants' stalemate meant increased security for the less great (however much they might complain about the decrease of American protection and use it as a pretext, their lament coexisted with a heightened feeling of protection against war in general). What the Germans saw as a liability was an opportunity to the French. Germany's situation, its low national consciousness, incited most German leaders to choose what might be called a "minimizing" interpretation of the new situation; France's situation, its high national consciousness and, after 1958, the doctrine of its leader, incited French political élites to choose a "maximizing" interpretation. The increasing costs of the use of force made this use by the superpowers less likely, American protection less certain but also less essential, Europe's recovery of not merely wealth but power more desirable and possible—possible since the quest for power could be pushed without excessive risk of sanctions by the two giants, desirable since power, while transformed, remains the moving force and *ultima ratio* of world politics. This recovery

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of power would help bring about the much desired prevalence of polycentrism over bipolarity.[22]

Secondly, as this feud shows, the balance of terror heightened the split over method among the "resisters." On the one hand, it provided new arguments for those who thought that emancipation could be achieved only through the uniting of Western Europe: individual national efforts would remain too ridiculously weak to amount to anything but a waste in resources; a collective effort, however, could exploit the new situation, make Western Europe a true partner of the U. S., and not merely an economic partner and a military aide-de-camp. On the other hand, those who feared that the "united way" could become a frustrating deviation reasoned that the theory of graduated deterrence justified the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a middle-size power with limited resources and that this acquisition would increase considerably the political influence as well as the prestige of the nation. The increased costs of force ruled out, in any case, what had in the past been the most disastrous effect of the mushrooming of sovereign states—a warlike, expansionist nationalism—but they simultaneously refloated the value of small or middle-sized nations, no longer condemned by the cold, bipolar war to look for bigger protectors or to agglomerate in order to assure their security. Moreover, the "united way" would be a dead-end, since some, and not exactly the least significant, of the associates had no desire for collective European power at the possible expense of American protection. Not the least significant reason for the prevalence of the second line of thought over the first has been one important element of the national situation—the army: almost destroyed by its Algerian experience, it had to be "reconverted." In the circumstances of 1962, this meant inevitably a conversion to French atomic concerns. Its success builds up in turn a vested interest in the preservation of the new establishment—and increases the difference in national situations between France and a non-nuclear Germany.

Thirdly, the new situation affected European unification negatively not only by sharpening those splits but in two other ways as well. On the one hand, until then, opposition to a supranational entity had come only from a fraction of the "resisters"; in the early 1950's the U. S. had strongly—too strongly—urged the establishment of a European defense system which was not considered likely to challenge America's own predominance in the military area. In the 1960's, the U. S. no longer urged the West Europeans to build such

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a system. American leadership has developed a deep concern for maintaining centralized control over the forces of the alliance, that is, for preserving bipolarity, and a growing realization that Europe's appetite would not stop short of nuclear weapons. As a result, some of the "resigned ones," instead of endorsing European integration as unreservedly as when the situation of a dependent Europe in a cold-war-dominated world did not allow Europeans to entertain thoughts of genuine military "partnership" with the U. S., now for the first time showed themselves of two minds—they were willing to pursue integration in economic and social fields, but much less so in matters of defense, lest NATO be weakened. It is significant that the Dutch resisted de Gaulle's efforts, in 1960-62, to include defense in his confederal scheme and that the German leaders, in their quest for security, put their hopes in the MLF—a scheme that ties European nations one by one to the U. S.—rather than in a revised and revived E.D.C. Inevitably, such mental reservations of those who had been among the champions of supranationality could only confirm the suspicions of those "resisters" who had distrusted the "Monnet method" since the beginning. Thus, the national situation of Germany in particular—a situation in which America's own policy of reliance on Germany as the anchor of U. S. influence on the continent plays a large role—damaged the European movement: the German leaders were largely successful in their drive to entangle the U. S., but found that the price they had to pay was a decreasing ability to push for European integration. European integration and dependence on the U. S. were no longer automatically compatible.[23]

On the other hand, even that minority of German leaders who began to read Germany's national interest differently did not really compensate for the weakening of the majority's integrating ardor. Increasingly, in 1963 to 1965, suspicions about the value of the policy of docility-for-entanglement were voiced by a group of Christian Democrats, led by Adenauer and Strauss. They still read the German situation in terms of security first; but their faith in America's aptitude to provide it was shaken, and they saw that Germany had sufficiently gained from America's support not to have to behave as a minor any longer. Their nickname of German Gaullists is however totally unsuitable. To be sure, these men are "resisters" in the sense of turning away from America; they are close to the French "integrationist resisters," insofar as they propose a European defense effort and a joint European nuclear policy (rather than a purely German one). Nevertheless, their foreign policy goals are quite dif-

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ferent from those of all the French resisters, integrationist or nationalist. The national situation of France made most French leaders agree on a common *vision,* described above, that can be summed up as the end of the cold war and a continent reunited with a Germany placed under certain wraps. That common vision coexists with the split on *policies* already discussed—the "European" policy (in which the wraps are organic, that is, the net and bonds of integration) *vs.* the "national" policy (in which the wraps are contractual). The national situation of Germany has made most German leaders, after the Social Democratic switch,[24] agree on a common *vision* deeply different from the French—a perpetuation of the cold war, hostility to the Soviet Union, the hope for a reunification tantamount not merely to the thawing of the Eastern "camp" but to its disintegration, and with as few concessions as possible. Since 1963, this vision has coexisted with two different *policies:* the majority policy of reliance on the U. S., the minority policy of substituting a strong, tough Europe for an increasingly less reliable, increasingly détente-happy U. S. At present, "resisters" are thus split not only on methods (French integrationists *vs.* French anti-integrationists) but also on objectives (French *vs.* German).

This long discussion of the different responses to common situations has been necessary in reaction to the dominant approach to European integration which has focused on process. The self-propelling power of the process is severely constrained by the associates' views and splits on ends and means. In order to go "beyond the nation-state," one will have to do more than set up procedures in adequate "background" and "process conditions." For a procedure is not a purpose, a process is not a policy.

III

However, since it is the process of European integration that is its most original feature, we must examine it also.[25] We have been witnessing a kind of race, between the logic of integration set up by Monnet and analyzed by Haas, and the logic of diversity, analyzed above. According to the former, the double pressure of necessity (the interdependence of the social fabric, which will oblige statesmen to integrate even sectors originally left uncoordinated) and of men (the action of the supranational agents) will gradually restrict the freedom of movement of the national governments by turning the national situations into one of total enmeshing. In such

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a milieu, nationalism will be a futile exercise in anachronism, and the national consciousness itself will, so to speak, be impregnated by an awareness of the higher interest in union. The logic of diversity, by contrast, sets limits to the degree to which the "spill-over" process can limit the freedom of action of the governments; it restricts the domain in which the logic of functional integration operates to the area of welfare; indeed, to the extent that discrepancies over the other areas begin to prevail over the laborious harmonization in welfare, even issues belonging to the latter sphere may become infected by the disharmony which reigns in those other areas. The logic of integration is that of a blender which crunches the most diverse products, overcomes their different tastes and perfumes, and replaces them with one, presumably delicious juice. One lets each item be ground because one expects a finer synthesis: that is, ambiguity helps rather than hinders because each "ingredient" can hope that its taste will prevail at the end. The logic of diversity is the opposite: it suggests that, in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender; ambiguity carries one only a part of the way. The logic of integration assumes that it is possible to fool each one of the associates some of the time because his over-all gain will still exceed his occasional losses, even if his calculations turn out wrong here or there. The logic of diversity implies that, on a vital issue, losses are not compensated by gains on other (and especially not on other less vital) issues: nobody wants to be fooled. The logic of integration deems the uncertainties of the supranational function process creative; the logic of diversity sees them as destructive past a certain threshold: Russian roulette is fine only as long as the gun is filled with blanks. Ambiguity lures and lulls the national consciousness into integration as long as the benefits are high, the costs low, the expectations considerable. Ambiguity may arouse and stiffen national consciousness into nationalism if the benefits are slow, the losses high, the hopes dashed or deferred. Functional integration's gamble could be won only if the method had sufficient potency to promise a permanent excess of gains over losses, and of hopes over frustrations. Theoretically, this may be true of economic integration. It is not true of political integration (in the sense of "high politics").

The success of the approach symbolized by Jean Monnet depended, and depends still, on his winning a triple gamble: on goals,

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on methods, on results. As for goals, it is a gamble on the possibility of substituting motion as an end in itself, for agreement on ends. It is a fact that the trans-national integrationist élites did not agree on whether the object of the community-building enterprise ought to be the construction of a new super-state—that is, a federal potential nation, *à la* U.S.A., more able because of its size and resources to play the traditional game of power than the dwarfed nations of Western Europe—or whether the object was to demonstrate that power politics could be overcome through cooperation and compromise, to build the first example of a radically new kind of unit, to achieve a change in the nature and not merely in the scale of the game. Monnet himself has been ambiguous on this score; Hallstein has been leaning in the first direction, many of Monnet's public relations men in the second.[26] Nor did the integrationists agree on whether the main goal was the creation of a regional "security-community,"[27] that is, the pacification of a former hotbed of wars, or whether the main goal was the creation of an entity whose position and might could decisively affect the course of the cold war in particular, of international relations in general. Now, it is perfectly possible for a movement to feed on its harboring continental nationalists as well as anti-power idealists, inward-looking politicians and outward-looking politicians—but only as long as there is no need to make a choice. Decisions on tariffs did not require such choices. Decisions on agriculture already raise basic problems of orientation. Decisions on foreign policy and membership and defense cannot be reached unless the goals are clarified. One cannot be all things to all people all of the time.

As for methods, there was a gamble on the irresistible rise of supranational functionalism. It assumed, first, that national sovereignty, already devalued by events, could be chewed up leaf by leaf like an artichoke. It assumed, second, that the dilemma of governments having to choose between pursuing an integration that ties their hands and stopping a movement that benefits their people could be exploited in favor of integration by men representing the common good, endowed with the advantages of superior expertise, initiating proposals, propped against a set of deadlines, and using for their cause the technique of package deals. Finally, it was assumed that this approach would both take into account the interests of the greater powers and prevent the crushing of the smaller ones. The troubles with this gamble have been numerous. One, even an artichoke has a heart, which remains intact after the leaves have

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been eaten. It is of course true that a successful economic and social integration would considerably limit the freedom governments would still enjoy in theory for their diplomacy and strategy; but why should one assume that they would not be aware of it? As the artichoke's heart gets more and more denuded, the governments' vigilance gets more and more alerted. To be sure, the second assumption implies that the logic of the movement would prevent them from doing anything about it: they would be powerless to save the heart. But, two, this would be true only if governments never put what they consider essential interests of the nation above the particular interests of certain categories of nationals, if superior expertise were always either the Commission's monopoly or the solution of the issue at hand, if package deals were effective in every argument, and, above all, if the governments' representatives were always determined to behave as a "community organ" rather than as the agents of states that are not willing to accept a community under any conditions. Finally, functional integration may indeed give lasting satisfaction to the smaller powers, precisely because it is for them that the ratio of "welfare politics" to high politics is highest, and that the chance of gaining benefits through intergovernmental methods that reflect rather than correct the power differential between the big and the small is poorest; but this is also why the method is not likely *à la longue* to satisfy the bigger powers as much: facing them, the supranational civil servants, for all their skill and legal powers, are a bit like Jonases trying to turn whales into jellyfish. Of course, the idea—ultimately—is to move from an essentially administrative procedure in which supranational civil servants enter a dialogue with national ministers, to a truly federal one in which a federal cabinet is responsible to a federal parliament; but what is thus presented as a linear progress may turn out to be a vicious circle, since the ministers hold the key to the transformation, and may refuse it unless the goals are defined and the results already achieved are satisfactory.

There was a gamble about results as well. The experience of integration would entail net benefits for all, and bring about clear progress toward community formation. Such progress could be measured by the following yardsticks: in the realm of interstate relations, an increasing transfer of power to the new common agencies, and the prevalence of solutions "upgrading the common interest" over other kinds of compromises; in the realm of transnational society, an increasing flow of communications; in the area of national

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consciousness—which is important both for interstate relations, because (as seen above) it may set limits to the statesmen's discretion, and for transnational society, because it affects the scope and meaning of the communication flows—progress would be measured by increasing compatibility of views about external issues. The results achieved so far are mixed: negative on the last count (see below), limited on the second, and marked on the first by features that the enthusiasts of intergration did not expect. On the one hand, there has been some strengthening of the authority of the Commission, and in various areas there has been some "upgrading of common interests." On the other hand, the Commission's unfortunate attempt to consolidate those gains at de Gaulle's expense, in the spring of 1965, has brought about a startling setback for the whole enterprise; moreover, in their negotiations, the members have conspicuously failed to find a common interest in some vital areas (energy, England's entry), and sometimes succeeded in reaching apparently "integrating" decisions only after the most ungainly, traditional kind of bargaining, in which such uncommunity-like methods as threats, ultimatums, and retaliatory moves were used. In other words, either the ideal was not reached, or it was reached in a way that was both the opposite of the ideal and ultimately its destroyer. If we look at the institutions of the Common Market as an incipient political system for Europe, we find that its authority remains limited, its structure weak, its popular base restricted and distant.[28]

It is therefore not surprising if the uncertainty about results already achieved contributes to uncertainty about future prospects. For the very divisions among the partisans of integration make it hard to predict where the "Monnet method" would lead, if the process were to continue along the lines so fondly planned by the French "inspirator." Would the enterprise become an effective federation, gradually turning the many into one, or would it lead to a mere façade behind which all the divergences and rivalries would continue to be played out? It is at least remarkable that Gaullist and American fears should converge in one respect: de Gaulle has consistently warned that the application of the supranational method to the area of high politics would lead not to a strong European entity, but to a dilution of national responsibility whose only beneficiary would be the U. S.; incapable of defining a coherent policy, the "technocrats" would leave the decisions in vital areas to the U. S., at least by default. On the contrary, many Americans have come to believe, on the basis of some of E.E.C.'s actions in the realm

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of tariffs and trade, that a united Europe would be able to challenge U. S. leadership much more effectively than the separate European states ever could. The truth of the matter is that nobody knows: a method is not a policy, a process is not a direction; the results achieved so far are too specialized, and the way in which they have been reached is too bumpy, to allow one to extrapolate and project safely. The face of a united Europe has not begun to emerge; there are just a few lines, but one does not know whether the supranational technique would finally give to Western Europe the features of a going concern, or those of a Fourth Republic writ large—the ambitions of a world power, or the complacency of parochialism. The range of possibilities is so broad, the alternatives are so extreme, that the more the Six move into the stormy waters of high politics, the less not only they but also the outside powers, such as the U. S., which may be affected by their acts are willing to extend the credit of hope and to make new wagers: neither Gaullist France nor the present U. S. leadership is willing to risk a major loss of control. Contrary to the French proverb, in the process of functional integration, only the first steps do not cost much.

There are two important general lessons one can draw from a study of the process of integration. The first concerns the limits of the functional method: its very (if relative) success in the relatively painless area in which it works relatively well lifts the participants to the level of issues to which it does not apply well any more—like swimmers whose skill at moving quickly away from the shore suddenly brings them to the point where the waters are stormiest and deepest, at a time when fatigue is setting in, and none of the questions about ultimate goal, direction, and length of swim has been answered. The functional process was used in order to "make Europe"; once Europe began being made, the process collided with the question: "making Europe, what for?" The process is like a grinding machine that can work only if someone keeps giving it something to grind. When the users start quarreling and stop providing, the machine stops. For a while, the machine worked because the governments poured into it a common determination to integrate their economies in order to maximize wealth; but with their wealth increasing, the question of what to do with it was going to arise: a technique capable of supplying means does not *ipso facto* provide the ends, and it is about those ends that quarrels have broken out. They might have been avoided if the situation had been more compelling—if the Six had been so cooped up that each one's horizon

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would have been nothing other than his five partners. But this has never been their outlook, nor is it any more their necessity. Each one is willing to live with the others, but not on terms too different from his own; and the Six are not in the position of the three miserable prisoners of *No Exit*. Transforming a dependent "subsystem" proved to be one thing; defining its relations to all other subsystems and to the international system in general has turned out to be quite another—indeed, so formidable a matter as to keep the transformation of the subsystem in abeyance until those relations can be defined.

The model of functional integration, a substitute for the kind of instant federation which governments had not been prepared to accept, shows its origins in important respects. One, it is essentially an administrative model, which relies on bureaucratic expertise for the promotion of a policy defined by the political authorities, and for the definition of a policy that political decision-makers are technically incapable of shaping—something like French planning under the Fourth Republic. The hope was that in the interstices of political bickering the administrators could build up a consensus; but the mistake was to believe that a formula that works well within certain limits is a panacea—and that even within the limits of "welfare politics" administrative skill can always overcome the disastrous effects of political paralysis or mismanagement (cf. the impact of inflation, or balance of payment troubles, on planning). Two, the model assumes that the basic political decisions, to be prepared and pursued by the civil servants but formally made by the governments, would be reached through the process of short-term bargaining, by politicians whose mode of operation is empirical muddling through, of the kind that puts immediate advantages above long-term pursuits: this model corresponds well to the nature of parliamentary politics with a weak Executive, for example, the politics of the Fourth Republic, but the mistake was to believe that all political regimes would conform to this rather sorry image, and also to ignore the disastrous results which the original example produced whenever conflicts over values and fundamental choices made mere empirical groping useless or worse than useless (cf. decolonization).[29]

The second lesson is even more discouraging for the advocates of functionalism. To revert to the analogy of the grinder, what has happened is that the machine, piqued by the slowing down of supply, suddenly suggested to its users that in the future the supplying of grinding material be taken out of their hands and left to the

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machine. The institutional machinery tends to become an actor with a stake in its own survival and expansion. The same thing happens often enough within a state whose political system is ineffective. But here we deal not with one but with six political systems, and the reason for the ineffectiveness of the Council of Ministers of the Six may be the excessive toughness, not the weakness, of the national political systems involved. In other words, by trying to be a force, the bureaucracy here, inevitably, makes itself even more of a stake that the nations try to control or at least to affect. A new complication is thus added to all the substantive issues that divide the participants—one that provides them with a whole trunkful of screens and masks. Thus, the agricultural problem is one that could have been solved "technically," since the governments had previously reached basic compromises, and more or less agreed on the relations between Common Market and outside agriculture. But the way in which these accords had been reached left scars, and the nature of the agreement meant a victory for one state (France) over another (Germany). The whole issue has been reopened, due not to the states' but to the Commission's initiative. In the crisis of 1965, the Commission's overly bold proposal of a common agricultural policy (along pro-French lines) cum supranationality (against French determination) has, on the one hand, allowed some of the Six, hostile in fact to the substantive proposals, to endorse the Commission's plan and stand up as champions of supranationality, while knowing that the French would block the scheme; the French have been able to use the Commission's rashness as a pretext for trying to kill supranationality altogether; a German government not too kindly disposed toward a Commission whose initiatives and economic inspiration were hardly in line with Mr. Erhard's views has found itself defending the Commission, whose head, now under French attack, is a German; a French government anxious to get its partners committed to a protected agricultural market has preferred to postpone the realization of this goal rather than let the Commission's autonomy grow. The states have found something more to disagree about, and the Commission, in an attempt to push the car out of the bog, has stopped the motor for months. To be sure, the Commission's dilemma had become acute: either its members resigned themselves to being merely patient brokers to their quarreling clients, and letting them set the pace; or else they tried to behave both according to the ideal-type of the Monnet method, and as if a genuine community had already been established; but if prudence meant

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sluggishness, anticipation has meant delay. In the immediate future, the settlement of the various substantive issues—"the uniting of Europe, what for?"—is likely to be postponed while the Six try to repair the damaged machinery; in a way, haggling about the kind of grinder one wants is a polite method for appearing to want to keep grinding together, while really disagreeing completely on what one wants to put in and get out.

IV

We must come now to the balance sheet of the "European experiment." The most visible aspect is the survival of the nations. To be sure, they survive transformed: first, swept by the advent of the "age of mass consumption," caught in an apparently inexorable process of industrialization, urbanization, and democratization, they become more alike in social structure, in economic and social policies, even in physical appearance; there is a spectacular break between a past which so many monuments bring to constant memory, and a rationalized future that puts these nations closer to the problems of America's industrial society than to the issues of their own history. Second, these similarities are promoted by the Common Market itself: it is of no mean consequence that the prospect of a collapse of the Market should have brought anguish to various interest groups, some of which had fought its establishment: the transnational linkages of businessmen and farmers are part of the transformation. Third, none of the Western European nations is a world power any longer in the traditional sense, that is, in the sense either of having physical establishments backed by military might in various parts of the globe, or of possessing in Europe armed forces superior to those of any non-European power.

And yet they survive as nations. Let us go back to the criteria of integration listed above. On foreign and defense policies, not only has no power been transferred to common European organs, but France has actually taken power away from NATO, and, as shown in part two, differences in the calculations of the national interest have, if anything, broadened ever since the advent of the balance of terror. As for intra-European communications, research shows that the indubitably solid economic network of E.E.C. has not been complemented by a network of social and cultural communications;[80] the links between some of those societies and the U. S. are stronger than the links among them. Indeed, even in the realm of

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economic relations, the Common Market for goods has not been completed by a system of pan-West European enterprises: enterprises that find themselves unable to compete with rivals within E.E.C. often associate themselves with American firms rather than merge with such rivals. Finally, views about external issues, far from becoming more compatible, appear to reflect as well as to support the divergent definitions of the national interest by the statesmen. French élite opinion puts Europe ahead of the North Atlantic partnership, deems bipolarity obsolete, is overwhelmingly indifferent or even hostile to the U. S., and is still highly suspicious of Germany; only a minority comes out in favor of a genuine political federation of Western Europe and thinks that U. S. and French interests coincide. German élite opinion puts the North Atlantic entente ahead of Europe, believes that the world is still bipolar, is overwhelmingly favorable to the U. S., deems U. S. and German interests in agreement, is either favorably inclined toward France or at least not hostile, and shows a majority in favor of a European federation. There is no common European outlook. Nor is there a common "project," a common conception of either Europe's role in world affairs or Europe's possible contribution to the solution of the problems characteristic of all industrial societies.

It is important to understand where the obstacles lie. To some extent, they lie in the present condition of national consciousness. I mentioned earlier that there were at the start considerable differences from country to country. In two respects, similarities have emerged in recent years. There has been a rebirth of German national consciousness, largely because the bold attempt at fastening Germany's shattered consciousness directly to a new European one did not succeed: the existence of a German national situation has gradually reawakened a German national awareness, and thus reduced the gap between Germany and France in this area. Moreover, all the national consciences in Western Europe are alike in one sense: they are not like Rousseau's general will, a combination of mores and moves that define with a large degree of intellectual clarity and emotional involvement the purposes of the national community. Today's national consciousness in Europe is negative rather than positive. There is still, in each nation, a "vouloir-vivre collectif." But it is not a "daily plebiscite" *for* something. It is, in some parts, a daily routine, a community based on habit rather than on common tasks, an identity that is received rather than shaped. Thus Germany's sense of "cohesion and distinctiveness" is the inevitable result

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of the survival and recovery of a West German state in a world of nations, rather than a specific willed set of imperatives. In other parts, national consciousness is a daily refusal rather than a daily creation, a desire to preserve a certain heritage (however waning, and less because it is meaningful today than because it is one's own) rather than a determination to define a common destiny, an identity that is hollow rather than full and marked more by bad humor toward foreign influences than by any positive contribution.

To be sure, the negative or hollow character of national consciousness need not be a liability for the champions of integration: general wills *à la* Rousseau could be formidable obstacles to any fusion of sovereignty. However, the obstacle resides partly in the common nature of the present state of national consciousness, partly in the remaining differences. A patriotic consciousness that survives in a kind of nonpurposive complacency may not be a barrier to efforts at transcending it, but it is a drag: it does not carry forward or push statesmen in the way in which an intense and positive "general will" prods leaders who act on behalf of national goals, or in the way in which European federalists have sometimes hoped that enlightened national patriotisms would propel Europe's national leaders into building a new European community, into which those enlightened patriotisms would converge and merge. Moreover, two of the "national consciences" have raised obstacles: the French one because it remains too strong, the German one because it remains too weak. The French may not have a sense of national purpose, but, precisely because their patriotism has been tested so often and so long, because the pressures of the outside world have continued throughout the postwar era to batter their concerns and their conceits, and because modernization, now accepted and even desired, also undermines traditional values still cherished and traditional authority patterns still enforced, French national consciousness opposes considerable resistance to any suggestion of abdication, resignation, *repli*—so much so that the "Europeans" themselves have had to present integration as an opportunity for getting French views shared by others instead of stressing the "community" side of the enterprise.[31] Germany's national consciousness, on the other hand, remains marked by a genuine distaste for or timidity toward what might be called the power activities of a national community on the world stage; hence a tendency to shy away from the problems of "high politics" which a united Europe would have to face and whose avoidance only delays the advent of unity; a tendency to refuse to

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make policy choices and to pretend (to oneself and to others) that no such choices are required, that there is no incompatibility between a "European Europe" and an Atlantic partnership. In one case, a defensive excess of self-confidence makes unity on terms other than one's own difficult, and obliges integrationist leaders to use cunning and flattery and deceit (with often lamentable results—like the E.D.C. crisis); in the other case, an equally defensive lack of self-confidence projects itself into the external undertakings of the nation and weakens the foundations of the common European enterprise.

And yet, if the "national consciousness" of the European nations could be isolated from all other elements of the national situation, one would, I think, conclude that the main reasons for the resistance of the nation-state lie elsewhere.

They lie, first of all, in the differences in national situations, exacerbated by the interaction between each of the Six and the present international system. Earlier, we have looked at concrete instances of such differences; let us return to them in a more analytic way. One part of each national situation is the purely *domestic* component. In a modern nation-state, the very importance of the political system, in the triple sense of functional scope, authority, and popular basis, is already a formidable obstacle to integration. It is comparatively easier to overcome the parochialism of a political system which, being of the night-watchman variety, has only a slender administrative structure, whose power consists of punishing, rather than rewarding, with the help of a tiny budget, and whose transmission belts to the mass of the people are few and narrow, than it is to dismantle the fortress of a political system which rests on "socially mobilized" and mobilizing parties and pressure groups, and handles an enormous variety of social and economic services with a huge bureaucracy. To be sure, it was the hope and tactic of Monnet to dismantle the fortress by redirecting the allegiance of parties and pressure groups toward the new central institutions, by endowing the latter with the ability to compete with the national governments in the setting up of social services. In other words, the authority of the new European political system would deepen as its scope broadened and its popular basis expanded. The success of this attempt at drying up the national ponds by diverting their waters into a new, supranational pool depended on three prerequisites which have not been met: with respect to popular basis, the prevalence of parties and pressure groups over Executives; with

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respect to scope, the self-sustaining and expanding capacity of the new central bureaucracy; with respect to both scope and popular basis, the development of transnational political issues of interest to all political forces and publics across boundary lines. The modern Executive establishment has one remarkable feature: it owes much of its legitimacy and its might to the support of popularly based parties and pressure groups, but it also enjoys a degree of autonomy that allows it to resist pressures, to manipulate opposition, to manufacture support. Even the weak Fourth Republic has evaded pressure toward "transnationalism" and diluted the dose of "bargaining politics" along supranational lines. The civil servants' careers are still made and unmade in the national capitals. Above all, each nation's political life continues to be dominated by "parochial" issues: each political system is like a thermos bottle that keeps warm, or lukewarm, the liquid inside. The European political process has never come close to resembling that of any Western European democracy because it has been starved of common and distinctive European issues. It is as if, for the mythical common man, the nation-state were still the most satisfying—indeed the most rewarding—form of social organization in existence.[32] As for what it can no longer provide him with by itself, the state can still provide it without committing suicide, through cooperation, or the citizens can go and find it across borders, without any need to transfer their allegiance—or else there is, in any event, no guarantee that any form of social organization other than a still utopian world state could provide it. If we look at the issues that have dominated European politics, we find two distinct blocs. One is the bloc of problems peculiar to each nation—Italy's battle of Reds *vs.* Blacks, or its concern for the Mezzogiorno; Belgium's linguistic clashes; Germany's "social economy" and liquidation of the past; France's constitutional troubles and miraculously preserved party splintering. Here, whatever the transnational party and interest group alignments in Luxembourg, the dominant motifs have been purely national. The other bloc of issues are the international ones (including European unity). But here is where the *external* component of the national situation has thwarted the emergence of a common European political system comparable to that of each nation.

It is here that the weight of geography and of history—a history of nations—has kept the nation-states in their watertight compartments. It is no accident if France, the initiator of the process, has also been its chief troublemaker: for in those two respects France's

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position differed from everyone else's in the community, and was actually closer to England's. Historically first: for Germany, integration meant a leap from opprobrium and impotence, to respectability and equal rights; for the smaller powers, it meant exchanging a very modest dose of autonomy for participation in a potentially strong and rich grouping. France could not help being much more ambivalent, for integration meant on the one hand an avenue for leadership and the shaping of a powerful bloc, but it also meant on the other the acceptance of permanent restrictions to an autonomy that was indeed quite theoretical in the late 1940's, but whose loss could not be deemed definitive. For a once-great power, whose national history is long, and therefore used to rise and fall, inherits from its past a whole set of habits and reflexes which make it conduct its policy as if it were still or could again become a great power (unless those habits and reflexes have been smashed, at least for a while, as completely and compellingly as were Germany's); for this once-great power showed, as described above, a still vigilant national consciousness, often the more virulent for all its negativism; for the international system itself seemed to open vistas of increased freedom of action to middle-sized states. In other words, integration meant an almost certain improvement in the national situation of the other five, but for France it could be a deterioration or an adventure.[33] There is no better example than the nuclear problem: integration here meant, for France, giving up the possibility of having a force of her own, perhaps never even being certain that a united Europe (with no agreement on strategy and diplomacy in sight) would create a common deterrent, at best contributing to a European force which would put Germany in the same position as France; but the French decision to pursue the logic of diversity, while giving her her own force, has also made a European nuclear solution more difficult and increased France's distance from Germany. Moreover, a geographical difference has corroborated the historical one: France had lasting colonial involvements. Not only did they, on the whole, intensify national consciousness; they also contributed to France's ambivalence toward European integration. On the one hand, as indicated above, the worse France's overseas plight became, the more integration was preached as a kind of compensatory mechanism. But, on the other hand, this meant that integration had to be given a "national" rather than a "supranational" color, to be presented as a new career rather than as a common leap; it meant that the French con-

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sistently tried to tie their partners to the prevalence of France's overseas concerns, much against these partners' better judgment; above all, it meant that there was a competition for public attention and for official energies, between the "load" of integration and the burden of the overseas mission. The great power reflex and the colonial legacy combine today in the policy of cooperation with the former imperial possessions, despite its costs: cooperation is presented as a transfiguration of the legacy, and a manifestation of the reflex.[34]

Thus, the national situations have multiplied the effects of differences between the shapes of the various national consciences. But the resistance of the nation-state is not due only to the kind of loan of life that its inevitable entanglement in international affairs and the idle motion left by its past provide even to nations with a low national consciousness. It is due also to the impact of the revival of nationalism in France. Even without de Gaulle the differences analyzed above would have slowed down integration and kept some fire in the nation's stoves. But the personal contribution of de Gaulle to the crisis of integration has been enormous. Not only has he raised questions that were inescapable in the long run, earlier and more pungently than they would have been otherwise, but he has also provided and tried to impose his own answers. His impact is due to his style as well as to his policies. The meaning of de Gaulle has been a change in French policy from ambivalence toward supranational integration to outright hostility; from a reluctance to force one's partners to dispel the ambiguities of "united Europe" to an almost gleeful determination to bring differences out into the open; from a tendency to interpret the national situation as oppressively difficult to a herculean effort at improving all its components in order to push back limits and maximize opportunities. The meaning of de Gaulle has also been a change in the national situations of the others, leading to a sharpening of antagonisms and to a kind of cumulative retreat from integration. Each one of those meanings must be briefly examined.

Insofar as France is concerned, the key is provided by de Gaulle's concept of grandeur.[35] Greatness is a mixture of pride and ambition—the nation shall not at any point leave the control of its destiny to others (which does not mean that he does not acknowledge the existence of irresistible waves with which the ship of state must roll, lest, precisely, it fall in the hands of others who would rush to a predatory rescue or to a plunder of the wreck).

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The nation must try at any point to play as full a role in the world as its means allow. The consequences are clear: First, the kind of supranational integration which would leave decisions on vital issues to majority votes or to executive organs independent of the states is out of the question; even if the interests and policies of France should happen to prevail for a while (as indeed they did as long as the Commission, in its drive for economic integration, remained very close to French ideas), there would be no assurance against a sudden and disastrous reversal. Second, extensive cooperation is not at all ruled out: on the contrary, such cooperation will benefit all participants as long as it corresponds to and enhances mutual interests. Third, however, it is part of the very ambition of grandeur that in such schemes of cooperation which aim not merely at exchanges of *services* but at the definition of common *policies*, France will try to exert her leadership and carry out her views: the degree of French cooperativeness will be measured by the degree of responsiveness of the others.

It is true that the General is an empiricist, and that his analysis of the European situation is to a large extent irrefutable. What could be more sensible than starting from what exists—the nation-states—refusing to act as if what does not yet exist—a united Europe—had already been established, and refusing to forget that each of the European nations is willy-nilly engaged in an international competition that entails a fight for rank and power? But pragmatism is always at the service of ends, explicit or not (the definition of a bad foreign policy could be: that which uses rigid means at the service of explicit ends, as well as that whose flexible means are not serving clearly-thought-out ends). De Gaulle's empiricism is a superb display of skill, but on behalf of a thoroughly non-empirical doctrine. It is obvious that his distrust of supranational integration, which, within Europe, could submit French interests to the dictates of others, and could expose Europe to the dictates of the "hegemonists," while it is perfectly comprehensible as a starting point, nevertheless results in a kind of freezing of integration and perpetuation of the nation-state. If his chief foreign policy objective were the creation of a European entity acting as a world power, his "empirical" *starting point* would be a most unrealistic *method*. But the fact is that such a creation is not his supreme objective, and Europe not his supreme value.

His supreme value remains the nation-state; his supreme political objective is the creation of a world in which the "two hegemonies"

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will have been replaced by a multipolar international system, whose "first floor" would be the numerous nations, endowed with and entitled to political integrity and independence, and whose "second floor" would be inhabited by the nuclear powers, in a role comparable to that of the late European concert. Again, the implications are clear: de Gaulle's doctrine is a "universalist nationalism," that is, he sees France's mission as world-wide, not local and defensive; but this means that Europe is just one corner of the tapestry; Europe is a means, not an end. "Things being what they are," it is better to have separate nation-states (whose margin of freedom is undoubtedly smaller than when the use of force was not so costly, whose capacity to shape history is also undoubtedly limited if their size, population, and resources are mediocre, but whose ability to behave as self-determined actors on the stage is enhanced precisely by the blunting of force and by the opportunities opened to other instruments of power and influence) than it is to have a larger entity, undoubtedly more able to act as a forceful competitor in the world's contests should it be coherent, but more likely to be incoherent, given the divisions of its members and the leverage interested outsiders possess over some of the insiders. The size of the unit is less important than its "cohesion and distinctiveness," for its effectiveness is not merely a function of its material resources: if the unit has no capacity to turn these to action, because of internal cleavages and strains, the only beneficiaries would be its rivals. In a contest with giants, a confident David is better than a disturbed Goliath. This is a choice that reflects a doctrine; the refusal to gamble on European unity goes along with a willingness to gamble on the continuing potency of the French nation-state; the determination to accept only the kind of Europe that would be France writ large[36] corresponds to a conviction that French policies could be made to prevail whether Europe contributes its support or not: "with Europe if they follow, without Europe if they do not," Europe is just a card in a global game. Schumpeter had defined imperialism as an objectless quest; de Gaulle's nationalism is a kind of permanent quest with varying content but never any other cause than itself.

As I suggested above, a nationalist leader is one whose reading of the national situation is likely to be quite different from the reading other leaders would give. De Gaulle's brand of nationalism being what it is—universalist, aimed at overcoming the "two hegemonies," exploiting both of the somewhat contradictory trends that dominate the present world (the conservation of the nation as

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its basic unit, the concentration of what one might call "final power" among the nuclear states)—it is not surprising that he has altogether liquidated a colonial burden that kept France away from every one of the routes he wanted to travel, and replaced it with an ambitious policy of cooperation with the "Third World." In a way, it is true, as some critics have charged, that this policy is a kind of self-consolation prize for the failure of his European policy; but in another sense it conforms deeply to his most vital designs and to his most constant habit of never relying on one line of policy only: In the first place, cooperation manifests France's universal destiny; in the second, it aims at consolidating a system of independent, if cooperating, nations; in the third, it tries to use the prestige thus gained as an elevator to the floor of the "big five," to which access has been denied so far by the "big two." It is clear that the first two missions rule out a concentration on Europe alone, that the second prevents in any case his putting any passion into overcoming the nation-state in Europe, that the third is precisely a substitute for the "elevator" Europe has failed to provide. As a result, all that has made France's historical heritage and geographic position distinctive has been strengthened.

Every great leader has his built-in flaw, since this is a world in which roses have thorns. De Gaulle's is the self-fulfilling prophecy. Distrustful of any Europe but his own, his acts have made Europe anything but his. Here we must turn to the impact of his policy on France's partners. First of all, there is a matter of style: wanting cooperation not integration, de Gaulle has refused to treat the Community organs as Community organs; but, wanting to force his views about cooperation on partners still attached to integration, and attempting to impose his views about a "European Europe" on associates who might have settled for cooperation but only on behalf of another policy, de Gaulle has paradoxically had to try to achieve cooperation for a common policy in a way that smacked of conflict not cooperation, of unilateralism not compromise. Thus we have witnessed not just a retreat from the Monnet method to, say, the kind of intergovernmental cooperation that marks O.E.C.D., but to a kind of grand strategy of nonmilitary conflict, a kind of political cold war of maneuver and "chicken." With compromises wrested by ultimatums, concessions obtained not through package deals but under the threat of boycotts, it is not surprising if even the Commission ended by playing the General's game instead of turning whatever other cheek was left; its spring 1965 agricultural

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plan was as outright a challenge to de Gaulle as de Gaulle's veto of January 1963 had been an affront to the Community spirit. Just as de Gaulle had tried to force Germany to sacrifice her farmers to the idea of a European entity, the Commission tried to call de Gaulle's bluff by forcing him to choose between French farmers' interests and the French national interest in a "European Europe" for agriculture, on the one hand, and his own hostility to supranationality and the French national interest (as seen by him) in the free use of French resources, on the other. Playing his game, the Commission also played into his hands, allowing him to apply the Schelling tactic of "if you do not do what I ask, I will blow up my brains on your new suit," and in the end buying his return at the price of a sacrifice of integration.[37] In other words, he has forced each member to treat the Community no longer as an end in itself; and he has driven even its constituted bodies, which still insist it is that, into bringing grist to his mill.

Second, his impact on his partners is a matter of policy as well. Here we must examine Franco-German relations. As long as he hoped that Germany would follow his guidance and provide the basis for the "European Europe" of his design, his attitude toward West Germany was one of total support of her intransigence toward the Communists. As soon as the increasing clarity of his own policy (half-veiled until the end of the Algerian ordeal and his triumph in the constitutional battle of October-November 1962) provoked German suspicion and reticence, as soon as the U.S., in response to his challenge, consolidated its ties with a still loyal Germany and even promised her substantial rewards for her loyalty, he applied to Germany the shock tactics so effectively used on Britain and the U.S. during World War II: he made his own opening to the East and gradually shifted away from the kind of celebration of a "new Germany" (heir to her greatness in her past but now willing to take her place as France's aide in the new "European Europe"), so characteristic of his German visit in the fall of 1962. He now resorts to carefully worded reminders to the Germans of their past misdeeds, of the risk which their loyalty to the U.S. entails for their reunification, and of the interest France and the Eastern states (including Russia) share in keeping Germany under permanent restrictions. Had Germany been willing to follow France, he would have given priority to the construction of a "half-Europe" that would thereafter have been a magnet (as well as a guarantee of German harmlessness) to the East. Germany's refusal leads him

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to put the gradual emergence of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals"—indeed from the British Isles to the Urals[38]—if not ahead of at least on the same plane as the development of the "European Europe" in the West; for the containment of Germany, no longer assured in a disunited Western Europe of the Six, may still be obtained in a much larger framework. The implications are important. First, there is a considerable change in Germany's national situation. On the one hand, its external component has been transformed. Whereas for more than fifteen years both the U.S. and France carried out tacitly Robert Schuman's recommendation—"never leave Germany to herself"—the Franco-American competition for German support, the Gaullist refusal to tie Germany to France in a federal Europe so to speak for the knot's sake (that is, unless Germany follows France), America's disastrous emulation of the sorcerer's apprentice in titillating Germany's interest in nuclear strategy or weapons-sharing, in the belief, or under the pretext, of anticipating her appetite, all of these factors have contributed to loosen the bonds between Germany and the West: to the European part of the West, because of the slump in integration, and even to the U.S., because of America's failure to follow up after raising in Germany hopes that should not have been raised, but which, once raised and frustrated, are unlikely to fade. On the other hand, and consequently, the domestic component of Germany's national situation has also been affected: Still concerned with security as well as with reunification, but less and less capable of believing that loyalty to their allies will deliver any goods, the German leaders and élites may well come to feel less dependent and less constrained. Of course, objectively, the external constraints remain compelling: a policy of self-assertion may not lead anywhere; an attempt at bypassing the nuclear restrictions of the Paris agreements is not likely to make the East Europeans and the Soviets any more willing to let East Germany go; and the price the Soviets may want to exact for reunification is not likely to increase German security. But the fact that Germany's ties to Western powers are weakening means at least potentially that the capacity to test those constraints by unilateral action may well be used. To be in a cell with a chain around one's ankles and the hope of being liberated by one's jailers is one kind of situation. To be in that cell without such a chain and with such hopes gone is another situation, although the cell has not changed.

In other words, although the impact of de Gaulle on Germany

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so far has not been a rebirth of German nationalism, it has been a transformation of the situation that gives to nationalism some chances—chances if not of external success, given the nature of the cell, then of being at least "tried." The temptation to use one's economic power and potential military might in order to reach one's goals and the example of one's allies competing for accommodation with one's foe are not resistible forever, especially if one's past is full of precedents. To be sure, a nationalist Germany may well find itself as unable to shake the walls or to escape through the bars as Gaullist France is unable to forge the "European Europe." But the paradox of a revisionist France, trying to change the international system to her advantage despite her complete lack of "traditional" grievances (lost territories, military discrimination, and so forth), next to a Germany full of such grievances, yet behaving in fact like a *status quo* power, may not last eternally. Of course, a less aggressively ambitious France might not have prevented Germany from trying to follow her own path one day: the possibility of someone else's imitative *ubris* is no reason for one's own *effacement;* but precisely because the "essence and drama" of nationalism are the meeting with others, the risk of contagion—a risk that is part of de Gaulle's gamble—cannot be discarded.

Thus the nation-state survives, preserved by the formidable autonomy of politics, as manifested in the resilience of political systems, the interaction between separate states and a single international system, the role of leaders who believe both in the primacy of "high politics" over the kind of managerial politics susceptible to functionalism, and in the primacy of the nation, struggling in the world of today, over any new form, whose painful establishment might require one's lasting withdrawal from the pressing and exalting daily contest.

V

This long balance sheet leaves us with two sets of questions: What are the prospects in Western Europe? What generalizations can one draw from the whole experience? As for the prospects, what precedes reads perhaps too much like a post-mortem. Is there no chance for the European Community? Is it condemned to be, at best, a success in the economic realm but a fiasco in "high politics," something like a hydra with one single body but a multitude of heads?

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It would be presumptuous indeed to read hope out of court. One of the decisive elements in the movement's "spillback," de Gaulle's nationalism, may not outlive him. His successors may have a less sweeping vision and may make exactly the opposite gamble from his—that is, prefer the risks of the common enterprise, whose rewards might be high if it works, to the dividends of national action; they could indeed attempt to revive the Monnet concept of Europe, and even to overcome the deficiencies of functionalism by a leap into more genuinely federal institutions. Moreover, whereas de Gaulle has had the backing of a parliamentary majority hostile to supranational integration and has exerted the kind of rule that parties and pressure groups do not affect much anyhow, his successors may depend for domestic support and survival precisely on those parties and pressure groups which had started to weave a transnational fabric. Should this be the case, the "Europe of the Six," instead of being as close as it now is to the traditional model of interstate relations, might move again toward the other ideal-type, that of political community-building, so well described by Ernst Haas, who sees in it the wave of the future.[39]

Whereas in the case of a revival of German nationalism, the propect of failure may not be enough to deter an attempt, here I would maintain that an attempt would not be tantamount to success. In the first place, while nothing (not even the Common Market) is irreversible, no important event leaves the world unmarked, and after the event one can never pick up the pieces as if nothing had happened: this, which is true of the Common Market, is true also of General de Gaulle. It will not be easy to sweep under the rug the curls of dust he has willfully placed in the sunlight; it will not be easy to ignore the kinds of questions he has asked, even if his answers are rejected, precisely because they are the questions any European enterprise would have faced sooner or later. Second, even the passing of his nationalism might not transform the national situations of the European nation-states so deeply that all the cleavages discussed here would suddenly disappear. For, even if all the political leaders of Western Europe had once again the same non-nationalist approach, the differences in the national situations would still lead to divergent definitions of the national interests. In particular, the problem of nuclear weapons control and command in a grouping divided between nuclear "have-nots" and nuclear "haves" may prove to be as intractable, and to raise as much of an obstacle to community-formation among Western Europeans, as in

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the Atlantic alliance. The ideal conditions not merely for the resumption but for the success of a forward march would be a transformation of Germany's external situation and of France's domestic one. If the search for a détente should lead the U.S. to put a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. ahead of its bonds to West Germany, and if it became clear in West Germany, as a result, both that security is neither the most urgent problem nor entirely provided any more by the U.S., and that reunification cannot be obtained from and through the U.S.; if, in addition, such disappointment with the U.S. does not encourage West German leadership to follow a nationalist path, or if an attempt by West Germany to obtain for itself from Moscow what its allies had failed to provide for her should end in frustration, then—at last—West Germany might be willing to accept a foreign policy close to de Gaulle's "European Europe" with its indifference to regimes and ideologies, its repudiation of the cold war outlook, its opening to the East, and its cautious promise of eventual reunification at the cost of border limitations and arms restrictions. In other words, on the German side, what would be required would be a "polycentric," yet non-nationalist, reading of the external situation. This would be likely to happen if at the same time France had given up her nationalist interpretation of "polycentrism," and become again more humble, more willing to trust the Community organs, more in need of adopting European integration as a goal in itself. Such a possibility would exist if, domestically, the impervious stability of de Gaulle's regime were to be replaced not merely with a political system whose Executive would lean on an "integrationist" party majority, but with the kind of instability that both prevents political leaders from acting on the world stage as if they were its managers and pressures them into seeking a European solution, or alibi, for their difficulties. Europe as Germany's least frustrating framework, Europe as the best compensation for France's domestic troubles, a Europe following Monnet's approach toward de Gaulle's objectives:[40] it may appear like a dream; it cannot be dismissed. But whether it has a chance depends essentially on *when* the General's nationalism will pass from the scene, on *what* degree of cooperation among the nations of Western Europe there will be at that time, on *whether* a new attempt by Britain to join the Community would introduce additional complications, on *what* the U.S. policy in Europe will be; the chance depends on the timely convergence of too many variables to be counted on.

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Against such a chance, there is too big a range of obstacles. Here is where the European experience is of general significance.

1. A first set of remarks deals with the conditions which the national situations of the units engaged in an attempt to integrate must meet, lest the attempt be unsuccessful. Those situations ought to be similar; but a generalization of this kind is almost worthless: what matters is the nature of the similarity.

a. Insofar as domestic circumstances are concerned, two conditions are essential. The first one is obvious at first sight, much less so upon reflection: the units must be political communities, not in a substantive sense (common values and goals, *à la* Rousseau) but in a formal one (the existence of intense communications and of common habits and rules across regional differences as well as across the borders of ethnic groups, tribes, or classes);[41] in other words, transnational integration presupposes integration within the units.* These units need not be nation-states, in the sense of com-

* The distinctions I suggest are like marks on a continuum. 1. At one end, there are *cooperative arrangements* whose institutions have no autonomy from the various governments (O.E.C.D., the U.N. in most respects). Such arrangements in turn range from truly cooperative to hegemonial, that is, from representing all the members to asserting the domination and extending the will of one of them. 2. Then there are *entities* which have *central institutions* endowed with some authority, in the sense of legal autonomy from the components and legal power all over the territory of the entity, but which are *not* political communities in the formal sense, because of drastic discontinuities in communications and transactions among the components, or because the cleavages within the entity deprive in fact the central institutions of autonomy or of much effective power (that is, states such as the Congo or certain Latin American states; supranational entities like the E.E.C., and, within the limits of effective military integration, N.A.T.O.) Such entities may be astonishingly resilient if they are states, endowed with international personality and institutions that have a formal monopoly of force or at least a superiority of force over internal challenges; but if these entities are supranational (and especially when they are not merely a way of disguising the hegemony of one of the component members), they are likely to be highly unstable (see below) precisely because the entity's "central" institutions are likely to be constantly challenged by the central institutions of the component states, endowed with external sovereignty as well as with superior force. In other words, supranational entities will tend either to retrogress toward stage 1 or to progress toward stage 3. 3. Next come entities which are *political communities* in the *formal* but not in the substantive sense: that is, their central institutions have autonomy and power, there are common habits, and the rules that come from above are enforced across internal barriers, but the central institutions are not endowed with legitimacy all over the territory, and the habits and rules are not based on common values con-

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munities endowed with external sovereignty under international law; but conversely, if a newly independent state is merely a shell within which there is no community yet, the cleavages that divide the population into separate communities will prove to be a decisive obstacle to trans-state integration: domestic integration is a prerequisite to the kinds of flows of transactions and of ideas which trans-state integration requires and will of necessity be the primary goal of any leader who tries to be more than the representative of the dominant sect, class, tribe, or ethnic group. This explains why, for so many countries of Latin America, Latin American integration remains a chimera, and also why it has been so difficult in Africa and in Asia to move beyond the nation-state: in many cases, the state is there, but not yet the nation.

The second condition concerns the structure of society and of the political system in units that are political communities. The students of integration have rightly stressed the importance of pluralistic social structures and élite groups in the units that try to integrate. But success depends on more than a similarity of such structures: It requires the simultaneous presence in the Executive of leaders who represent those sections of the élites that advocate union and whose power depends on the support of the integrationist élites and groups. To the extent to which many of the new states—those whose capacity to become viable nation-states is most dubious—are single-party states with so-called charismatic (or should one say authoritarian?) leaders, this internal condition for unification is missing.

b. Insofar as external conditions are concerned, what matters is not that the units be in "objectively" similar situations at the time when integration begins and while it proceeds. What matters is "subjective" similarity—a similarity that is not the scholar's assertion, but the policy-maker's conviction. The implication, which is crucial, is that one must examine more than the relation of each unit to the international system at the moment. Even if this relation is

cerning the polity; this is the case of many nation-states, which have "national consciousness" but are not political communities in the last sense. 4. Here I refer to nation-states whose central institutions are altogether autonomous, effectively powerful and legitimate, and whose society has shared values concerning the polity. These are political communities in the *substantive* sense. Needless to say, they are not legion. The difference between stage 3 and stage 4 is largely a difference in the level and scope of consensus. I would reserve the term nation to states in those two stages.

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the same for all the units involved, one must go beyond: One must also determine whether the units come to this moment and place from similar origins and through similar itineraries, whether they are likely to proceed from this moment and place toward similar destinations. "Objective" similarity is disembodied—removed from time and space. The similarity that matters is a similarity in the way in which different statesmen interpret a whole historical and geographical experience and outline the future in the light of this experience. Integration means a common choice of a common future. Success presupposes two sets of conditions, one about the past, one about the present.

As for the past, integration is likely to be more successful when the voyagers' baggage is light. If the units' past international experiences have been long and heavy—long *or* heavy—if the state apparatus has developed over decades and centuries, if the state has, quite simply, enjoyed an autonomous existence on the world scene for a long time, integration will not be easy. Is it an accident if the only successful example of voluntary unification in the modern world is that of the U.S.—the fusion of units that had been colonies, not states, and in which neither the machinery of the state nor traditions of foreign policy had had the time to develop? In a sense, the shedding of overseas commitments by countries such as France and Britain should make their luggage lighter. But, as we have seen in the case of France, the old burdens tend to be replaced by new ties, the old *imperium* leaves lasting concerns, and the old responsibilities do not disappear without leaving a sense of responsibility. Moreover, even if the nations of Western Europe are less weighed down by the past than before, the present remains distracting enough.

The kind of similarity required in the present concerns the relation of the units to the international system. A first question to be asked is the degree of *involvement*. When the similarity in the national situations is one of distance or insulation from the international system, as was the case of the American states and to a large extent the case of Switzerland after the Reformation, concentration on the difficult job of unification becomes possible. A capital obstacle to integration anywhere in the world today is the loss of such distance, the impossibility of such insulation, in the echo chamber of the present international system. This obstacle can, however, occasionally be cancelled. For there is a second question: the degree of "*compellingness*" of the international system; when the national

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situations are similar because of an overwhelming external threat (as was originally the case with the Swiss cantons and the American ex-colonies), unification for survival or security may become an imperative. A compelling threat can make up for different pasts, and impose a common destination, when all divergencies about ultimate destinies have to be subordinated to the preservation of a chance for any destiny at all. One can argue that this was Western Europe's condition in the first ten years after the end of World War II. But the countervailing force was the combination of the different pulls of different pasts, with the different kinds of involvements in the international system: All threatened from the East, the nations of Western Europe nevertheless assessed differently the degree to which this threat superseded every other aspect of international politics. It is not an accident if the nation that deemed the menace entirely compelling was Germany, divided and literally thrown face to face with the threat at the exclusion of almost everything else. It is not an accident if France and Britain, entangled overseas and heirs to Europe's past, never let the threat from the East command their entire foreign policy in the present[42] or assumed that it would inevitably dominate their future. Moreover, Europe today is no longer compelled by the threat: Today's international system is a perverse seducer to diversity. It inflates each national situation, while it removes some of sovereignty's sting. In a way, the relative impotence of force, the postponement of the minute of truth, should reduce the significance of all differences in national situations: The mighty cannot use all the muscles they flex; the weakly can safely boast of more muscle strength than they have. But, in another way, since this is still a competitive system of fragmented states, Rousseau's iron logic applies: Each state tries to exploit whatever margin of difference it has; each state, even when its objective position in the world is not so different from its neighbor's, stresses the marginal differences above the similarities; and, since it ultimately matters much less than before, the incentive to unification in order to "pull more weight" is slim. The changes in the nature of usable power, in the relation between the uses and the achievements of power, give even to the weakest unit one asset in the contest—the power of its mere existence. The breakdown of the two polar camps, the kind of weightlessness with which restrictions on force endow the actors in the new international system, encourage the proliferation of different visions of the future or the tendency to live in the hazards and chances of a fascinatingly diverse present rather than planning

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too much for an inscrutable future. The rational observer, outside the contest, can preach that precisely because the stakes of the contest are more symbolic than real—barring a holocaust that would equalize through annihilation—nation-states ought to be willing to unite even at the cost of transferring for a while their energy from the intoxicating but disappointing stage of world politics to the real job of community-building; for the outcome would be the appearance of a new actor whose power, by contrast with that of each old component, could really be sufficient to make a difference. But the logic of competition operates exactly the other way; it conforms to the French proverb: one thing possessed is worth more than two things promised. In the immediate postwar system, European nations seemed obliged to choose only between separate insecurity and the Atlantic shelter. The "halfway house" of Western Europe got started, but did not progress far enough before the advent of the era in which the temptation of separateness started to smile again, and the reward for separateness was a seat in the U.N.

It is the dialectic of fragmentation and unity (a single international system, whose members may well be kicking and screaming but have an interest in the avoidance of excess violence, that is, in behaving less asocially than before) which gives to the drama of Europe so much of its pathos. On the one hand, in a "finished world" dominated by giants, in a crowded world singularly resistant to the sweep of anyone's universal mission, there is something absurb and pathetic in the tenacious persistence of separate European national wills. On the other hand, it is precisely because most of the differences between them have taken refuge in the realm of foreign affairs that integration is so difficult, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that international politics today is more a stage on which one can parade than a battlefield that seals one's fate.

2. A second set of remarks concerns the meaning of integration. It has become possible for scholars to argue both that integration is proceeding and that the nation-state is more than ever the basic unit, without contradicting each other, for recent definitions of integration "beyond the nation-state" point not toward the emergence of a new kind of political community, but merely toward an "obscur[ing of] the boundaries between the system of international organizations and the environment provided by member states."[43] There are two important implications.

a. The first one is, not so paradoxically, a vindication of the

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nation-state as the basic unit. So far, anything that is "beyond" is "less": that is, there are cooperative arrangements with a varying degree of autonomy, power, and legitimacy, but there has been no transfer of allegiance toward their institutions, and their authority remains limited, conditional, dependent, and reversible. There is more than a kernel of truth in the Federalist critique of functional integration: functionalism tends to become, at best, like a spiral that coils ad infinitum. So far, the "transferring [of] exclusive expectations of benefits from the nation-state to some larger entity"[44] leaves the nation-state both as the main focus of expectations, and as the initiator, pace-setter, supervisor, and often destroyer of the larger entity: for in the international arena the state is still the highest possessor of power, and while not every state is a political community there is as yet no political community more inclusive than the state.[45] To be sure, the military function of the nation-state is in crisis; but, insofar as the whole world is "permeable" to nuclear weapons, any new type of unit would face the same horror, and, insofar as the prospect of such horror makes war more subdued and conquest less likely, the decline of the state's capacity to defend its citizens is neither total nor sufficient to force the nation-state itself into decline. The resistance of the nation-state is proven not only by the frustrations of functionalism but also by both the promise and the failure of Federalism. On the one hand, Federalism offers a way of going "beyond the nation-state," but it consists in building a new and larger nation-state. The scale is new, not the story, the gauge not the game. Indeed, the Federalist model applies to the "making of Europe" the Rousseauistic scheme for the creation of a nation: it aims at establishing a unit marked by central power and based on the general will of a European people. The Federalists are right in insisting that Western Europe's best chance of being an effective entity would be not to go "beyond the nation-state," but to become a larger nation-state in the process of formation and in the business of world politics: that is, to become a sovereign political community in the formal sense at least. The success of Federalism would be a tribute to the durability of the nation-state; its failure so far is due to the irrelevance of the model. Not only is there no general will of a European people because there is as of now no European people, but the institutions that could gradually (and theoretically) shape the separate nations into one people are not the most likely to do so. For the domestic problems of Europe are matters for technical decisions by civil servants and ministers rather

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than for general wills and assemblies (a general will to prosperity is not very operational). The external problems of Europe are matters for executives and diplomats. As for the common organs set up by the national governments, when they try to act as a European executive and parliament, they are both condemned to operate in the fog maintained around them by the governments and slapped down if they try to dispel the fog and reach the people themselves. In other words, Europe cannot be what some of nations have been: a people that creates its state; nor can it be what some of the oldest states are and many of the new ones aspire to be: a people created by the state. It has to wait until the separate states decide that their peoples are close enough to justify the setting up of a European state whose task will be the welding of the many into one; and we have just examined why such a joint decision has been missing. The very obstacles which make the Federalist model irrelevant to nations too diverse and divided also make all forms of union short of Federalism precarious. Functionalism is too unstable for the task of complete political unification. It may integrate economies, but either the nations will then proceed to a full political merger (which economic integration does not guarantee)—in that case the federal model will be vindicated at the end, the new unit will be a state forging its own people by consent and through the abdication of the previous separate states, but the conditions for success described above will have to be met—or else the national situations will remain too divergent, and functionalism will be merely a way of tying together the preexisting nations in areas deemed of common interest. Between the cooperation of existing nations and the breaking in of a new one there is no stable middle ground. A federation that succeeds becomes a nation; one that fails leads to secession; half-way attempts like supranational functionalism must either snowball or roll back.

b. But the nation-state, preserved as the basic unit, survives transformed. Among the men who see in "national sovereignty" the Nemesis of mankind, those who put their hopes in the development of regional superstates are illogical, those who put their hopes in the establishment of a world state are utopian, those who put their hopes in the growth of functional political communities more inclusive than the nation-state are too optimistic. What has to be understood and studied now—far more than has been done, and certainly far more than this essay was able to do—is, rather than the creation of rival communities, the transformation of "national sov-

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ereignty": it has not been superseded, but to a large extent it has been emptied of its former sting; there is no supershrew, and yet the shrew has been somewhat tamed. The model of the nation-state derived from the international law and relations of the past, when there was a limited number of players on a stage that was less crowded and in which violence was less risky, applies only fitfully to the situation of today. The basic unit, having proliferated, has also become much more heterogeneous; the stage has shrunk, and is occupied by players whose very number forces each one to strut, but its combustibility nevertheless scares them from pushing their luck too hard. The nation-state today is a new wine in old bottles, or in bottles that are sometimes only a mediocre imitation of the old; it is not the same old wine. What must be examined is not just the legal capacity of the sovereign state, but the *de facto* capacity at its disposal: granted the scope of its authority, how much of it can be used, and with what results? There are many ways of going "beyond the nation-state," and some modify the substance without altering the form or creating new forms. To be sure, as long as the old form is there, as long as the nation-state is the supreme authority, there is a danger for peace and for welfare; Gullivers tied by Lilliputians rather than crushed by Titans can wake up and break their ties. But Gullivers tied are not the same as Gullivers untied. Wrestlers who slug it out with fists and knives, prisoners in a chain gang, are all men; yet their freedom of action is not the same. An examination of the international implications of "nation-statehood" today and yesterday is at least as important as the ritual attack on the nation-state.

3. A final remark concerns the future of integration. Prospects of genuine unification would improve if the international system created the conditions and incentives for moving "beyond the nation-state." In a world in which, on the one hand, many more units had succeeded in becoming genuine nations with pluralistic structures, in which, on the other hand, a return to multipolarity had resulted both in greater autonomy for the subsystems and in a resurrection of interstate war (in the form of limited conventional war or even geographically limited nuclear conflicts), the conditions of unification would be met, at least in some parts of the world: a less universal and intense involvement, a more compelling threat, greater internal harmony might allow the nation-state to supersede itself. But even so, the result might simply be the agglomeration of many smaller nation-states into fewer, bigger ones; and there are more

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things in the heaven and earth of possible international futures than in any philosophy of international relations.

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1. See Pierre Renouvin et Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Introduction a l'histoire des relations internationales* (Paris, 1964).

2. In a way, the weaker are the foundations on which the nation rests, the shriller the assertions become.

3. On this point, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), Ch. XIX; and Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* (Paris, 1962), Ch. XI.

4. E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London, 1965), p. 51. Quoted in Pierre Hassner, "Nationalisme et relations internationales," *Revue française de science politique*, Vol. XV, No. 3 (June 1965), pp. 499-528.

5. See Ernst B. Haas' book by this title (Stanford, Calif., 1964).

6. See on this point my essay "Rousseau on War and Peace," in *The State of War* (New York, 1965).

7. P. Hassner, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

8. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 147.

9. A more systematic and exhaustive analysis would have to discriminate rigorously among the various components of the national situation; if the purpose of the analysis is to help one understand the relations between the nation-state and the international system, it would be particularly necessary to assess (1) the degree to which each of these components is an unchangeable given (or a given unchangeable over a long period of time) or on the contrary an element that can be transformed by will and action; (2) the hierarchy of importance and the order of urgency that political élites and decision-makers establish among the components.

10. See Raoul Girardet, "Antour de l'ideologie nationaliste," *Revue française de science politique, op. cit.*, pp. 423-445; and P. Hassner, *op. cit.*, pp. 516-19.

11. As will be stated more explicitly in part V, what matters is not the "objective" difference detected by scholars or outsiders, but the "felt" difference experienced by political élites and decision-makers.

12. See "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," in S. Hoffmann, *et al.*, *In Search of France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

13. *La politique extérieure de la V République* (Paris, 1965), p. 12.

14. *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, Calif., 1958).

15. See my discussion in "The European process of Atlantic cross-purposes,"

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Journal of Common Market Studies (February 1965), pp. 85-101. The very success of internal economic integration raised those external issues far earlier than many expected. (Cf. Britain's application for membership, the problem of external commercial policy.)

16. The latter case is self-evident; the first, less so, since the crisis over E.D.C. was primarily an "intra-European" split, between the French and the Germans over the return of the latter to arms and soldiery. However, there was more to it than this: E.D.C. was accepted mostly by those who thought that Europe could and should not refuse to do what the U.S. had demanded—that is, rearm in order to share the defense of the half-continent with the U.S., and to incite the U.S. to remain its primary defender; E.D.C. was rejected by those who feared that the Defense Community would freeze existing power relationships forever.

17. There was, however, in France, a minority of "resigned ones," like Paul Reynaud.

18. There is an impressive continuity in French efforts to preserve the difference between France's position and Germany's: from the préalables and protocols to E.D.C., to Mendès-France's Brussels proposals, to de Gaulle's opposition to any nuclear role for Germany.

19. France's "intergrationist resisters," like Jean Monnet himself, often chose not to stress the "resistance" aspect of their long-term vision, but nevertheless aimed ultimately at establishing in Western Europe not a junior partner of the U.S. but a "second force" in the West. Mendès-France's political vision never put the nation on top of the hierarchy of values; however, in 1954 (especially in his ill-fated demands for a revision of E.D.C. at the Brussels meeting in August) as well as in 1957 (when he voted against the Common Market), his actual policies did put a priority on national reform over external entanglements.

20. It is no coincidence if E.D.C. was rejected six weeks after the end of the war in Indochina, if the Common Market was signed while war raged in Algeria, if de Gaulle's sharpest attack on the "Monnet method" followed the Evian agreements. The weight of the situation affected and inflected the course of even as nationalist a leader as de Gaulle, between 1958 and 1962. Even he went along with the "Monnet method," however grudgingly, right until the end of the Algerian War. It is not a coincidence either if the French leaders most suspicious of the imprisoning effects of the community of the Six from France were the ones who labored hardest at improving the national situation by removing the colonial burdens (Mendès-France, de Gaulle)—and if those French rulers who followed Monnet and tried to place the pride of a nation with a sharp but wounded patriotic sense in its leadership of a united Europe were the men who failed to improve the national situation overseas (the M.R.P., Mollet). The one French politician who sought both European integration and imperial "disengagement" was Antoine Pinay.

21. Especially by Henry Kissinger in *The Troubled Partnership* (New York, 1965).

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22. One should not forget that the original decisions that led to the French force de frappe were taken before de Gaulle, or that the French opposition to a national deterrent came from men who did not at all object to his argument about the need for Europe as a whole to stop being a client of the U.S., and who thought that, indeed, America's nuclear monopoly in the alliance was obsolete.

23. Hence the rather vague or embarrassed formulas used by Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe with regard to defense in the past two years.

24. The case of Erich Mende's Free Democrats is more complicated.

25. See my previous discussion in "Discord in Community," in F. Wilcox and H. F. Haviland, Jr. (eds.), *The Atlantic Community* (New York, 1963), pp. 3-31; "Europe's Identity Crisis," *Dædalus* (Fall 1964), pp. 1244-97, and the article listed in reference 15.

26. See, for instance, Max Kohnstamm's "The European Tide," in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.), *A New Europe?* (Boston, 1964), pp. 140-73.

27. See K. W. Deutsch, *et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, N. J., 1937).

28. Under authority, I include three distinct notions: autonomy (the capacity to act independently of the governments, and particularly the financial capacity), power (control over acts of others), and legitimacy (being accepted as the "rightful" center of action).

29. Along similar lines, see Francis Rosenstiel, *Le principe de "Supranationalité"* (Paris, 1962).

30. I am using here unpublished studies done under Karl Deutsch, especially by Donald J. Puchala.

31. On this point, see Raymond Aron and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *France Defeats EDC* (New York, 1957).

32. See Rupert Emerson, *op. cit.*, Ch. XIX.

33. England's refusal to join European integration, before 1961, could not fail to increase French reticence, for integration thus meant equality with Germany, and a clear-cut difference between France's position and England's, that is, a reversal of French aspirations and traditions. England has on the whole rejected the "resignation-resistance" dilemma—and as a result, both the aspects of its foreign policy that appeared like resignation to U.S. predominance and the aspects that implied resistance to decline have contributed to the crisis of European integration: for France's veto in January 1963 meant a French refusal to let into Europe a power that had just confirmed its military ties to the U.S., but Britain's previous desire to play a world role and aversion to "fading into Europe" encouraged France's own misgivings about integration.

34. See Alfred Grosser, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV.

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35. For a more detailed analysis of this concept, see my article: "De Gaulle's Memoirs: The Hero as History," *World Politics*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 140-155.

36. Grosser, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113, draws attention to Prime Minister Pompidou's statement: "France is condemned by geography and history to play the role ot Europe."

37. See Thomas Schelling's *Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

38. See de Gaulle's reference to England in his press conference of September 9, 1965.

39. See his essay "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 62-88.

40. As Grosser points out in his book and the presidential election campaign of 1965 confirmed, even the opposition to de Gaulle's foreign policy accepts his notion of a "European Europe" and rejects American "hegemony" (with the exception of a very few men like Reynaud or perhaps Lecanuet). There is disagreement about methods and style rather than on objectives.

41. I find Ernst B. Haas' definition of a political community in his *Uniting of Europe*, p. 5, ("a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority") not very helpful in the case of states marked by severe domestic cleavages; there might be more loyalty to the center than to any other political authority merely because there is no other *political* authority, and yet one would still not be in the presence of anything like an integrated society.

42. Witness France's army strength in Algeria until 1962, and Britain's extra-European troop commitments.

43. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, p. 29.

44. Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration," *International Organization*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 705-737, and p. 710.

45. One could argue that the entity of the Six, insofar as its functional scope is concerned (that is, the realm of welfare, which is certainly a significant part of politics) is a political community in the formal sense. My own analysis of political realities (by contrast with the law of the treaties that established the three communities) is more pessimistic; although I admit that because of the Commission's role the entity of the Six came close to being a political community in the formal sense, recent events have underlined the precariousness of the Commission's autonomy and power.

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